



3 1761 05646120 5

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING RUSSIA

BARON A. HEYKING

39 / 90

XVI, 219 p., pte.

25. -

PROBLEMS
CONFRONTING RUSSIA



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation



Photo by]

[Bassano, Ltd

J. Hysling.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING RUSSIA

AND AFFECTING RUSSO - BRITISH POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC INTERCOURSE

A RETROSPECT & FORECAST /

BY

BARON A. HEYKING

Cand. Jur. utr., Gold Medallist, Ph.D., D.C.L.,
Former Russian Consul-General in London

Author of

"A Practical Guide for Russian Consular Officers and all Persons
having relations with Russia"

"L'Exterritorialité des Souverains, Ministres Publique, Consuls en Orient,
Vaisseaux de Guerre"

"Англія, ея государственный,
общественный и экономическій строй"

("England, her State, Social, and Economic Structure"), etc.


LONDON :

P. S. KING & SON, LTD.

2 & 4 GREAT SMITH STREET, WESTMINSTER

1918

DK
266
H48



TO
MY WIFE

PREFACE

THE present publication comprises fifteen chapters, each of which treats a particular aspect of the problems now confronting Russia and Russo-British political and economic intercourse.

Each chapter is intended to be an independent essay, while together they form a whole which is throughout an appreciation of the evolution of Russia and of the continuation and further development of close friendly relations between the two countries.

Some of the essays have been partly reprinted by the kind permission of the editors of such periodicals as the Russian section of the *Times*, the *Hibbert Journal*, the *Contemporary Review*, the *Asiatic Review*, the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, the *Journal of the United Russia Societies Association*, and the *Russian Quarterly*.

CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	xi
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS OF RUSSIA	1
II. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS	17
III. COSMOPOLITISM <i>v.</i> NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA	30
IV. RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE	36
V. THE DEGENERACY OF THE REVOLUTION	49
VI. BOLSHEVIK POLITICAL ECONOMY	60
VII. PROSPECTS OF REGENERATION	73
VIII. THE BALTIC PROBLEM	84
IX. THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF RUSSIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BRITISH INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES	100
X. THE POTENTIALITIES OF RUSSO-INDIAN TRADE RELATIONS	135
XI. A PLEA FOR RUSSO-BRITISH INTELLECTUAL COALESCENCE	145
XII. THE SUPPRESSION OF VODKA	158
XIII. THE INTERESTS OF POSTERITY	166
XIV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW UPON DUELLING	181
XV. PRO PATRIA: A DEFENCE AGAINST HYPER-CRITICISM	201

INTRODUCTION

THE tragic events which have overcome Russia since the outbreak of the Revolution have taken England by surprise and nonplussed all her forecasts concerning that country. The interests of Great Britain as well as those of Russia have received a severe check by this failure of political foresight, and it was also due to ignorance of the real nature of the Russian people and their political aims that Great Britain committed herself in the past to wrong methods in dealing with Russia. Anglo-Russian relations of older times, dating from 1553, when the adventurous expedition of Willoughby and Chancellor accidentally reached Archangel, and from thence proceeded to Moscow to obtain from Tsar Ivan the Terrible the first charter to be granted to an English trading company, and the subsequent ups and downs of closer or looser political relations between the two countries were guided more by chance than by steady policy. Later on, throughout the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, Anglo-Russian relations were under the influence of a political tension until, as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War, the balance of power in Europe seemed to be disturbed. Then arose the necessity for England to back Russia, and the Anglo-Russian agreement concluded on August 31, 1907, concerning the political affairs of Central Asia was brought about, and an Anglo-Japanese conjointly with a Russo-Japanese Alliance, culminating in the whole-hearted assistance accorded to one

another in the Great War of 1914 up to the advent of the Bolshevik Government in Russia, established a cordial co-operation. However, the last phase of the Russian Revolution, with its repudiation of all treaty and financial obligations, the conclusion of peace with the enemy, and the war waged against the educated classes throughout the world, have nullified the former close friendly relations, even reducing to naught ordinary diplomatic connections.

It must never be lost sight of that the maintenance of close relations between the British and Russian people is of vital importance to Russia as well as to Great Britain. And herein lies the meaning and significance of the desire to draw the bonds of friendship between the British and Russian nations closer together. It is not a mere bubble on the surface of the life of the nation, a passing whim and wish, but, on the contrary, it is a movement deeply rooted and based upon a firm foundation. It is founded alike on the dictates of reason and intelligence as well as on the demands of the heart.

It is also the result of a fundamental change in the character of the British nation, which has perhaps no parallel in its history. A new and better order of things arises in such stocktaking times of great trial, when nations by the force of events part with preconceived ideas, erroneous conceptions of the past and exploded bugbears of old. This refers especially to the impracticable idea of splendid isolation; the false conception of the unsympathetic foreigner as a whole, without making due allowance for the difference between friend and foe; and the ungrounded fear of Russia as a rival and enemy endangering the safety of the British Empire.

If Lord Beaconsfield's antagonism had not prevented Russia from occupying Constantinople, and from reaping the fruits of her victory over the Turks in 1878, the subsequent wars in the Balkan Peninsula, and perhaps even the present world-wide conflagration, might have been prevented. It was mistaken policy to make an enemy of Russia from mistrust of her, which fear afterwards proved to be groundless. Again, it was a mistake from the point of view of British interests to rejoice over the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, for at such a critical time it was fatal for Russia to shake off the rule of the Tsars when all her energies were taxed in favour of the further prosecution of the war. Public opinion was led astray by the generous but not altogether practical longing to see personal freedom and liberty, after English fashion, established in Russia. Such a desire only too often overlooks the fact that other nations cannot be judged by English national standards. English people have not sufficiently realised the nature of the issues involved when a revolution breaks out in a country like Russia, which has not a homogeneous population and is not inspired by common ideals. The rule of the Tsars and the Russian bureaucracy had, to be sure, their great shortcomings, but it had the invaluable advantage of representing a well-defined and well-organised power based upon traditions centuries old. As soon as this power fell away a void was created which was impossible to bridge over. The Russian State edifice was mainly rooted in the theocratic-monarchic idea of Tsardom. In serving the political purposes of temporal power, religion had become atrophied, and when that power was wiped out by the Revolution, religion seemed to lose much of its signification, receiving a set-back from which it can only recover gradually


when it has found a new and more independent position in the State. Bearing these ideas in mind it is easy to understand that the Russian Revolution could only drift into chaos and destruction. The Bolshevik Government, which assumed the heavy responsibility of concluding a treacherous and ignominious peace with the enemy, have tried to excuse their action with the subterfuge that it was forced upon them. Of course it was forced upon them, but not so much by the enemy as by the deplorable methods of the Bolsheviks themselves, who had made resistance impossible by undermining the whole State fabric with their incompetency and systematic disorganisation.

When disaster broke over Russia, English public opinion committed the further error of abandoning itself to utter pessimism, never having fully understood the Russian psychology. An English friend of mine writes: "I fear that much time must elapse before English people forgive Russia." But Russia needs not so much forgiveness as compassion for the calamity that has befallen her, in direct consequence of a revolution which, as already stated, was acclaimed and encouraged in England! Russia—the Russia of established order and authority—was a *bona fide* ally and did not shirk any of her obligations. Did she not send her soldiers to fight side by side with her allies in Greece, Mesopotamia, and other battlefields? Did not Russia save France in the beginning of this war by the invasion of Eastern Prussia at her own terrible cost? The peace which Bolshevism has concluded with the enemy is not the work of the educated classes, which alone have articulate and sound political opinions. Russia's present dismal conditions involve, of course, serious drawbacks, but to all intents and purposes they cannot affect the intrinsic value of Russia as an ally,

as a lucrative field for capitalistic enterprise, as the holder of untold mineral, forest, and agricultural wealth, as a great employer of engineering and similar skilled labour, and as a customer for foreign commodities.

Pessimistic forecasts on Russia are founded upon the witness of a country apparently desperately bent upon suicide—economic, moral, and political. But when thought is brought to bear upon the nature of the driving forces which are now at work in Russia, it will be seen that there is no room for despondency regarding her future, a fair and unprejudiced estimate of the significance of the crisis through which Russia is passing will dispel the present lack of confidence and re-establish a mutual assurance between the two countries. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish, between rule and exception, the normal state of affairs and abnormal temporary conditions. A man's general health cannot be judged at a time when he happens to have contracted German measles, depriving him of his usual efficiency, capacity, and power, reducing him to collapse and helplessness. At present Russia is stricken down by a fever of revolt, an orgy of unrestrained self-will, the conscious negation of law and order. Anarchy, overruling patriotism, piety, and civilisation, is dancing the dance of death, hurling itself against the natural and immutable requirements of life, and is veering ever nearer to the abyss of self-annihilation. But the Phoenix of a regenerated Russia must rise up out of the ashes of this awful catastrophe. The present situation affords ample food for meditation upon past errors, and the best means to be adopted for reconstruction in the future.

Now, therefore, is England's opportunity for making herself thoroughly acquainted with the complex situation



created by the Revolution, to assist in Russia's regeneration, and to save the important and economic British interests involved in that country. When Russia again settles down for productive work there will be a great demand for engineers and other skilled labourers, civil administrators, financial experts, commercial and industrial enterprise. It is, therefore, in the interests of Great Britain to strain every effort to make her influence felt in Russia by active co-operation with Russians.

Problems Confronting Russia

CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS OF RUSSIA

THE idea of Russia current amongst foreigners, especially before the Revolution, was that of a backward country with a torpid population condemned to stagnation. That this is a mistaken conception may easily be proved.

One of the leading features of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—the democratic ideal—has found full expression in Russia, and in this respect Russia may be justly recognised as congenial in essence to the national spirit that governs Great Britain.

To a certain extent the Russia of the past was under the influence of Byzantine principles, Tartar methods of administration and German tutelage, but at the same time she bore throughout features of the democratic ideals of human brotherhood, charity, and love of personal freedom. This can easily be ascertained if one consults Russia's historic past without bias and prejudice. Before the Tartar invasion, which overthrew the whole fabric of Russian social and State institutions, the existing centres of Russian life were the great Republics of Pskoff and Novgorod in the north, and the principality of Kieff in the south. Both were founded and built up on truly constitutional lines.

When Moscow first succeeded in shaking off the Tartar yoke the prince of that town assumed, so to say, automatically the power of the Tartar Khans and modelled his reign

after Tartar rule. To confirm his power still more, he adopted certain Byzantine attributes of statesmanship. Byzantium, from whence Russia has invested herself with the Christian religion, also exercised an influence in clerical hierarchy. Then came the time of the Europeanisation of Russia under such reformers as Peter the Great, Catherine II, and Alexander II. They were dazzled by the civilisation of Western Europe, and instead of reverting to the old traditions of Russian State rule, they thought to secure quicker progress by adopting the forms of West-European culture. As Germany was the neighbouring State it was only too natural that an infiltration of German methods in Russia took place to a certain extent. The "Tabel of Rangach," the Act by which Peter the Great organised the whole State Service, is strongly influenced by German bureaucratic ideas. Thus the Russian State employee, the *Chinovnik* (*Chin* means rank), became in his character a sort of strange cross-breed between the Tartar Collector of Taxes, the *Baskak*, and the German *Regierungsbeamte*. He was considered as a more or less heterogeneous element in Russian life and did not enjoy popularity. Gogol's *Revisor* is a proof of it.

Another feature of Russian democracy is the absence of feudal relics of the past and of plutocracy—this bastard of aristocracy!—which is paving the way to social revolution. Russian democracy manifests itself in a thousand ways; for instance, in Russian literature and art. Can there be anything more democratic than the works of Count Leo Tolstoy, Gorky, and many other Russian writers, or the art of Verestchagin? It is most characteristic that Englishmen who have lived for many years in Russia and know Russian life well, often maintain that more personal freedom is enjoyed in Russia than in England.

This, however, refers to the social side of Russian life. In public life and as regards a constitutional system Russia is, of course, not yet the equal of Great Britain—the world's model of public life. Nevertheless, the progress of constitutional freedom was more pronounced when the Duma was

first called into being than when freedom made its appearance in England. The promulgation of the Russian constitutional Magna Charta gave to the Empire a franchise which was framed on much more democratic lines than that which England obtained when her barons wrested the Magna Charta from their sovereign. Moreover, the work of the town Dumas, the Zemstvos (county councils), and the Volostnia Oupravlenia (district councils) bears witness to the spirit of self-government which animated Russian public life and may be compared with analogous institutions of self-government in Great Britain.

There is no use in speaking of barbarism, where barbarism does not exist, as there is also no use in assuming that the specific individuality of a civilised nation has not the right of existence. Amongst civilised nations there must necessarily be differences in the mode of life, qualitatively, without necessarily entailing a quantitative gradation in the degree of culture. There are many different forms of culture, all of which have the right to exist in accordance with differences of climate and race, based on broad-mindedness, tolerance, and justice, and avoiding a narrow-minded tendency to reduce the beautiful diversity in the life of nations to one universal pattern of culture.

It is a truism that Russia, in comparison with Great Britain, is backward in education, means of communication, industry, and enterprise, but at any rate and to all intents and purposes the Russian nation can vindicate for itself a deep-rooted spirit of Christian love and forbearance, a true democratic conception of social life, and a firm will to progress in the evolution of human existence. A nation endowed with such ideals can truly be called a cultured nation. After having been estranged from European civilisation for nearly two hundred years (from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century) by the vile Tartar yoke, after having passed through a not altogether pleasant Kindergarten period of German pedantic schooling, after having, during the present war, been sorely tried by the invasion of an implacable enemy, Russia has become more and more alive to her true

destination in the world, viz. to assure to Christian ideals their highest possible realisation in life. Her task in fulfilling that destination is greatly facilitated by the fact that sympathy is the most predominant feature of the soul of the nation. It is precisely sympathy which is the primary root of all ethics of Christian morality, and of that which is good in human nature.

Another side of human existence which contains the means of measuring culture as a higher modus of life is the influence and position of women in the social fabric. The position of women in human society has always been the touchstone of culture and civilisation. The women in Russia have not struggled so much for their own special interests as has been the case in Great Britain, engendering amongst a certain class a hostility to the opposite sex. They have thought it more important for the progress of the country to assist the men in practical political and social work, and in so doing they have proved, more than any feminist agitation for women's rights could do, that they possess sufficient energy, capacity for work, spirit of self-denial, acumen and interest for the public weal to make them desirable helpmates in all walks of life and also in politics and State administration. This refers to nearly all classes of the population of Russia. In the peasantry, women, in the absence of men, who often go away for the whole summer or winter to find lucrative work in other districts and in towns, not only do hard physical work—they plough, furrow, harrow, and sow—but they deliberate at the village moots (*Skhody*), pass resolutions, and do all the administrative work like men.

In the educated classes Russian women are even more proficient. Their thirst of knowledge and their industry in acquiring learning and science is especially noteworthy. All University towns possess women's university colleges, and in the Tomsk University women are allowed to take medical degrees. They practise as physicians. There are schools for trained women as architects, chemists, electricians, and so forth. They do the important work of agricultural

instructors after having been qualified as agricultural experts. Under the Zemstvos and municipal councils they excel in important administrative work and in the supervision of hospitals. In family and society they exercise an influence and occupy a position which is often equal, if not superior, to that of the men. This is not so much due to feminine social prerogatives as to their character, will-power, perfect temperance, and understanding of the practical requirements of life, in which they often surpass the men.

In the whole Russian literature the steadfast character of the women forms a predominant feature. Whether it be Pushkin, Ostrovski, Turgenieff, Tolstoy, Dostoievsky, or Tchehoff, their women characters, taken from life, are always prominent. Remember the proud Lisa in comparison with the characterless Evgeni Onegin, Anna Karenina, and the heroines of Turgenieff's novels—they all tell the tale of the superiority of Russian women's character.

Broadly speaking, the foundation of contemporary Russia is the work of Peter the Great, but even his genius must have failed to create a social structure so lasting and so capable of further development had not the material at his command been equal to his great task. Let us characterise the founder and his material, the Russian nation, in a few words.

Peter the Great has often been accused of not being sufficiently national in his reforms. Of course he believed in Western European methods. He travelled widely, for the purpose of self-instruction, and also spent some time in England in order to acquaint himself with English life and methods. But none the less his personality and his whole life bear the characteristic features of *Russian* individuality. His aims were broad in the extreme, one might almost say immeasurable; his principles of action radical in the highest possible degree. He devoted himself to the task set before him with passionate self-renunciation, unreservedly serving his country with all the power at his command, even to the extent of passing a death sentence on his only son, who had dared to endanger his life-work

by plotting with the reactionary party against him. At the same time this all-powerful autocrat was as unsophisticated and simple in his behaviour towards all with whom he came into contact as Russians generally are.

From his own point of view Peter the Great was certainly right to revert to Western European methods of State organisation. He realised that the only way by which Russia could secure herself against European aggression was by applying European methods. When the Japanese ports, as the result of a quarrel with England, had been bombarded by British men-of-war, the Japanese nation realised that the European foe could only be held back by opposing him with their own weapons. That was the commencement of the European reforms of Japan and of her world-power. In the same way, when Northern Russia was invaded by the armies of Charles XII of Sweden, and the untrained warriors of Peter the Great had been badly beaten at Narva, Peter had only one course open to him, namely, to reorganise his army on European lines, to supply them with the same up-to-date weapons, and use the same methods of warfare as those to which Charles owed his victory. That was the beginning of Russia's world-power. By the Battle of Poltava Russia was saved from Swedish supremacy. If Peter the Great had not had the foresight to reform the Russian army in this way, the north of Russia would undoubtedly have fallen a prey to Sweden. His reforms, therefore, must be regarded as constituting the right procedure for ensuring to Russia the position she occupied prior to the overthrow of Tsardom.

Peter the Great has also been criticised for his uncompromising attitude towards any elements in Russia which opposed him. But his true greatness manifested itself in his undeterred steadfastness, and his clear perception of the impossibility of carrying out his great reforms if hampered by the retrograde members of his antiquated Council of Boyars and the hitherto unchecked, conservative power of the clergy.

The material upon which he had to work—the Russian

nation—consists at present of people two-thirds of whom speak the Russian language and belong to the Greek Orthodox faith or to religious sects akin to it, the remaining third being composed of various other races. The Great Russians, who are the centre and kernel around which the Empire crystallised, are Slavs. In appearance they are tall and of powerful build, with regular features, fair complexions, and blue eyes. The type is best preserved in some parts of the previously free State of Novgorod and in the forest regions of the north, while in the centre and east of Russia the population has somewhat changed its original type by the assimilation of Finnish-Mongolian tribes, with pronounced cheek-bones, round noses, and irregular facial contours. The Little Russian, in the south of Russia, possesses all the features of the Southern races, being dark, vivacious, endowed with a rich imagination, and devoted to music and poetry.

The language of the Great and Little Russians is sonorous. It is rich in vocabulary and inflexions of the verb, and presents one of the most perfect mediums for expressing the deepest thoughts and the most subtle emotions of the soul. It is very adaptable to the description of all the varied circumstances of life. It is the surest guarantee of the future of the Russian nation, being in itself a monument of greatness and of intellectual wealth and strength. I have met Englishmen in Russia who, without having lost touch with their English nationality, had become quite enthusiastic about the beauty of the Russian language. It is probably also due to this superiority of the language that among the leading theorists of Slavophilism and Panslavism in Russia, not only Russian, but also German names are found, such as Müller, Freygang, Hilferding, Ostaken, Dahl, Grot, and others. The genius of such literary giants as Pushkin, Lermontoff, Gogol, Alexis and Leo Tolstoy, Turgenieff, Dostoievsky, and others would have been of little effect had they not had at their command the Russian language, in which the Russian soul has found its most perfect expression.

Contemporary Russia has been "gathered," as it is put in historic Russian language, first of all by the Great Russians.

The foundation of this great Empire was the result of the energy, valour, and strong-headed statesmanship of the Muscovite Tsars, who in a series of victorious wars overcame the Tartars, the Poles, the Livonian Order, the Swedes, the Northern Russian Republics of Pskoff and Novgorod, and the rebellious Little Russians, and succeeded everywhere in establishing their rule. In addition, a series of enterprising private individuals like Yermak, the conqueror of Siberia, helped to increase the territory of the Empire, rendering for Russia similar services to those rendered to England by Raleigh, Francis Drake, Cook, and many others. Thus the Great Russians have been the founders, augmenters, and preservers of the Empire. But none the less it cannot be overlooked that the Little Russians and the rest of Russia's population which belong to other races, as, for instance, the Poles, the Lithuanians, the Baltic stock of Teutonic descent, the Finlanders, the Letts, the Esthonians, the Caucasians, and the different tribes inhabiting the south-east and the east of the Empire, have also had a certain share in that achievement. Of course, half-civilized races such as the Samoyeds, Kalmuks, Kirghiz, Yakuts, Kamtchadale, and so on, could not possibly have exercised any influence on Russian history. On the other hand, people who were, at the time of their conquest by Russia, more advanced in civilisation than the Great Russians themselves were bound to affect the destinies of the Empire.

By the law of the Empire the population was divided into four groups or classes—the Clergy, the Nobility, the Burghers, and the Peasants. Their several functions in the State and in the social fabric of the nation differed considerably. Religion and Church have always been of paramount importance in Russia. The Russian is by nature religious; he likes his whole life to be in constant touch with religious practices, and he attaches great importance to Church

ceremonies. He strictly observes religious holidays, and is a conscientious churchgoer. He keeps fast-days, worships before the ikons with which every home is adorned, and frequently makes the sign of the Cross. Religion has, up to the present, played a very important part in the life of the nation, and has acquired a more national significance than in any other European country.

The national position of the Orthodox Church in Russia has been determined by the particular course of historic events. Although the Christian faith was introduced into Russia from Byzantium, and, moreover, the High, or so-called "Black," clergy in Russia belonged during the ninth and tenth centuries for the most part to the Greek nationality, the Greek Orthodox Church soon acquired a Russian national character. The Apostles of the Slavs, Cyril and Methodius, translated the Greek liturgical books into the Slavonic language, and thus gave to the Russian Orthodox Church its own national service. When in 1453 Constantinople was conquered by the Turks, the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church from her previous religious metropolis became assured.

At the head of the Russian Church stood the Patriarch of Moscow, who occupied a position independent of State rule. Peter the Great considered it necessary for the centralisation of power to abolish the Patriarchate and replace it by the Holy Synod, which was composed of the high dignitaries of the Church appointed by the Tsar, and one representative of the lay element, the Supreme Procurator of the Holy Synod, whose duty it is to watch the interests of the State. The resolutions of the Synod required to be sanctioned by the Tsar, and as the Synod controls all the administration of the Church, including its financial affairs, the Tsar became its all-powerful guardian. He did not care to interfere in questions of religious dogma, which were left to be settled by the Tserkovni Sobor (the Church Council); but in other respects Peter the Great made the Church an instrument of the State, and himself and the State instruments of the Church. This form of

State government cannot be called "Cæsaro-Papacy," as it is sometimes erroneously styled ; but at any rate it was a national State institution serving religious and political purposes.

The father and predecessor of Peter the Great, Tsar Alexis Michaelovitch, commanded the Patriarch Nikon to correct mistakes in the translation of the Holy Books. Nikon's corrections, which were by no means a reform, but were only meant to be an improvement of the texts which had been transcribed, with many mistakes, by ignorant monks, brought about a religious schism, by which those who refused to accept the corrections of Nikon broke away and formed a separate body called the "Old Believers." These Old Believers had to endure many hardships until the year 1905, when they were recognised by the Russian Government. However, the Orthodox Church had up to the Revolution still many prerogatives, for instance, that of religious propaganda, while all other denominations were forbidden to proselytise.

The religious mind of the Russian people has also found expression in numerous religious sects, of which many bear distinct traces of higher spiritual conceptions and purer ethical principles.

The veneration of the numerous saints is another feature of the same order. Lectures describing their pious life, charity, Christian forbearance, and confidence in God, form a most popular pastime among the peasants at village social gatherings.

Up to the time of Peter the Great, the clergy were the chief representatives of national culture. When the House of Rurik, the founder of the Empire, had died out, the nation turned to Philaret, Patriarch of Moscow, asking him to crown his son, Michael Romanoff, Tsar of Russia.

Peter the Great, as already stated, revised the position of the clergy in the State and gave precedence to the nobility.

It fell to the lot of the Russian nobility to become the chief factor of progress, of learning, and of intellectual

development in Russia. They were able to fulfil this mission because they were not a caste or class, but an estate or group which constantly recruited itself from the various strata of the population, and stood in the closest connexion with it. The old feudal idea of nobility, derived from the possession of land, had been abolished by the Tartar yoke. Later on, the surviving remnants of the old Boyars were suppressed through the drastic measures of Ivan the Terrible and his successors. Peter the Great encountered no difficulty in establishing a new nobility founded on the idea of State service. On the other hand, only members of old noble families were admitted to it. Catherine the Great rescinded that condition, but still the State service remained in practice accessible only to noblemen, and in addition they had the privilege of possessing serfs.

Thanks to the liberal reforms of Alexander II, these restrictions were abolished. Henceforth Government service was open to every one. The right to become a hereditary nobleman was acquired by all who had reached the rank of actual State Councillors, Lieutenant-Generals, or Vice-Admirals, or those who had received the Order of St. Vladimir. These distinctions were earned by a great number of persons, and this put the qualification for nobility on a very broad basis. By the abolition of serfdom the democratisation of the principle of aristocracy was carried a step further, seeing that the nobility lost that privilege which was tantamount to the right of owning land, as land without serfs had no value.

Since 1861 the Russian nobility have sold the greater part of their land, chiefly to peasants, descendants of serfs; and being no longer in possession of land they have become a group of State employees, people engaged in liberal professions, representatives of provincial self-government, and so forth. This virtual revolution has brought about a closer connection between the nobility and the rest of the population, facilitated by the absence of titles and by the custom of addressing noblemen by their surnames and patronymics just like anybody else. Moreover, marriages

took place between members of the nobility and other groups of the population without any suggestion of *mésalliance*.

It is true that Russia has also a titled nobility, but this does not take precedence in any way over the untitled nobility, except in the case of members of the Imperial House before the Revolution. The numerous princes were the offspring of the feudal Rurik princes, or were descended from Tartar or Caucasian princes. Representatives of other titled classes—counts, barons, *vons*, etc.—held their lineage for the most part from conquered provinces, as, for instance, Poland, the Baltic provinces, or Finland. But as a title in Russia is not necessarily connected with wealth or political influence, it is of little practical value. Socially, noble lineage is less thought of in Russia than in any other European country. Moreover, plutocratic tendencies and the power exercised by the possession of wealth play in Russia a comparatively small part. Clever and gifted men, of whatever origin, can rise to the highest honours and position. For instance, Admiral Makaroff, General Kuropatkin, and many other persons in positions of trust were of peasant origin.

With few exceptions, as, for instance, in the case of the founder of modern Russian literature, Lomonossoff (1711–1765), who was the son of a peasant, the chief poets, artists, literary and learned men, all belonged to the nobility. Zhukovsky, Pushkin, Lermontoff, Gogol, Turgenieff, Dostoievsky, and Tolstoy came from the land-owning nobility. This gives some idea of the important part which the Russian nobility have played in the intellectual development of the nation. It can be asserted that in Russia before the Revolution, roughly speaking, almost any one of importance belonged to the nobility, but that, on the other hand, there was no insurmountable obstacle to any one becoming a nobleman.

It is apparent, therefore, that in their inception and position the Russian nobility differ absolutely from the plutocratic aristocracy of Great Britain. Russia has no nobility in the English sense of the word. There is no

room and no necessity for it in Russia. Her nobility occupied the position, and has the character and importance, of the gentry or upper middle class in England. This difference bore out the democratic character of the Russian Empire, which may be described before the Revolution as a democracy furnished with a bureaucracy administered by a supreme autocratic power.

The third group, the burghers, *meshtchanie*, is not very well defined at the present time, as the greater part of the nobility have, as mentioned above, taken up their residence in the towns, the population of which is also mixed with a large number of peasants who have left the land in order to gain a livelihood elsewhere. The *meshtchanie* were composed originally of the merchant and artisan class. The merchants were intended by Peter the Great to form a close corporation, but later on various laws interfered with these limitations, with the result that from a practical point of view there seems at present no intrinsic necessity for a special group of burghers.

On the other hand, the fourth group, the peasants, form up to the present a well-defined separate body, endowed with special privileges and obeying special regulations. This group is the real mainstay of Russia, as Russia, broadly speaking, is a peasant State. Up to 1861 the peasants were serfs in the sense of being *glebæ adscripti*—that is to say, they were bound to remain at their place of abode, and belonged to the proprietors of the land. Broadly speaking, serfdom was a patriarchal form of social structure; the brutality which naturally resulted from the system was in very many cases mitigated by the practical interest which kindly landlords took in the welfare of their serfs, by the common religion and race of both, and by the naturally gentle and forbearing nature of the Russian. But, of course, this deplorable system led to abuses, and to a state of dependence bordering on slavery. It condemned the greater part of the population of Russia to a state of perpetual stagnation and an utter lack of personal freedom. Agriculture was carried on by old and inefficient methods. A part of the

land was used in common, and belonged to the peasant community as a whole—the *mir*. According to the changes in the number of "souls," this land was constantly subdivided by the community under the direct control of the landlord, who had the right to demand a certain amount of work to be done by the peasants on his own estate in return for their allotment. When serfdom and the right of the landlord to the labour of the peasants was abolished by Alexander II in 1861, the common land remained at the disposal of the latter, and the landlord received from the State, as compensation for the loss of their labour, money certificates bearing percentages, and subject to redemption. The State in its turn imposed upon the village communities as a whole a tax, arranging for the payment of the percentage to the landlord and the gradual redemption of the money certificate. These certificates have now all been redeemed.

The peasant community, the *mir*, had to fix the amount to be paid by each person. It had the power to exact penalties from those who did not pay their quota at the right time, and even possessed the right to administer corporal punishment or to exile to Siberia any persons so condemned. To a great extent the *mir* thus took over the rights previously exercised by the landlords, and the peasants found themselves economically in a state of even greater dependence than before the abolition of serfdom. The harshness of this system was the direct result of the above-mentioned principle that the village community as a whole was responsible for the payment of the taxes. This system, the *krugovaia porouka*, meant practically that the industrious, sober, and worthy peasant had to pay for the lazy, drunken, and worthless one. Socialistic cranks tried to find in the *krugovaia porouka* a cure for all social evils. The *mir* system was praised as a panacea and an ideal arrangement for counteracting all the ills that exist, owing to the difference between those who have and those who have not. Unfortunately, in practice the advantages of the *mir* and of the *krugovaia porouka* proved to be illusory.

The common ownership of the land involved a constant new partition of it, and made it impossible to improve the methods of cultivation.

The abolition of serfdom achieved only personal freedom ; it did not at all provide for economic prosperity and progress. The great economic advantages and moral value of personal ownership of the land had been totally left out of account by the reforms of 1861. The reformers did not wish to depart from the old principle that the ownership of land was assured to each individual through its common ownership by the village as a whole. But the constant increase of the population was necessarily followed by a correspondingly decrease of the area which could be allotted to each person. In many parts of the country these allotments became too small to maintain a family. The happy (or rather unhappy) possessors of such allotments had therefore to look out for a living in the towns, in industrial works, and so forth, and derived no real benefit from the theoretically glorious fact that he was a member of the *mir* and, as such, a landowner.

On the other hand, the primitive methods of agricultural cultivation diminished increasingly the productivity of the soil. The average production of corn on one acre of peasant land in Russia in the years 1899-1906 did not exceed 670 kilogrammes, while in Western Europe such a piece of land would yield three times this amount. Lack of rational cultivation of the land also produced harvest failures, which repeated themselves with increasing frequency, for instance, in the years 1891, 1897, 1898, 1901, 1906, 1907, and 1908. But more than any other consideration, the agrarian upheavals which followed the disasters of the Japanese War made it apparent to Russian statesmen that fundamental agricultural reforms were badly needed.

It was the Prime Minister Stolypin who had the courage to break with the old methods of the *mir*, advising the Tsar to promulgate an Imperial Order on March 17, 1906, by which every village community received the right to decide by a majority of two-thirds whether they wanted

to convert the common ownership of the land into freehold property, to be divided amongst the peasants of the village. This left it entirely to the peasants themselves to decide for or against private ownership. The advantages of private ownership, for the purpose of improving land culture and creating more energetic individual exertions from a sense of personal pride, are so evident that common ownership of the land in Russia is now gradually disappearing in favour of the former system. The consequence of this momentous reform will be to ensure to the peasant community—comprising some 80 per cent. of the population of Russia—a secure prosperity in the future. The Revolution has, of course, temporarily interrupted the course of this economic progress.

Taking the Russian nation as a whole, it appears that the principal feature of the evolution of its state and social organisation lies in the broadmindedness and progressiveness of the nation, and in its insistent struggle in the past to regain its ancient political freedom which was lost under the Tartar rule. Having thus reviewed the chief characteristics of the organisation of the Empire in the past, we may consider the last stage of the evolution of Russia brought about by the Revolution.

CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS

HISTORY teaches that great reforms or energetic movements in favour of progress, as, for instance, revolutions of a progressive nature, are often the direct result of international cataclysms. In Russia, the Crimean War brought in its train, in later years, the period of the great progressive reforms of Alexander II. The war with Japan was followed by the October constitutional reforms. The Great War of 1914 brought about the Revolution.

It is with some reluctance that a student of public law has to recognise the quasi-legal aspect of revolution. No one acquainted with history can deny, however, that such an aspect exists, and that it must be taken into practical consideration. The English Revolution of 1688 gave birth to the Declaration of Rights, which, up to the present, forms the corner-stone of the English constitution, while the great French Revolution was the parent of the principles of freedom, equality before law, and brotherhood amongst the citizens of a State, which constitute part of the laws and the public order of modern civilised communities.

De facto, if not *de jure*, revolutions are creators of State rule and law, and as such must be recognised as legal, not in the ordinary sense of the word, but in a broader meaning, taking into account the manifestations of the will of the nation, outside the frame of the existing State constitution.

Herzen, a Russian revolutionary writer of the last century, said that the government of Russia was despotic, mitigated accidentally by the murder of the head of this form of government. This statement can be enlarged upon by

considering any form of government as constantly subject to alterations and improvements by violent acts generated in a sphere outside the existing State constitution. When in critical times the temper of a nation reaches the pitch of impatience, which the ordinary means of progress provided by the State can no longer satisfy, a spontaneous eruption becomes inevitable.

Revolution must, therefore, be recognised as a factor which in itself is constantly present, but only appears actively under certain conditions, in the same way as a latent fever only breaks out when the body grows weak, and cannot perform its organic duties satisfactorily.

Of course no one would care to advocate the cause of revolution as a principle. It is an *ultima ratio*—an extreme course, which attains its ends, but often leads to excesses and also brings in its train severe hardships for the individual, loss of property, and even death. But such paroxysms of the people's power cannot be measured by the sufferings of the individual, but must be rightly considered from the point of view of the public weal.

It is fatal for any ruler of a State to get out of touch with the temper of the nation over which he rules, and it is doubly so if this happens at a time of great national calamity, such, for instance, as a war which endangers the safety and existence of the State. Already, in 1905, at the time of the Japanese War, the temper of the Russian nation made itself felt and demonstrated a strong disapproval of its rulers. The Japanese War, as is known by every one, was an unnecessary war, provoked by a clique of courtiers who hoped to profit by it. The nation from the very beginning did not understand it, and when disaster was the result, a great wave of discontent passed over the whole country. It was a bitter trial for a nation of such vast proportions and such great resources to be beaten by a small country like Japan, and it became apparent to every one that incapacity, disorganisation, and corruption were responsible for it. But when the supreme effort for victory was made, and half a million Russian soldiers, well fitted

and equipped and ready to fight, stood before the enemy, the Government lost its nerve and concluded a humiliating peace for fear of revolution. But the pusillanimity of the Government did not save it from what it feared. On the contrary, this was one of the causes of the revolutionary upheaval which took place immediately after peace was declared. The uprising was stifled, but it showed that discontent had spread nearly all over Russia, and that part of the military were in sympathy with the outbreak. The entire social structure seemed threatened by the agrarian revolts which shook the Empire to its foundations. It was a severe lesson, and one would have thought that it would have profited the rulers of the Empire. As it was, the Government—compelled by the force of events—introduced a constitution, and laid down the fundamental principles of civic freedom, but in so doing it was not really sincere. Since the creation of the Duma, and of the principles which promised civic liberty, the Government has tried in a hundred ways to minimise and rescind the rights which were then given. By the Act of June 16, 1907, the suffrage was considerably narrowed down, and part of the legislative rights which had been promised to the people were withdrawn.

There is nothing more dangerous than to grant political rights, and afterwards to withdraw them. The policy of reaction which followed the constitutional reforms after the Japanese War was bound to exasperate the people, who were craving for freedom.

When the war of 1914 broke out, and Russia, faithful to her Slavophil traditions, had to come to the rescue of Serbia, the nation hoped that the Government had been taught by the disastrous experiences of the Japanese War, and that the war with the Central Powers—which from the beginning was very popular in Russia—would find the Empire well prepared for the eventuality which had been in the consciousness of the nation for many years. However, it turned out that, apart from some reorganisation of the military, Russia, in 1914, was no better prepared for war than when the Japanese War broke out. When thousands

and thousands of soldiers had been armed with simple sticks instead of rifles, and a miserable shortage of ammunition prevented Russia from opposing the German invasion, there could only be one opinion, namely, that the Government was hopelessly at fault, and should be taken to task as soon as the war was over. The Revolution would have broken out sooner if it had not been for the pressing on of the enemy, and the necessity for avoiding anything that could weaken the power of resistance.

That the Revolution has come before the end of the war was rather in the nature of an accident, and has only indirectly a bearing on the causes which brought it about. It was the unsatisfactory distribution of food, the hunger of the masses, who could not pay the enormous prices entailed by the shortage of the available stocks, and it was nothing short of madness for the ministers of the Cabinet to refuse the co-operation of the Zemstvos in the distribution of food. Only when the first shots were heard in the streets of Petrograd did the Government announce that the organisation of food supplies would be handed over to the local bodies. That death-bed repentance came too late. The reason why Mr. Protopopoff, the Minister of the Interior, declined the offer of the Zemstvos is not quite clear. Probably it was simply due to fear that the importance of the bureaucracy would be minimised by the co-operation of members of representative institutions.

✓ The rule of the bureaucracy has of old been a sore point in Russia. There has always been an abyss between the nation and the bureaucracy. They have never understood one another. The bureaucracy ruled the nation in a spirit which the latter could not understand, and even hated. This antagonism was patent to every one, and formed a constant danger which might at any moment lead to a violent outburst of national discontent.

Bureaucracy is a form of government which, of course, is odious to any one who believes in the virtue of self-government and in the principle of the election of the rulers of the State and their responsibility to the nation. But in

Russia, bureaucracy proved especially objectionable, as it was conducted on entirely unsound lines. In old bureaucratic Russia there existed a method of appointment to high administrative positions *na kormlenie*—namely, for the personal benefit of the person appointed. Instead of a fixed salary the person received a “province,” or part of the administration, with the idea that he would pay himself by squeezing from the people dependent upon him whatever he could. This kind of remuneration, which is reminiscent of the way the Proconsuls of ancient Rome treated subjected provinces, engrained itself in the morals of the Russian bureaucratic system down to the smallest *Tchinovnik*. It has been abolished long ago. None the less it lingered in the consciousness of the bureaucratic class and formed the *point de départ* for the abuses known as *vsiatka* (bribery) and *lichnoimstvo* (appropriation of money and goods which are not due). The evil was the more difficult to uproot because the bureaucratic class as a whole was very badly paid, and was often, especially in the case of large families, practically forced to revert to these corrupt methods.

Another nefarious side of the bureaucracy in Russia was the arbitrariness of its methods, by which those responsible to the nation often acted under the guidance of those who for their own private interests closed their eyes to the abuses which prevailed. This method was bound to bring in its train endless abuses, prevarication and favouritism, the result of which could only be iniquity. Tartar rule and autocracy, with its arbitrary conception of self-made law—unauthorised by the people—had stifled their respect for the very principle of law and order. Englishmen, living in Russia and knowing the Russian character well, have often commented on the fact that Russians do not seem to feel any obligation on their honour to observe the law of the land, and, in fact, every *Tchinovnik* official was accustomed to regard himself in the light of an autocrat, superior to the dictates of the law, and at liberty to break its bonds at pleasure, just as the general public were always

trying to evade all legal restrictions imposed upon them. The Chancellor, Gortchakoff, was credited with saying: "La loi est là pour être violée!" And Pushkin sarcastically remarks:

*V Rossiji njet sakona,
V Rossiji stolb i na stolbje korona*

✓ ("In Russia there is no law but the pillar on which rests the Crown")—an allusion to the emblem of the Ministry of Justice and to the supreme power of the Tsar.

But criticism directed against the Russian bureaucracy touches in a far greater measure the principle of it than the personnel which represented it. It is well worth while remembering that the Russian bureaucracy was recruited chiefly from the Russian nobility, which has carried upon its shoulders the affairs of the State and of the learned professions, literature, and art, and has produced a series of patriotic, essentially Russian men, who were ready to devote their lives to the public welfare, enlightenment, and culture.

war { In addition to bankruptcy in the conduct of the war, the utter lack of organisation in the food problem and the constant discontent with the rule of the *Tchinovnik*, it was also the Tsar's failure to understand the political requirements of the moment which caused the State structure to fall. In the moment of the great ordeal, the whole nation felt it an imperative necessity to be at one with their august ruler. It was obviously the paramount duty of the ruler to bring about such a union; it was the specific and psychological moment for eliminating any political dissatisfaction and for granting the most liberal reforms. Such action would have done double good, by giving to the Russian nation a better constitution and more satisfactory conditions of life, and at the same time raising the spirit of the nation to fight with all its strength against the enemy.

L Unfortunately, just the contrary happened. The Emperor surrounded himself with Ministers and Councillors who proved to be incapable, and lacking in broad-minded states-

manship. They advocated reaction, and for alleviating the extreme tension found no other remedy than the giving out of a promise to the effect that "after the war some concessions would be made." Such a way of dealing with the situation showed utter incompetence, as these very reforms were urgently necessary for the better conduct of the war. In consequence the people lost faith, and it was an easy matter to convince every one, and especially the soldier, that something was wrong, and that the war could not be brought to a victorious end except by the overthrow of those who were misgoverning the State. The wrath of the people has been justly turned towards the traitors who forsook the national cause to satisfy their own lust for power. Their plan of action consisted in concealing the truth from the Emperor himself, and in denying to the people the most legitimate demands necessary for prosperity and victory.

Another unfortunate circumstance, which helped to bring about the Revolution, was the unpopularity of the Empress Alexandra, and her strong influence upon her husband's decisions in politics. But it is a very delicate matter to allege that the Emperor had Germanophil tendencies. Many historical facts are against such an allegation. He was the son of one of the most national of the Russian Emperors who ever governed the Empire—Alexander III—and his mother is a Danish Princess who was always noted for her anti-German tendencies. Nicholas II followed the same political lines as Alexander III, and his declaration of war with Austria-Hungary and Germany in defence of Serbia can hardly be construed as showing German sympathies. However, great stress was laid on the fact that the Empress was a German Princess. Her position was indeed a very difficult and delicate one. If she had been wise, and had realised the thin ice upon which she and the Imperial power stood, she would have observed during the war an extreme reserve in all that she did.

The very contrary happened. The Emperor, an affectionate and only too indulgent husband, was willing to listen

to the Empress, and she was not afraid, not only to exercise so preponderant an influence as to cause some people to call her the real ruler of Russia, but to allow herself to be influenced in turn by the people who were openly labelled by various illustrious political bodies as the "Powers of Darkness." There is really no better word to describe, for instance, such an adventurer as Rasputin, and it was certainly more than unfortunate that this man was allowed to influence the Emperor in the dismissal of Ministers and in the appointment of new ones. It was partly due to his influence that during the last two years a constant change of Ministers and men in power took place, and that consequently a feeling of uncertainty, nervousness, and extreme dissatisfaction took possession of even the most conservative and the most loyal of the Emperor's servants.

With singular unity the whole of Russia had, during the weeks preceding the Revolution, pronounced itself against the "Powers of Darkness" which had got a hold on the supreme authorities of the Empire. In this respect, the Council of the Empire, the Duma, the Assembly of the representatives of the nobility of the provinces, the assemblies of the provincial nobilities, the Zemstvos, and many other communal and social organisations were unanimous. But no heed was taken of the incontrovertible and manifest signs of a universal and grave discontent with the Imperial Government of the country.

A further influence which had a bearing on the accomplishment of the Revolution can be traced to the Jewish propaganda. The Jews, who number in Russia some six and a half millions, had little reason to be satisfied with the prevailing order in Russia. They were hampered by the "Pale of settlement," viz. by their being confined to a circumscribed area in Poland, and, moreover, they laboured under various legal restrictions of the law, and did not enjoy equality of rights with the rest of the Russian population. As a result, they constantly formed a centre of dissatisfaction.

The Jewish question has always been considered as one

of the most difficult problems to be solved in Russia. It was alleged that the Jews, by their tribal proclivities, acted, in the form of their kahals, as a close fighting phalanx against the Christians, who had no such organisation, and were in general a danger to the rest of the population. It was also supposed that their energy and cleverness in business made the ingenuous Russian peasant an easy prey to their activities. That may be so, but at any rate the problem to be dealt with could certainly not be solved in a modern civilised State by the suppression of the Jews, but had to be handled, so to speak, from the other end of the stick. If the Jews prove to be successful and dangerous opponents, their success could be checked by making their Christian opponents equal in strength. In other words, if the Christians would apply the same force of organisation, the same energy and eagerness for work, as the Jews, there could not be any question of danger from the latter. It appears, therefore, that it is the fault of the Christians who allow themselves to be beaten. It is, for instance, a very significant fact that in Great Britain, north of the Tweed, very few Jews are found, for the reason that the Scots are so hard-working and so pushful a race that they prove a good match for the Jews, who have no chance whatever of exploiting them.

The Jewish question in Russia could not possibly be dealt with apart from the general question of equality of rights and equality of religion for all races inhabiting the Empire; the Revolution has, therefore, taken the only possible course: to give to all Russian citizens the same rights, including the Jews. Thus the Jews have achieved their goal by the Revolution. It remains now for them to show that they are worthy of the rights they have obtained. Equal rights imply equal duties. The Jews will have to realise that there is no longer any reason for them to be antagonistic to the order of the Russian State, of which they themselves form part. Equality of rights means that any difference from a legal point of view between citizens of different race and religion does not exist; and that the question of race and religion only forms a part of the private

rights of the particular individual, but is not acknowledged as such by public law. No race, therefore, in a State, where perfect equality of all citizens exists, can claim to have a position apart, and on that account to deserve special consideration. In human affairs there is a constant interchange of action and counteraction between repression and self-defence. In every walk of life the minority is always more alert, more self-conscious and active than the majority. The tenacity of the Jews is to a great extent due to their repression during centuries. Once the restrictions applying to them are rescinded they will find it easier to combine with the rest of the population and give up their tribal tendencies. On the other hand, the Christians, if they do not occupy a privileged position as compared with the Jews, will apply more energy to the conduct of their affairs with them and become more capable of holding their own against them.

A very important part in the transformation of the Government was taken by the Co-operative Societies in Russia. The growth of these Societies during recent years bears witness to the democratic spirit of the nation ; they number at present 40,000 and comprise more than twelve million members. Their aim is not confined to increasing the economic prosperity of their members, but embraces also the object of teaching the Russian peasants self-help and independence from bureaucratic rules with a view to implanting in them the consciousness of their citizenship and political responsibility before the nation. They exercise an influence similar to that of the co-operative societies of the Rochdale type in Great Britain. The peasant co-operators in Russia clad in khaki educated their fellow-soldiers as to the coming Revolution, and in doing so were instrumental in making the Army ready to overthrow the autocratic regime.

The peasants, who constitute an overwhelming majority of the rank and file of the army, have borne a terrible burden of physical and material losses in this war, and at the same time have felt that their power was the real foundation of the Empire. Imagine what it meant to the peasant,

whose ordinary life was formerly confined to work in the fields and to family ties, to be thrown together with the other fighting men, discussing with them the reasons for the conflagration and the future prospects and conditions of life in general. What an incentive all that must have been for promoting his intellectual development and broadening his horizon! The outcry of the peasant for education, for a more satisfactory state of well-being, and a more pronounced recognition of his political importance in the structure of the State, pressed for consideration. ✓

Up to the time of the war, the Government was accustomed to provide for the needs of the country, relying exclusively on its own resources. But the requirements of war, and especially the need of a supply of munitions on an unprecedented scale, made it necessary for the Government to apply to the nation at large for assistance in carrying on the war. That call was answered with the same enthusiasm as has been shown in the great emergency by the British. The close co-operation between the Government and the people, which has borne such good fruit, was bound to make the masses conscious of their own importance. ✓

The political education of the peasant was also greatly assisted by his sobriety. The drink evil has been the surest means of keeping the masses in bondage, as the higher aspirations and political self-consciousness are impaired by the use of liquor. It is not an exaggeration to say that the abolition of the sale of vodka made the Russian peasant inclined to engage in political thought and self-determination, and thus constituted one of the conditions which made the Revolution possible. Even the most advanced of radicals will agree that Nicholas II deserves the gratitude of the nation for having suppressed the sale of vodka, and for having thus contributed involuntarily to the success of the Revolution. ✓ also ✓

Broadly speaking, the Russian Revolution bore a retrospective character, and in that respect the influence of Slavophilism has also been one of its causes. The old Slavophil formula: "For the nation force of opinion, for

the Tsar the force of power " may not be in keeping with the idea of a Parliament responsible to the nation and to the nation only. But, with all its dreams about absolute autocratic power, Slavophilism is, in the main, an appreciation of Slavonic culture as it was before the invasion of the Tartars, and before the reforms of Peter the Great, and this remembrance of old Slavonic times bears distinctly the stamp of democratic tendencies. The Russian and Slavonic institutions were founded on a communistic ideal, the *Sobornost*, a principle which manifested itself in the *Vetché*, the ancient Slavonic Parliament, the village community called the *Mir*, the working *Artel*, the *Krugovaja Poruka*, and so forth. Moscow had to copy the rule of the *Golden Horde* from a military point of view, and in doing so she had failed to grasp the old Russian free institutions of the republics of Pskoff and Novgorod, and crushed them out of existence. But in the consciousness of the Russian nation as a whole these free institutions continued to play a part, and Slavophilism acknowledged them, with a view to combine if possible the power of the sovereign with the Duma. The cry for nationalism really meant a development of the nation on the ancient principle of popular sovereignty. The *Vetché* exerted, indeed, a paramount predominance over all other powers in the State, including the ruling princes, who had not only to submit to the control of the *Vetché*, but were nothing more or less than its servants. The prince only represented the executive, and remained in power as long as he had the approval of the popular opinion represented by the *Vetché*. If the *Vetché* differed with him, he had to go in peace, and quickly, without any revolution, owing to the fact that his dismissal was one of the principles provided for by the constitution. The present Revolution and the abdication of the Tsar bears, unmistakably, a semblance to many an analogous occurrence in the Russian rule of the past. The only difference in this case consists in the change from Tsardom of a new pattern to State rule of a time dating back some thousand years. Thus the first phase of the Revolution has brought about

an ideal which always stood before the eyes of the Slavophiles, and has, of course, been hailed by them as the realisation of their popular faith.

A very important question standing before the revolutionary Government was the necessary agrarian reform. The peasant population, increasing at a considerable rate, require new land, and their demand seems to be reasonable enough. There were different ways of satisfying this want. One was by fostering emigration to Siberia by offering advantages in acquiring new land there. This measure has been already resorted to in the past and was of great economic value, as it developed at the same time the productivity of Siberia. Another form of relief was found in the growing industrialism of Russia, which will give employment to a great number of peasants by attracting them to the towns and to the workshops. But still a third way of dealing with the problem was open, namely, by legislative measures to compel the big landowners to give up large parts of their property to the peasantry, in a way analogous to that which has already been done in Great Britain by the Smallholding Acts, viz. forcing the big landowners to sell or lease part of their property for the use of the peasantry. Enormous tracts of fertile land which belonged to the Crown, or are the property of big landowners, were allowed to lie waste. Their proper cultivation would mean a great increase in the agricultural productivity of Russia and should be advocated from that point of view also. All this could have been done without resorting to the Socialistic measure of the nationalisation of the land, and without endangering the principle of personal proprietorship.

CHAPTER III

COSMOPOLITISM *v.* NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA

IN the past as in the present, Russian intellectual life has constantly swayed between two diametrically opposed currents of thought. In shifting between the two extremes of Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism, Russia has not succeeded in finding a workable basis for continuous national progress and steady internal peace. The Revolution forms but one stroke of the pendulum swinging to and fro. Let us try to place it in the right perspective of the Russian psychology and of its historic antecedents in relation to the two opposing forces.

Peter the Great and his successors to the throne broke away from Russian traditions and introduced in their fundamental reorganisation of State and Society Western ideas and methods of progress superseding the old national structure. French culture and language were adopted by Society as standards of education and social intercourse. German philosophy and literature, particularly the universalism of Hegel, the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and the cynicism of Nietzsche, as well as the destructive socialism of Karl Marx and Lassalle, took firm hold upon the mind of the Russian *intelligentsia*. Translations from foreign literature flooded the Russian market, as there existed no convention safeguarding the copyright of foreign authors in Russia. All this, together with an inclination to overestimate things foreign and to underrate the home production of cultural values, brought about an overgrowth of foreign mentality and a stunting of national thought. National aspirations were merged in a cosmopolitan outlook upon the human race. National merits

were depreciated as against work done abroad. The whole situation was marked by extreme prejudice and not based upon the practical requirements of self-conscious existence.

Against this weakness in national self-appreciation, a natural reaction arose in the form of Slavophilism founded by Aksakoff, Khomjakoff, Katkoff, and others. Their idea was the superiority of the Slavonic race. They considered that Western European culture was rotten to the core, and that the Slavonic world, headed by Russia, was destined to discover a new mode of life, new ideas, and to reorganise the whole civilised world. Their teaching was even more theoretical and of a more speculative nature than that of the "Westerners," since it could not be substantiated by facts. The blindness of their exaggerations was only too patent. If they opposed Western European civilisation and culture to proclaim Slavonic ideals as superior in every way, they were bound to prove this challenge right and well-founded. Russia could not, as it were, make good her claim, owing to several centuries of Tartar domination and misrule, which had retarded her entry into the field of progress with other civilised nations.

Every nation has a natural right to the preservation of her own individuality, to belief in herself, and to combat against foreign intellectual and physical domination; it is in this respect, therefore, that Slavophilism and Russo-philism had unquestionably a sound footing. But soon this sound tendency of national self-appreciation became aggressive and intolerant towards other races. The programme of the Slavophiles: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and the Cult of the Race, was carried into practice in the distorted form of a rigid bureaucratic centralisation at the expense of any local self-government, of a denial of religious equality in favour of the prevailing influence of the Russian Orthodox faith, and of a system of forcible Russification to the limit of persecuting other races of the Empire. The Nationalistic Press denounced in turn the Finlanders, the Little Russians, the Tartars, the inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces, the Caucasians, and especially the Jews, advocat-

ing a policy of oppression. This campaign of unceasing insidious insinuation and slander, playing off one race against the other, and crushing under a domineering heel everything not belonging to the Great Russian race and Orthodoxy, did much harm to the consolidation of the Empire, and induced even well-intentioned elements to overthrow State and Society when otherwise they would have been ready to give their support to the existing law and order. Any attempt at pointing out the disintegrating nature of this movement, and the danger it created for the very existence of the Empire, was systematically suppressed. Russians of the *ancien régime* did not want to be convinced of the reality of things. They preferred to live in an atmosphere of self-deception where they suggested to themselves that all was harmony, crying "peace when there is no peace."

In the domain of foreign politics, Slavophilism brought about the war of 1877-78 against Turkey. The proposal to unite the Slavonic nations of the Balkan Peninsula by liberating them from Turkish oppression and Austrian interference necessarily involved war. If a Government decides for war, its least duty, it seems, would be to be sufficiently prepared for such a contingency in order to be able to carry it through to a successful end. Although the campaign of 1877 was successful from a military point of view, it brought Russia the disadvantage of diplomatic failures, new political friction in the Balkan Peninsula, and the birth of a nation who, unfortunately, soon proved to be a dangerous enemy not only to Russia, but also to the whole Slavonic cause—Bulgaria. The present war has further frustrated Russia's aims and brought disaster in its train to Serbia as well, who, relying upon Russia's aid, took up the gauntlet flung down by Austria.

If thus the material outcome of the war has proved that the Government of Nicholas II was wanting in practical statesmanship, it yet remains to be seen whether it had any justification from the point of view of ideals and principle. It has been stated that Russia as the most

powerful of the Slavonic States had incurred an obligation to bring about a consolidation of all the Slavonic tribes and to save them from Austrian oppression. The national revival of the Balkan and Yugo Slavs certainly deserved Russian consideration, and the world will always admire the chivalrous self-sacrifice with which Russia embraced the cause of the Balkan Slavs, but these noble aims might have been reached by other means than warfare. A compromise with Austria-Hungary might have achieved much better results in the interests of the Slavs. Such a policy of conciliation, had it been possible, would have strengthened the position of Russia, while the policy inaugurated by the Chancellor, Prince Gortchakoff, had the fatal result of bringing the old rivals, Austria-Hungary and Germany, into line. Since the creation of the Triple Alliance Russian policy has unconsciously done its best to strengthen it instead of working for its dissolution. It must be confessed that Russia in the past has been singularly unhappy in the promotion of her generous but unavailing Balkan policy. She incurred thereby great responsibilities, heavy sacrifices, a dangerous delay in the development of her internal political affairs, and was even not able to prevent the two fratricidal Serbo-Bulgarian Wars and the conflagration of 1914. Her political influence in shaping the fate of the Balkan and Yugo Slavs was steadily on the decline instead of being, as intended, of a decisive nature. Russia's diplomatic and military powers were not equal to her good intentions. At present Austria has been delivered hand and foot into Germany's power by the Germanisation of her population and a grafting of German aims upon her policy. Placing, therefore, all the responsibility for the outbreak of the war upon Austria for her unwarranted lust of conquest and subjugation of Slavonic nations, it is doubtful whether Russia might have averted the calamity by diplomatic means. Judging from Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which undermined the legitimate national aspirations of Greater Serbia, it would rather appear that Russia's inability to bring about a co-operation with Austria

in dealing with the Balkan problem was solely due to the uncompromising attitude assumed by that Power.

Russia's disaster in the war against the Central Powers brought in its train another recrudescence of cosmopolitanism in Russia. This time cosmopolitanism identified itself with international socialism and Judaism, factors which are natural champions in the destruction of national self-consciousness. The former promotes the interests of the proletariat irrespective of nationality, and the latter pursue a religious and tribal ideal without regard to the existence of separate States. The existence of separate States is a hindrance to both aims, which can only be overcome by cosmopolitanism. In Russia socialism and Judaism succeeded so well in counteracting nationalism that the Russian nation, under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, lost all national self-respect, all inclination to foster Russian interests, and behaved like a flock of bewildered misguided sheep ready to fling themselves into an abyss without any apparent reason or necessity.

Austria and Germany had an easy task in walking over a disorganised and listless South of Russia, and allowed their "mailed fist" to come down heavily upon the poor Russians. They saddled her with a German peace, and engaged in a policy of brutal interference with Russian internal affairs. But this will have the advantage of bringing revolutionary Russia to her senses. The Austro-German military force dispatched to the South of Russia on police duty may be able to introduce order, and such an example may also have a salutary and steadying influence upon the other parts of the country, inducing it to revert to civilised methods of assuring safety, order, and respect of law, but in so doing they will, in all probability, make themselves thoroughly hated as foreign intruders and bullies. This will restart the political pendulum swinging in the direction of nationalism.

It would, therefore, appear that Russian internal and external politics have been alternately under the influence of national superestimation and international cosmopolitanism.

Up to the present Russian politics presented themselves as a hybrid and ever-vacillating combination of two extremes, excluding each other. But there is reason to believe that the future will bring about a compromise between these two opposite currents of thought by a political programme working for national self-respect and tolerance : the former being destined to be a corrective for cosmopolitanism, and the latter for uncompromising nationalism.

CHAPTER IV

RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

ONE of the first acts of the Russian Provisional Government was the abolition of all social, religious, and national restrictions, and the declaration of political liberty and equality of all Russian citizens. This momentous resolve towards universal tolerance has the significance and character of a complete reversion of the Russian State rule, as it abolishes intolerance, which in the past formed one of the fundamental principles of Russian Tsardom and bureaucracy.

The principal working programme of Russian bureaucracy was centralisation. When the small Muscovian State emerged from the Tartar rule, it began at once its policy of conquest, and succeeded throughout the centuries in incorporating the territory of the Russian republics of the North—Novgorod and Pskoff; Finland; the territory of the Livonian Order; Courland; Lithuania; Poland; the Ukraine and Little Russia; Bessarabia; the Tartar kingdoms of the South; the Caucasus; Grusia; Mingrelia; part of Armenia; Bukara, Samarcand; the domains of the Kirghises, the Kalmucks, and other wild nomadic tribes; and the whole of Siberia. In so doing it was guided by the leading idea of the necessity of suppressing local self-government, with a view of assuring a complete centralisation of the whole machinery of State administration. The bureaucracy had a constant fear of popular initiative and local autonomy. Its chief aim was to reduce everything to one uniform pattern, in order to make the administration of the country easier for the bureaucratic centre. This principle was practical enough for its purpose, for it was evidently easier to rule all countries on the same lines than to consider

the existing local conditions of the different provinces of the Empire and to conform with them.

It does not need much imagination to perceive that this method of State administration was not suitable for the real interests of the different parts of the Empire and for the Empire as a whole. As a matter of fact, it was hopelessly inefficient, apart from the cruelty it involved in subjecting countries of the North and of the South to one pattern, which was very ill-adapted to the vital requirements of the different parts of the Empire. As a result, there was a constant outcry from the various parts of the Empire for adjustment in administration fitting the conditions of life of the provinces, and evolved from local economic requirements and also from the historic past. But these repeated and earnest demands always fell upon deaf ears, as the Russian bureaucracy felt its vital nerve imperilled by leaving anything to the initiative of self-government and social self-determination. Centralisation has exercised a terrible tyranny in Russia, has occasioned untold sufferings, and has held portions of the Empire and the whole in a state of backwardness and inefficiency. Grave errors made by ruling from one bureaucratic centre—on paper, as it were—a vast Empire comprising one-seventh of the *terra firma* of the globe, and purposely ignoring the differences of climate, race, and religion of the individual components of that Empire, were the result of intolerance, which is incompatible with the principle of freedom.

Russian bureaucracy alleged that the granting of racial freedom is incompatible with the desirable assimilation of alien elements in a State in order to make its population homogeneous. It supposed that the existence of different races in a State involves a constant danger of its disintegration.

However, it cannot be denied that the various races united under one State rule, who have fought on a common battlefield, and spurred by the same spirit of patriotism, feel that they have had an opportunity once more of proving by their devotion, even unto death, that they deserve equal rights

and equal treatment with the ruling race. Too much has been expected from the unifying influence of common racial origin. The example of the Bulgarians, who owed a heavy debt of gratitude to their liberators from Turkish rule, the Russians, needs no comment. On the other hand, there are many examples where different races live in peace and concord, forming together a common State. Not only racial and religious homogeneity, but also the same public obligations and rights, and common economic and political interests, exercise a unifying influence, build up civic patriotism, and tend to consolidate a nation. In such gigantic State organisms as Russia, political unity is best assured by the freedom and satisfaction derived from the fullest development of the potentialities of its self-governing integral parts.

As a result of the progressive tendency in modern times to enlarge the territory of the State, there exists at present hardly a State with a perfectly homogeneous population from a racial point of view. This involves the necessity of providing for a satisfactory co-ordination of several ethnographical units under one State rule.

It must be conceded that, generally speaking, it is easier to control a homogeneous nation than a population consisting of different races. But the issue under consideration is not this, but rather whether racial freedom cannot be observed without imperilling in any way the power, prosperity, and safety of a State. It can be proved by numerous historical instances that the use of forcible means to denationalise alien races entails dissatisfaction and revolt, and has the very opposite effect to the one desired. On the other hand, cases are no less numerous where the strict observance of racial freedom has led to a consolidation of the State, making it more prosperous, and more able to resist any attack from without. Examples of the former are the Finlanders, the Poles, the Armenians, the Little Russians, the Jews in Russia, and the late Turkish subjects of Slav origin who, as a result of the treatment meted out to them, formed an element of danger and weakness to the

State to which they belonged. As examples of the latter may be quoted the three racial elements which form the population of Switzerland, the different races of which the United States of America consist, and the heterogeneous population of the British Empire. The case of the Boers is specially noteworthy. Not long ago they fought against the British; while in the present war they are fighting for them as devotedly and loyally as any other race of the great Empire. This change in the attitude of the Boers has been brought about simply by the racial freedom and Home Rule which have been accorded and guaranteed to them. It was due to the principle of not forcing men of different races into one mould, and of according greater self-development, that the political union of the two white races in South Africa was brought about in the shortest possible time.

Now that the shackles of intolerance have been thrown off in Russia, Russian culture and civilisation are bound to develop upon the lines of freedom similar to those which exist in the British Empire.

But this evolution towards tolerance which has been proclaimed by the Russian Provisional Government as the basis of its policy is such an enormous change from the ancient ideology of the past Russian rule that it will take some time to be realised in its real meaning by the masses of the Russian people, who are still hampered by a lack of understanding of freedom. Tolerance has up to the present been so foreign to Russian State rule that its essence and significance will only be better understood when revolutionary enthusiasm will have died away and given room to a more mature appreciation of its benefits.

Up to the Revolution the Russian citizens were practically classed into four categories: (1) the Great Russians; (2) the Little Russians; (3) the Poles, Lithuanians, Finlanders, people from the Baltic provinces and from the Caucasus, Mohammedans, and so forth; and (4) the Jews. These categories were from a political and social point of view looked upon in a different manner.

The reason for this inequality was the strongly grounded ethnographical idea of the Great Russian individuality apart from the organic cohesion of all the Russian citizens. The Russian Empire was theoretically identified with the Great Russian race, and was based on an ethnographical principle which was foreign to all the other nationalities not belonging to the Great Russian, but none the less forming component parts of the Empire. The Great Russians were supposed to be the "real Russians," while the other Russian citizens were constantly given to understand that they were more or less tolerated, but not admitted on equal terms in the Russian commonwealth.

In 1905, when the first revolutionary movement took hold of the Empire, a meeting in Petrograd was arranged of representatives of the nations not belonging to the Great Russians; that meeting was attended by Poles, Lithuanians, Grusians, Asserbeidgantses, Armenians, Hebrews, Kirghises, Letts, Esthonians, Tartars, Ukranians, White Russians, Little Russians, and Russians from Galicia. All these representatives pronounced themselves in favour of maintaining their particular national individuality. They complained of the administrative centralisation, and the policy of Russification of the central Government, which was shown in the attempt to suppress the Little Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish languages by all kinds of administrative measures. The unfairness of such a bureaucratic policy is clearly shown if it is appreciated that only 43.5 per cent. of the population of Russia is Great Russian, and the majority—that is to say 56.5 per cent.—is not.

It was the privilege of the first Council of the Empire and the first Duma, after the Constitution had been proclaimed, to express themselves in favour of a just recognition of the individuality of the different tribes and races of Russia, and of the desirability of a full equalisation of the laws of all Russian citizens, with abrogation of all limitations inherent in a given race. These public bodies recognised that the demands of the different races of the Empire for the retention and development of their particular ethical individuality

was a necessary condition for uniting them in one State organism.

It appears, therefore, that the first Imperial Duma had already in view decentralisation—namely, the granting of Home Rule and of the inner administrations of the different races inhabiting the Empire, upholding at the same time the principle of political unity and the integrity of the Empire. According to such constitution, the central organisation of the Empire would have had to engage in interests of an Imperial nature—for instance, military and naval armament, national safety of the Empire from attack, the relations between the different parts of the Empire, international commerce, and imperial finance ; while the different Home Rule administrations would comprise the laws and administration referring to local interests only. The observance of these principles makes it possible to administer the different parts of the Empire in a more efficient way, giving due consideration to the particular conditions prevailing on the spot, and at the same time assuring to the central organisation the possibility of devoting itself more completely to the interests of the State as a whole. On broad lines, such decentralisation is a primary condition for further progress in Russia. Her safety and strength are not impaired by a difference in the races belonging to her, if only these latter are satisfied with the way they are treated by the Central Power. As far back as thirty years ago, an eminent Russian teacher of State Law, Professor Kapustin, explained in a pamphlet which he wrote on the significance of nationality that : “ Nationalities live in peace with each other if they enjoy freedom and self-government. They become hostile to each other if they are subjected to tyranny, persecution, and humiliation. Experience has taught that the free institutions of a country produce nowadays a closer touch between the different nationalities. Every unnecessary administrative centralisation and interference paralyses the power of social organisations. Any action by a State which endeavours by sheer force to unify the different elements of the population which cannot assimilate ethno-

graphically is utter tyranny." In the same strain Mendeléeff, the famous Russian scientist, declared: "Our nationalisation must embrace the principle of tolerance—namely, must renounce every overestimation which involves an abyss of injustice."

It was a long-felt want of the Russian Empire that all races inhabiting the Empire should be considered as equal; and that the Empire should have the opportunity of drawing on all races in order to obtain national service from them. The principle of racial privileges and racial drawbacks amongst the citizens of one State is contrary to democracy, and is especially inappropriate in a country like Russia, which has from time immemorial been a country inhabited by mixed races. The soundest policy for the administration of an Empire like Russia lies in impressing on the minds of the different races which form component parts of it that they can count upon a guarantee of free development. It is civic patriotism which must bind them all together. Racial patriotism cannot do this, as such patriotism refers only to portions of the Empire, but not to the whole.

It has already been mentioned that it was the Russian Revolution which brought these principles to practical recognition by the proclamation of equality and tolerance. Henceforth religion and racial individuality will in Russia be the concern of the private individual only, as civic obligations have no bearing on religion or ethnographical peculiarities, but consist in the conscientious and whole-hearted devotion to the interests of the community and the State as a whole.

In this respect Great Britain can serve as a model to other countries and also to Russia. In Great Britain the appreciation of good and useful citizenship predominates so much over considerations of racial origin that racial freedom has become a feature of these happy isles. It is this supreme valuation of citizenship as the main driving force in the life of the State which in Great Britain has reached the high significance of the *civis Romanus* of old, and is responsible

for the unparalleled success she has achieved in her mission for the cause of civilisation and culture in both hemispheres.

The case of religious tolerance, which, as already mentioned, has also been proclaimed by the Russian Provisional Government, is more complex than that of racial tolerance, as the interests of the "Orthodox" religion and of the State were hitherto deemed to be identical in Russia.

Religious tolerance is often confused with indifference owing to the fact that the protagonists of tolerance have often been men who were indifferent to religion. To them intolerance in matters of religion could have no meaning, and that was the reason why they were all for tolerance. Voltaire, for example, in his defence of the brother Calas, pleaded for tolerance in matters of religion; and his friend Frederick the Great of Prussia, who shared his religious convictions, made it a rule that in his dominions every one should be at liberty "to gain bliss in his own fashion."

As a matter of fact, tolerance is not necessarily the outcome of indifference. It is based on a recognition of the right of every human being to freedom of thought and conscience, and on a broad appreciation of any honest religious conviction, provided that such a conviction is not contrary to recognised ethical principles. Thus tolerance has in its essence nothing in common with indifference, but exists independently as a principle of the highest order.

Christian religion unmistakably embodies this principle. The writers of the New Testament laid down the rule, "Judge not, that ye be not judged," and this denotes the essence of tolerance, which involves not only a *laissez-faire*, but also the avoidance of even mentally passing judgment on other religious creeds and thus taking upon ourselves the right of judging those to be wrong who do not concur in our own belief. If the Christian Church has in the course of history proved to be intolerant, this has been due to causes absolutely foreign to its first conception, brought about as a result of the lust for power and riches. Especially pernicious was its identification with State rule and temporal power. It was a fatal blow to the Christian religion when

the Emperor Constantine declared that Christianity was to be the State religion in his dominions, and it served the cause of that religion badly when the Bishop of Rome, fascinated by the world-power which ancient Rome exercised of old, conceived the idea of placing himself at the head of the Christian Church and exercising an absolute power over the world. In this way the Christian religion was vested in a theocratic form of government and became imbued with temporal power. Two principles were here fused together which could not possibly form a good alloy. Religion—i.e. "the Kingdom of God"—is not of this world, as the New Testament expressly states, its purpose being to order that man should serve God, and consider life on earth a mere preparation for an existence to come. The aim of the State, on the other hand, is to satisfy all the requirements which are a part of the social co-ordination of the life of man, and to raise it to the highest possible degree of efficiency, development, and prosperity. This fundamental difference between State and religion makes it abundantly clear that if not kept apart each will interfere with the other. It has always been a mistake to use the power of the State for the spiritual aims of religion, and the power of religion for the temporal purposes of the State. The theocratic form of State rule in Palestine, Egypt, the Papal State of the Church, and in Russia, has proved to be the worst of all forms of State rule, involving inefficiency, stagnation, and the stifling of freedom of conscience. Intolerance formed an essential part of this system, as the power of the State had to support a certain religion, and as religion had to serve the purposes of the State. A great patriot and defender of Russian State interests, Katkoff, who himself belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church, wrote as far back as forty years ago in favour of tolerance : "The Orthodox Church as a Catholic Church cannot be identified with one special race. If she is identified with the Russian nationality, this is a sin against her Catholic character, and is at the same time an attempt against the Russian State by estranging from it and pushing into enemy

camps all those Russian subjects who from their origin do not belong to the Orthodox Church. Up to the present religion is bound up with race. We, as it were, desire that 'Russian' should mean at the same time 'Orthodox,' as 'Turk' means 'Faithful': against the truth and the spirit of Christianity we are still of the opinion that the Russian State is not as the other States of this world, but that it is already a heavenly kingdom, where the other believers must not have a place. Against our nature, and in contradiction to our vocation, and in opposition to our development, we imagine that the civic society and the Church are identical, and, in consequence, we deprive the Christian Church in our midst of her character, tear it down from its height and make of it a bureaucratic settlement."

The more fully a division between State and religion was attained in the course of European civilisation, the greater was the moral and material progress. The countries in which that division has been carried out in a satisfactory way have secured the highest efficiency in State administration, and, at the same time, the most enlightened form of religious worship. In Russia, the claims of the "Orthodox" religion to be backed up by State power, and the pretension of the State to be supported by the "Orthodox" religious belief, meant tyranny in the State as well as in religious administration.

It is hardly possible to conceive anything more preposterous than bringing force to bear on religious persuasion. Belief is the result of an essentially personal inward experience, a conviction built up by free will, a certitude gained by a psychic effort; while force is an outward factor which may achieve many things, but not religious conviction. Compulsion does not convince. On the contrary, it defeats its own aims when applied to matters of religious belief. In Russia the opposition of the Old Believers and many other sects which were subjected to persecution, but only gained in ascendancy and power, provide an unmistakable proof of this.

The repeated application of force to matters of religion

in Russia was the outcome of the belief in the necessity for uniformity—one of the fetishes which stand in open and flagrant opposition to the natural conditions in the life of man. The greatest importance is placed on the outward signs of religious uniformity, based on the performance of certain religious ceremonies. Religious conception, however, depends to a great extent on the degree of intellectual development. The highly trained mind is more accustomed to think in the abstract, while minds of a lower intellectual order have to revert to symbols, and in general to a conception of divinity which is full of anthropomorphic features, appealing to the senses in a more concrete manner. Moreover, the differences of age, sex, and climate play a great part in establishing a variety of attitudes towards the Divinity, and differentiate religious thought far more than allegiance to different religious denominations. Within the boundaries of Roman Catholicism, Russian Orthodoxy, or Protestantism, there are *de facto* many varieties of belief and of religious conviction which are disregarded for the sake of outward uniformity. Such varieties of belief are only the outcome of the above-mentioned differences in the conditions of human life—namely, climate, age, or sex—and should be acknowledged by admitting the necessity for the same variations in matters of religion due to these differences.

Of course any religious denomination is bound to adhere to a certain creed by which the principles of the belief of that denomination are set forth. But the question as to whether tolerance or intolerance prevails is decided by the way in which one religious denomination judges another. If it bases itself on the principle of “*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*,” or on the notorious dictum of Augustine, “*Virtutes paganorum sunt splendida vitia*,” there can be no question of tolerance. Surely it ought to be possible for enlightened and broad-minded people to maintain that they are right in their particular personal religious conviction, without condemning those who do not share their views to eternal perdition.

Of course any thesis has in relation to itself an antithesis. "*Omnis determinatio est negatio.*" But this does not touch the case of tolerance, which simply admits the possibility of different views on the same subject. "By whatever road a man approacheth Me, on that road do I welcome him." The exclusiveness of Orthodoxy and the branding of people as heretics who are of a different religious conviction denote a state of self-assurance and self-satisfaction which is lacking both in humility and in breadth of outlook. Did not Jesus Christ himself protest in the most emphatic manner against the orthodox belief of the Scribes and Pharisees? Was it not He who said that the letter kills and the spirit quickens? The revolution against Roman Papacy, fought for the sake of religious freedom, called the Reformation, achieved much for religious tolerance, but it has not yet been realised in all its aspects. The Revolution in Russia may do greater things in relation to tolerance.

But even tolerance has its limits set by the ethical side of religion. If a religion embodies practices which are contrary to the law and the moral principles laid down by the State, it cannot be tolerated—as, for instance, the polygamy of the Mormons, or the self-mutilation of certain sects in Russia; and if a religious belief professes intolerance, it cannot be adhered to by those who profess tolerance.

A quaint and significant story tells us that a member of a denomination which thought it possessed the monopoly of religious truth was, after having been released from this mortal life, being shown his new surroundings by the Apostle Peter. They came to an enclosure from which the singing of church hymns could be heard. The apostle remarked: "Tread softly, that we may not be heard by those inside, who believe that they are the only ones in heaven"! It is precisely this advice, "Tread softly," which contains the essence of tolerance, allowing as it does for diversity of religious belief, in perfect harmony with the religion which places goodwill, charity, and love at the head of its teaching.

It may be concluded, therefore, that uniformity of belief,

which is contrary to the varying conditions of existence, stands in opposition to nature, and is a contradiction of the elementary principle of freedom which is necessary to the religious self-determination of the individual. In Russia, tolerance as regards racial and religious individuality has now been won as the result of religious enlightenment, and of those civic liberties which are recognised by modern civilised States.

CHAPTER V

THE DEGENERACY OF THE REVOLUTION

THE Russian Revolution has brought about personal and political liberty, responsibility, and racial freedom. But, as in so many instances of revolution in the past, the control of the masses, the sense of proportion, and the consciousness of the practical requirements of statesmanship, without which public affairs cannot be conducted, has been lost. The destruction of a regime of despotic rule, centuries old, seemed of such enormous importance that all other considerations were pushed into the background as having no practical significance. Nobody whose mind is not prejudiced by the expectation of special personal advantages could desire the return to the former days of an unlimited autocrat ruling over irresponsible and irresponsible automata. The days of bureaucracy pure and simple are over in Russia, ✓ never to return again. The people will henceforth decide ; the people want to shape their fortunes on the strength of their own free will. But as soon as a State edifice disappears the question arises unavoidably what structure should replace it, as every community or society must be organised in some way, must recognise some rule and prevent the individual merely following his own instincts regardless of the requirements of his neighbours and of the *res publica*. The question of the special form or constitution of a community is of secondary importance in comparison with the other question that order should prevail and the existing law should be respected.

For centuries Russian bureaucracy has impeded the formation of character, the education of political thought, and adequate instruction in the schools, with the consequence

that when the *ancien régime* ceased to exist, there were no prominent statesmen to take up the reins of government, open up a truly constructive policy, and to introduce a new and lasting form of State administration. The Russian Revolution has drifted through a series of phases which have wholly changed its primary aspect. The original idea was conceived by the Cadet party for the sake of freedom and progress and the suppression of autocracy and bureaucratic rule. Their intention was to bring about a truly constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government representing the will of the nation. Tsar Nicholas signed the new statute according to the wishes of the Cadet party, but somehow this did not prevent the delegates of the Duma, who received an audience with the Emperor at Pskoff, from demanding and accepting his abdication in favour of his brother, Michael Alexandrovitch. Instead of taking up the reins of government and saving the country from the abyss of anarchy, the latter declined the offer and the revolution then drifted into the hands of the inarticulate and uneducated masses.

In the course of six months, Russia underwent no less than five revolutions—one after the other! First it was the Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates conjointly with the Duma who overthrew the Tsar's government; then, Mr. Kerensky abrogated the Duma and the Cabinet and created a self-made government devoid of any constitutional authority. The third revolution was marked by a proclamation of the Republic regardless of the oath which had been taken by the so-called Provisional Government that the promised Constituent Assembly should decide the form of rule. Public order was systematically undermined by constant sudden changes in the form of government. A plethora of self-appointed committees took the place of any regular administration. Again and again the Cabinet took new configurations. The fourth act of the revolutionary tragedy was the overthrow of Kerensky's government by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates acting under the direct influence of the Revolutionary Extremists,

who with the aid of the Petrograd garrison seized the central power and declared themselves undisputed masters of the situation. The last phase consisted in the suppression of the National Constituent Assembly, who had met in Petrograd with a majority that voted against the Bolshevik party. In order to remain in power this party proclaimed, as a fundamental principle, that the workmen's, soldiers', and peasants' class should unquestionably rule irrespective of the wish and will of the whole nation.

This claim rests on the presumption that a great State organism can do without its intellectually trained classes—an illusion especially dangerous in a State like Russia, where the educated classes represent a very small minority, amounting probably to not more than 3 per cent. of the total population. The educated classes form the backbone and brain of the country, and it becomes very difficult to replace them, owing to the fact that many years of study and preparation are necessary to fit a man for an intellectual career in the conduct of the practical exigencies of State and Society. Only extreme doctrinarianism and an uncompromisingly prejudiced mind can overlook the fact that every occupation requires a certain qualification and efficiency. An educated man does not look with contempt upon the uneducated. On the contrary, he recognizes that the uneducated man, performing as he does necessary manual labour, is indispensable to the life of the nation, but at the same time he also realises that the management of matters concerning the State and public affairs require a certain standard of knowledge and training which are not at the command of the uneducated masses. This truism could only be ignored by the hopeless class prejudice of Bolshevism, which mistrusted and disqualified the educated classes solely for the very fact of their education. Such a principle, embodying the subversive teaching of Leo Tolstoy, is inimical to enlightenment and progress. The educated classes represent the greatest effort made towards efficiency, improvement, and the understanding of opportunities afforded by nature. The mistake made by the miscon-

ception of this nature of the educated classes and the rôle they are called upon to play in State and Society is especially fatal in the case of Russia since the progress of recovery from Bolshevism must necessarily be slow, owing to the thinned ranks of educated men.

If democracy has any merit, it is the principle that class rule should be replaced by a form of government representing the will of the whole nation. Socialism in its most virulent form of proletarianism is, therefore, the enemy of democracy and in its very essence reactionary. It reverts to class rule of a new and more objectionable order than existed before. If any class proclaim its right to rule, at least it should be in some way qualified for such pretence. Every employment or occupation requires a certain knowledge and capacity for successful accomplishment. According to the aristocratic idea, the best should rule, and this principle was carried out in Europe by entrusting such responsibility to those who had the greatest stake and share in the country, and who were proficient in the acquisition of learning and practical training. Workmen, soldiers, and peasants, who by the declaration of their representatives in Congress are to be the rulers of Russia, cannot possibly claim such qualifications; as long as they belong to their class they have, individually, no preponderating interest in the country, and their ignorance makes them unfit for the duties of practical statesmanship. One wonders what qualifications were possessed by the series of leaders who seized the reins of government only to make themselves conspicuous by their tragic blundering of public affairs. The majority of the Generals and officers of the army have been murdered or deprived of their position or subjugated to an intolerable treatment, because the private soldier refused to submit to any discipline and wanted to be his own master.

It has been assumed that Tsar Nicholas intended to conclude a separate peace with Germany and that the Revolution saved the country from such treachery. But just the contrary took place. It is an historic fact that the Tsar was true to the cause of the Allies, and certainly did not

contemplate concluding a separate peace, while on the other hand it is the degeneracy of the Revolution which is solely responsible for the peace and all that led up to it.

As shown in the preceding chapter, the starting-point of the Russian Revolution was the inefficiency of the army organisation, which brought about military disaster, and the critical position of the food problem of the nation, starvation actually staring the people in the face. The first duty of the Revolution, therefore, was to grapple with these two deadly dangers which were threatening the country with immediate catastrophe. It could have found no other justification. The country was in danger and so the nation rose against the Tsar's government. The chief and paramount object was to save the country from imminent disaster, and it was precisely this noble aim which assured to the Revolution a wonderful and speedy success. But nothing of the sort happened. When military discipline had been destroyed, and all capable officers had been murdered or dismissed, when chaos began to reign and the educated classes—the so-called *Burgui*—were treated as outcasts and enemies, there was no further possibility of commanding the soldiers to fight the Germans. It followed as a natural consequence that international obligations and the treaty forbidding the conclusion of a separate peace with the enemy now became null and void.

It is therefore clear that if the Revolution had not taken place, Russia would have preserved her mighty army and could have added another offensive to her successful campaign in Eastern Prussia, Galicia, and Asia Minor, and that, in all probability, by this time the war would have been over. The responsibility of the collapse of Russia and all its consequences must therefore necessarily rest with the Revolution.

In times of the breakdown of an old order there often arise idealistic theories which bear witness to the desire for improvement, but which are not based upon practical possibilities. The Government of Russian Extremists has proclaimed and adopted as a panacea against the occurrence

of wars that each race should be declared independent or at liberty to join whatever State it likes, always preserving autonomous rights. This meant disintegration, the wilful negation of sovereignty over territory which, in the historic past and by the requirements of national existence, had been welded together to form one mighty State organism commanding the respect and admiration of the world. The so-called right of self-determination of any part of the population of Russia is a cheap edition of the fallacious principle proclaimed by Napoleon III that each race should have an independent national existence, and it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the philosophical forerunners of the great French Revolution, who maintained that small self-governing communities should be formed which should take the place of the State itself.

This doctrine leaves out of account that international relations of the civilised world have become so closely interwoven that constant intervention, direct or indirect, in the affairs of State is unavoidable. Even if theoretically the right of independence may be ascribed to each race, such a right is hardly in keeping with practical statesmanship. No race can avoid the influence of other races, and such influence is necessarily more pronounced and more felt if it comes from a more powerful race. It would, for instance, scarcely be possible for England to consent to Ireland's political independence, since this country is in such close proximity. England's safety demands, therefore, the exercise of a certain control in order to prevent Ireland from preserving a dangerous attitude. Another example is Finland, whose political independence threatens Petrograd from a military point of view.

The so-called right of self-determination is a right *in vacuo* generated outside such vital requirements which every independent State should be able to fulfil and without which it cannot exist. Self-determination can only lead to independent national existence in so far as the possibility of maintaining itself against foreign aggression gives it practical value.

But apart from this intrinsic limitation reducing *ad absurdum* the right of self-determination as a State-building device, Bolshevism has given itself the lie by constantly interfering with those parts of Russia which had availed themselves of that right. In Finland, the Ukraine, and the Crimea, which had declared for a separation from Russia and an independent national existence, Petrograd Bolshevism carried on civil war. In the Baltic Provinces, in so far as they had not been overrun by the Germans, the population clamouring to be separated from Bolshevik rule were subjected to continuous outrages against life and property to punish them for exercising their right of self-determination. Thus, this much-vaunted new socialistic panacea has not only in theory but in practice shown itself to be highly misleading, disastrous, and devoid of the very elements of constructive policy.

Historical experience has proved over and over again that the existence of small States is no guarantee whatever against the recurrence of wars, but rather the contrary, and that the formation of large States entails, *ipso facto*, the pacification of all the territory comprised by them. Classical Hellas and mediæval Italy were brought to ruin by decentralisation setting up small communities pretending to be independent of each other. The result has been constant warfare between all these miniature States, to their final mutual destruction. On the other hand, the Pax Romana imposed peace upon the vast territory of Roman possessions on people of very different races, and as soon as the restriction was broken the central power was always able to extinguish the flames. On the territory of modern Germany there used to be incessant feudal warfare owing to the fact that the central power was too weak to prevent strife. Russia, having enlarged her territory to the proportions it assumed prior to the outbreak of the present war, abolished the system of war upon all the territory she occupied, preventing hostilities occurring between Muscovites on the one side, and on the other the Poles, the Livonian Order, the Republics of Novgorod and Pskoff, the Caucasians, the Tartar Khanats of the South,

the Kalmuks and other nomadic tribes. The Pax Britannica assured to an Empire unsurpassed by any other in size and population the blessings of peace, owing to the fact that any warfare in her domains was speedily suppressed by the central power. Great Britain has always vindicated that owing to her rule in India the different races and tribes of which the peoples of that country consist have been forced to live at peace with each other.

Another case in point is the example of Central Europe, where wars have been chiefly brought about by the fact that the realm of Charlemagne was split up. The Germans, French, Italians and a part of the Slavs were under his rule, and if his Empire had never been divided all those wars within the ancient boundaries of that Empire could never have come about.

The present world-war cannot be used as an argument to the contrary, only proving that Europe is still in need of that unity which excludes the possibility of wars, as in the case of the United States of North America or other States representing a happy combination of local autonomy and of a strong central power working for a co-ordination of purposes in the region of international politics. The very reason why any State organism succeeds in existing at all is chiefly a result of power and the possibility of maintaining itself against outside aggression.

The state of affairs brought about by the degeneracy of the Revolution is aggravated by the nature of the Russian, who is wanting in organisation and does not like order, for he believes in acting on the spur of the moment, is always swayed from one extreme to the other, aiming at ideal heights of perfection, dreaming of saving himself and the entire human race, but entirely leaving out of account the practical conditions of everyday life. This is also the reason why he does not believe in regular work but prefers to act on impulse. Such natures are of course particularly difficult to keep in order and to impress with authority. The old school of Slavophiles had a clear insight into the Russian character when they proclaimed the famous triad

of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality as the necessary conditions for the life of the Russian people. Autocracy has gone, nationality no longer plays any rôle in Russia, having been superseded by a sort of cult of the different racial individualities of the many races of which the great Russian State organism is composed. Even orthodoxy has ceased to occupy the important part assigned to it by the Slavophile idea.

A Russian is endowed with a full share of intellectual power, talent, imagination, and idealism, but he is wanting in a proper appreciation of the sound common sense necessary for the proper conduct of public affairs. In his dreamy idealism there is no place for the most pressing needs of the moment. A Russian does not even care about practical success, he hankers after the latest original ideas which have taken possession of his imagination. Much that he has ever achieved in State construction in the past has been done by allowing himself to be brought into contact with steadying influences from abroad, which he succeeded in blending with his own character to practical purpose. Thus he has found from outside sources just that which is lacking in his own character and has in so doing been able to accomplish great things.

Russian history began with the fusion of Slavonic and Finno-Mongolic races, but even then public affairs suffered from internal internecine strife. The *Vetché*, the old form of popular council, were only too often converted into a sort of bear-garden where no union or agreement could be reached for lack of the faculty of compromise in matters concerning public interests. Realising the utter impossibility to rule themselves and to live in peace and order, the Slavonic tribes invited Rurik, a Scandinavian warrior prince, to occupy, so to say, the chair and to lay down the law which should be obeyed by every one. The arrival of this foreign element was a great boon to Russia as forming the cementing and binding element, stiffening the central administrative power, and keeping the unruly spirit of the masses in check. But soon the old Slavonic vice of disorder and disunion

broke out again in the form of different small principalities opposing each other, and unable to come to a proper confederate understanding. In the result the country was too disunited to withstand the Tartar onslaught.

The Tartar yoke ruined Russia and kept her back for centuries, but at the same time it benefited the country by giving it a painful practical lesson in the necessity of submitting to the central ruling power. When Russia finally emerged from this ordeal she had acquired discipline. The Tsars who followed ruled with a rod of iron, having been taught in the school of Tartar supremacy. When this line of rulers died out, anarchy broke out again and lasted through the terrible fifteen years of the so-called *Smutnoye Vremya*—namely, the time of constant insurrections and upheavals. The only authority which remained unchallenged was that of religion. If religion can bring salvation not only to the soul but also into the actual conduct in the life of man, that applies particularly in the case of Russia. The Patriarch of Moscow was called upon by a National Assembly to save the country from ruin and to crown his son Emperor, thus founding the Imperial House of the Romanoffs. That house, strange to say, also had its origin from abroad, descending from an immigrant from Eastern Prussia.

During the three centuries of its reign, this house accomplished great things, thanks to the grit and statesmanship of such rulers as Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, who, it may be noted, was also of foreign origin, Alexander I, Nicholas I, and Alexander II. Russia expanded considerably during this period, becoming a great European Power sharing in the political destinies of Europe, and being respected, admired, and feared by her neighbours.

In the Russian Revolution, the political pendulum has swung from the policy of conquest and aggrandisement to the other extreme of granting complete independence to provinces of the Empire once won by the valour and sacrifice of past generations, now only to be abandoned with a blindfold liberality born from international doctrinarianism. If disintegration is for the benefit of humanity, this new

departure in Russian State affairs can, of course, only be applauded ; but if, on the contrary, the historical growth of great State organisms may be regarded as a better and fuller accomplishment of the multiple requirements of a civilised community, then the progress of Russia demands the holding of all territory acquired in the past irrespective of any local autonomy to be granted. The sound idea of local autonomy to be granted to the different provinces of Russia can only bring about satisfactory results if that autonomy is not exaggerated into independence and if the different parts of the State unconditionally recognise the overlordship of the central government which would bind them together.

Even at this present juncture the most vital artery of Russia's whole being lies in striving to preserve her unity as one State, indivisible.

CHAPTER VI

BOLSHEVIK POLITICAL ECONOMY

THE Russian Revolution has led to open and undisguised class warfare: war is waged by the uneducated classes against those educated classes possessing property. In order to put down the educated classes, the uneducated, led by untrained and unbalanced demagogues like Lenin and Trotsky, made it first of all their business to destroy wealth. To this effect the right of inheritance and possession was denounced in imitation of Proudhon's dictum: "*La propriété c'est le vol.*" A series of decrees was drawn up to serve that purpose. Municipalities were empowered to sequester all houses, inhabited or uninhabited, for the benefit of those who owned no abode or who were living in overcrowded or unsanitary dwellings; all factories were declared to be the possession of the operators working in them; all private ownership of land was annulled without compensation being made to the owners, and the land, being handed over to the cultivators, became nationalised. Large landed properties belonging to the State, the Church, monasteries, and towns were placed at the disposal of land committees of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates; all agricultural machines and implements, by the decrees of the Government, became the property of the State, the distribution of which was effected by the same land committees. State loans were repudiated; all stock became valueless. Confiscation of any valuables was practised on a large scale. To all intents and purposes this is not communism, but depredation pure and simple, for the purpose of enriching the class of the workmen, soldiers, and peasants, and pauperising the educated class.

The momentous question arises whether such a mode of action can be said to be founded upon sound principles, and whether it is consistent with political economy. It will be admitted at the outset that mere acquisition by unlawful means and without endeavour is unsound ethically, and also from the point of view of political economy. Similarly it is fatal for credit, the very foundation of trade and finance, to break assumed liabilities and to repudiate contracted debts. Such a course is, therefore, a bad guarantee for the promotion of finance, industry, and commerce. Plunder and theft destroy the stimulus for work and endeavour, which are incentives in the production and acquisition of wealth.

It is alleged that the workmen and peasants are the only producers of wealth, that all the necessities of life are provided for by them, and in consequence, therefore, their labour should be rewarded while the rest of the community, as useless drones, should not even have the right to exist ! Primarily it must be understood that the action of appropriation, called by the revolutionaries "expropriation," but commonly known as robbery and theft, does not come under the head of any principle, producing, as it does, merely a change of ownership. Those who have been enriched by predatory dictatorial legislation will, to be sure, turn the tables by becoming unwilling to give up their new possessions. The peasants after having seized the land of the previous landowners will be the first to declare themselves against any idea of nationalisation of the land. The workers, who have been endowed with all the means of production, such as factories, industrial works, fisheries, and so forth, will be loath to relinquish their new proprietorship. It will thus become apparent that the benefiting of the proletariat is but a lever to bring socialistic wire-pullers to power, and to allow licence to base instincts of rapine and deprivation of the lawful property of others. The principle of private ownership, very far from being eliminated, will, on the contrary, attest itself stronger than ever before, and socialism will be beaten by the very measures

of forcible expropriation to which it has taken refuge as a means of baiting the masses. It will prove thereby its inconsistency and insincerity.

Under the influence of Bolshevik theories manual work has struck, but the dearth of labour cannot affect any recognised economic principle, the only result being, as we have already shown, a change of hands. The present masters of the situation in Russia, the labourers, factory hands, shop assistants, waiters, and domestic servants, have secured for themselves exorbitant wages, and are thereby able to impose on everybody not belonging to the proletariat the most exacting conditions in payment for their work. The result was that some of the educated classes naturally began to undertake manual labour in order to profit by the fabulous pay exacted. For instance, army officers, whose pay is very low, became railway porters at the Nicolay railway station at Petrograd, and in that capacity earned a much better living than before. This proves that the inflated artificial prices ruling the labour market by special decrees of the Bolsheviks induce the educated classes to take the place of the former manual labourers, and, in consequence, become their formidable opponents, while it is impossible for manual labourers to engage in occupations for which mental training is required. The increased supply to the labour market and the increased demand for brain-workers will necessarily lower the prices for labour and raise the prices for brain-work. Thus the wages paid for labour in Russia, at present far exceeding the reasonable requirements of the working classes, will soon be brought to an economic *reductio ad absurdum*. On the other hand, the utter impossibility of making industrial production pay its way under the burden of wages disproportionate to the gain obtained from such production, must bring the economic life of the country to a standstill. This indeed has been the case in Russia, where the socialistic outrage of the national conditions under which the economic life of a country can be carried on has brought about destruction and ruin. A practical proof of the unsoundness of handling such economic

problems as industrial production from a purely theoretical point of view has been given by the Bolsheviks in Russia.

The great shortage in the production of commodities and in available labour, a direct result of the conditions of war, has produced a rise in prices and in wages which is economically unsound. In Russia the same reasons, conjointly with the effects of the socialistic nature of the Revolution, have augmented prices and wages by approximately 500 per cent. The economic position is desperate. Works had to be shut down, being unable to keep going at a loss. Those which manage to exist under such adverse and abnormal conditions simply drag on without making any profits, or are able to do so solely on account of special orders given by the Government, which are executed at exaggerated prices. From such a situation the question arises, Is manual labour from the economic point of view in a position to assume a dictatorial attitude?

Manual labour cannot possibly do without a guidance of brain work; the latter being even in a higher degree than manual labour necessary for the production of the requirements of life and its whole organisation. The workmen and peasants in Russia are out for a fight, they will have it. It is a fight between the directing brain-power and the physical exertion necessary for its materialisation. But can there be any doubt which side will win in the contest between brain and muscle? The history of the evolution of the human race tells an eloquent tale of the manner in which this evolution has come about. It was not physical strength which marked the development of man from the animal stage. Many animals, as, for instance, the gorilla, the mammoth, the tiger, and the lion, were endowed with infinitely greater muscular force than *homo sapiens*, but the latter was able to overrule them all, relying upon the strength of his superior brain-power, his social instinct, and the faculty to fight adverse conditions of nature more effectively than any other living creature. Those reasons which made men victorious over superior muscular force in the past still prevail in permitting that

section of humanity which represents brain-power, knowledge, science, and education in a higher degree to gain the upper hand over those engaged in manual labour.

If manual labour resorts to strikes, brain-power is in a position to resort to the same methods of fighting. Hitherto brain-workers have very rarely availed themselves of this weapon, owing to the fact that it was found difficult to reconcile such means with the maintenance of order and the stability of industrial production. But if emergency calls for action in this direction, brain-power will not shrink from taking the step. When Russian extremists under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky overpowered the dictator Kerensky, and took possession of Petrograd, the majority of the ministries opposed them with a resolution to cease work, and this sort of passive resistance of the educated classes and brain-workers went on and counteracted the carrying out of the socialistic decrees of the Maximalist Government except in cases where armed force was employed. This example of resistance may be taken as a fair test of what may be the outcome of the struggle between brain-workers and manual labour. Brain-power is unquestionably the primary factor of any undertaking. Under the present quite exceptional conditions manual labour has been enabled to enforce its claims, but when it comes to the test it will soon become apparent that the reach of brain-power is wider, its faculty to coerce stronger, and its resources more manifold for the fight between the two opposing forces. The labourers will be the first to starve, as the men directing them by brain and capital have much more resisting power ; the poor suffer more in an economic crisis than the rich.

As for the socialistic pretence that manual labour should be rewarded not less than brain-work, such a principle should be relegated to the realm of theories, which are in open opposition to the necessary conditions of life in our present state of culture and civilisation. Manual labour, and especially skilled labour, of course, represents brain-power in so far as useful work can only be performed if controlled by the brain ; but the man doing useful work,

not by muscular force, but by his intelligence in directing and counselling his fellow-men, and creating values of a higher economic or moral order, does work of a superior kind which should be acknowledged as such. Conscious of that fact such men possessing higher education, higher culture, naturally expect a correspondingly higher standard of living. It stands to reason that occupation in the more elevated atmosphere of science, theoretical and applied, literature, art, statesmanship, and so forth, generates other requirements of life than the healthier but simpler and more rudimentary mode of living of the man who uses muscular force alone. Hence the necessity of admitting and recognising that the reward for work done by brain or by physical labour should abide by different standards. Equality in this respect would be neither just nor economically possible.

Social revolutionaries aim at the suppression of personal responsibility and enterprise in favour of collectivism overruling the individual in politics, economics, and finance. Its policy is for the benefit of the mediocre, lazy, improvident, inefficient—in a word, for those who through lack of qualifications or the vagaries of Fate lag behind in the struggle for life, and its intention is to curb the endeavour of those possessing better qualifications for success or being more favoured by fortune. But a distribution of wealth, outside personal merit, stands in flagrant contradiction to the principles of equity and justice. There should certainly be equality in chances and opportunities as far as possible, but never and nowhere can a forcible interference in the distribution of wealth be obtained without doing an injury to one of the chief promoters of the production of wealth, i.e. personal merit.

Leaving out of account the element of luck which, though playing a conspicuous part in human affairs, of course lies outside the scope of investigation, the origin of wealth may be traced in industry, talent, energy, enterprise, and thrift. If, therefore, inequality in the possession of wealth is the postulate in the difference in the economic potential-

ties with which single individuals are endowed by nature the nationalisation, municipalisation, and collective dealings in industry, commerce, and trade cannot serve economy and benefit the production of wealth. As a matter of fact they often breed waste, carelessness, and inefficiency. Every one acquainted with practical business and the routine of life knows how much economic and financial success is dependent on the exertion of the individual working for his own profit. Humanity at large does not become richer, but poorer by discarding the element of personal risk and responsibility, which ensure in their train the utmost exertion in the application of all the capacities of the individual. A man who does his work for a fixed salary, not incurring financial risks, and without the possibility of acquiring wealth, will not exert himself to the same extent as others who actually realise that loss or gain depend upon the manner they go about their business. The greatness of England, politically and economically, has been built up by a brilliant array of prominent personalities, who had at their disposal every chance of reward and the risk of complete failure.

The political economy of Bolshevism is, therefore, radically unsound and does not tend to promote prosperity and progress.

It must, however, be admitted that during the period of fundamental, social, and political transition through which the world is at present passing, the economic life of the nations must necessarily undergo a complete revaluation. There is no doubt that the war will be a potent factor in bringing about a new structure of State and Society, correcting existing ideas in economic values, changing moral conceptions in the conduct of life, and improving the standard of existence for the vast majority of people.

Let us try to forecast some instances of such revaluation in the coming "new age" after the war.

It is a lamentable blot on our civilisation that a large proportion of the population is living under squalid conditions, suffering from hunger, privation, and the like, and, as

it were, foredoomed to degeneracy and premature death. The rich are held responsible, their apparent idleness standing in vivid contrast with the overworked poor. This view, however, does not touch the root of the matter. The fact that moneyed people exist does not necessarily imply that others are thereby impoverished ; moreover, it is untrue to assume that idleness and wealth are synonymous. Many rich people work harder than the poor, and laziness is as much a vice in the one class as in the other. The root of the evil does not lie in the difference between the substance of rich and poor, but rather in a faulty economic social organisation. It is a fact that with proper organisation of State and Society it would be possible to assure a healthy and decent mode of life to all who are willing and able to do useful work.

In the sense of bringing the democratic principle more strongly to bear upon State and Society, the war is bound to involve great changes. The masses fully realise that the war could not have been fought without their help, that they have suffered immeasurably, and that millions of them have lost their lives. It was not for them to decide as to the making of the war, they had no alternative but to follow the lead that was given. Thus in the future the Voice of the People will make itself more distinctly heard in the affairs of State, and greater influence in political power will be exercised by them as an outcome of their patriotic sacrifice in this tremendous struggle. The remnants of political privileges now accorded to birth, rank, and owners of property will disappear in favour of the levelling of chances for all, even as Nature herself is "no respecter of persons."

But what can be said about the differences entailed by occupation and education ? Will the proletarians, by sheer weight of numbers, pretend to rule the educated classes as has been the case in the Russian Revolution ? Are the theories of Tolstoy, the Muzhik philosopher and the extreme Socialist, to hold the field in depreciating intellectual training, learning, and accomplishments, and in viewing the simple-minded but ignorant peasant as the best and most useful

member of State and Society? Indeed, such a teaching would be contrary to the fact that education and learning improve rather than detract from a man, from all points of view, and if that is so, the educated man whose judgment is matured and based upon positive knowledge and comparison is unquestionably more fitted to be entrusted with the reins of Government in State and Society than the man whose mentality is undeveloped. In this respect, therefore, there can be no equality, and all efforts tending to level men to one standard will only bring about a reduction in personal capacity, talent, and the higher powers of mind, energy, and character.

There remains, however, to be settled the great question of the difference in the scale of wealth which reduces one man to a state of abject poverty and leads another to the unscrupulous abuse of power. The problem of a proper and equitable distribution of wealth is of pressing urgency owing to the growing education and enlightenment of the people, the materialistic tendency of the age, and the possibility of acquiring colossal fortunes by speculation and such paths as lie outside the field of persistent effort and honest work.

The capitalistic form of economic life among modern civilised nations has given to wealth the power of multiplying at a speed hitherto unknown, and has left the masses who are not in possession of riches in a more or less stationary position. Although the poorer classes have gained in their standard of life in comparison with the past, the difference between those who have and those who have not has become more glaring than ever. This is chiefly due to the fact that other differences in the fortunes of men, such as the privileges of birth, social standing, and inequality of rights before the law have been swept away by democracy, the possession of wealth remaining the only decisive factor in social position, and the amount of comfort, luxury, or pleasure at their disposal. The whole civilised world has become more or less plutocratic as a direct consequence of capitalism.

On the other hand, the innumerable inventions of modern times have given to men an undreamed-of mastery over nature, and have opened out to those who can avail themselves of such inventions possibilities of enjoyment and of all sorts of pleasurable sensations of which humanity was previously unaware. The improved means of communication, the marvels of science adapted to the uses of practical, everyday life, and the many devices which counteract the limitations of time and space and multiply the physical and intellectual powers of men—the world and all that is in it belongs to those who are possessed of wealth. It therefore becomes all the more imperative to satisfy the requirements of justice inborn in men regarding an equitable, harmonious, and beneficial distribution of wealth. Thus the problem has a double bearing : (1) on the principle of justice, and (2) on political economy.

The principle of justice involves the consideration of merit. Personal capacity, initiative, and energy should be adequately rewarded in order to maintain an incentive to useful work, but to what extent in each separate case remains to be seen. Modern life is interdependent and interwoven with the many and various services rendered by the one to the other. The isolated individual is like a drop of water in a mill-stream, unable to perform any work without the co-operation of all the other drops of water forming the whole force of the stream itself. The association of different factors in the production of wealth plays such a prominent part that in forming an idea about the proper distribution of wealth this cannot be left out of account. The formula that riches should be enjoyed according to personal merit does not entirely meet the case. In the present state of culture and civilisation the individual cannot be considered atomistically—each for himself—but must be regarded in the light of his relationship to State and Society as a whole. It is the fable of Menenius Agrippa all over again. Different organs perform different functions, but each one is necessary for bringing about the phenomenon of human life, or, from an economic point of view, for producing wealth. Manual

labour argues, not without reason, that brain-power cannot do without it, just as the reverse order of things is claimed to be equally true. In a social organism there are different functions to be performed which require different expressions of skill and power. The postulate in rewarding personal merit in the production of wealth has, therefore, to be qualified in so far as such merit is not confined to the one primary mover and initiator, such as the capitalist or inventor, but must be extended to the vast number of workers who, in one way or another, are all engaged in the process of production of wealth in all its forms.

But the more complex question arises : to what extent should the people involved in the production of wealth be rewarded ? It must be admitted that the distribution of wealth as it exists at present is far from satisfactory. There are classes of brain and manual workers whose incomes barely cover the necessities of life, with no prospect whatever of increasing their financial standing by industry and thrift—a state of affairs which is unsound both economically and morally, as not affording the right incentive for work to those who should be encouraged. On the other hand, there are many occupations, such as, for instance, operations on the Stock Exchange and speculations of a more or less doubtful character, which permit wealth to be acquired without entailing a proportionate amount of exertion. In either case a certain amount of adjustment is necessary.

This adjustment is one of the chief aims of modern legislation, and probably will be so until the rich are taxed to breaking point and conditions of life have been to a great extent equalised. Revolution and violence will not be necessary. Gradual and peaceful evolution will have a pronounced and beneficial influence as the possibilities of feeding, housing, clothing, and educating the population increase. Millions of workers now spending their whole existence in providing for the luxuries, caprices, and fanciful requirements of the rich will turn their energy to the more useful work of satisfying the natural needs of individuals and the community as a whole.

Of course capitalism, which is one of the mainstays of modern economic progress and the chief cause of the difference in the wealth of individuals, will always exist, but its function will be mainly carried out by co-operative societies, federative associations, municipalities, and the State, thus mitigating the marked and glaring contrast which has hitherto existed in the economic position of individuals.

Although no country can at present exist without it, it would be rash to assume that capitalism unconditionally works for the happiness of the people. It is, however, a system which ensures efficiency more than any other form of economic organisation. The last phase of the Russian Revolution, in attempting to destroy capitalism, has resulted in Russia losing her international credit, trade, and industry, and involving the country in a terrible famine. Here is indeed an object-lesson. Up to the present no system has been found which as a practical working proposition could take the place of capitalism.

But there is still great scope for improvement in the conditions of human life moving towards the greater development of personal freedom. Owing to the exigencies of war, the whole course of existence has been subjected to a bureaucratic regime which will be looked upon as intolerable as soon as peace is re-established. It is especially irritating and burdensome to be dependent on those who, being responsible for the production of the necessities of life, take advantage of the shortage of commodities by raising the market prices. Moreover, a rigid centralisation of the economic and social mechanism to promote the efficiency and fighting value of the nation has interfered with individual discrimination, curtailed personal enterprise, and introduced a sort of modern slavery which is but an example of what the application of collectivism on the whole gamut of life may mean to the freedom of the individual.

In order to secure a greater measure of personal liberty it is necessary to extend the limits of activity by enabling the producer to be the consumer as well, so far as the cir-

cumstances of his life permit. Economic centralisation and the division of labour in great industrial centres have resulted in the lives of millions becoming atrophied, reducing a man's mental and moral outlook, and converting him into a soulless machine. Overcrowded masses herded together in the life of large towns are physically and morally unhealthy, breeding racial degeneration, involving a decline in the birth-rate and compromising individual happiness. The various prominent inventions which have given to humanity facilities for promoting home comforts, in providing clothing and all the necessities of life, even the possibility of enjoying artistic productions at home, have made man independent of towns. It is evident that decentralisation and home-production of the necessities of life best assure economic freedom and a satisfactory existence to each and all who are willing to pay the price in personal endeavour. Evolution, not revolution, is needed. A fair life start should be given to each and all, a proper differentiation made in individual capacity and merit, a just reward meted out for manual as well as intellectual labour, a greater personal freedom assured by means of the individual production in the necessities of life and the possibility of leading a well-regulated existence in healthy surroundings for every worker—such is the progress demanded by present-day civilisation.

CHAPTER VII

PROSPECTS OF REGENERATION

ACCORDING to the idea of the Russian extremists, who at present hold the reins of government, the future of Russia lies in a Russian Federation of Republics. But the separate parts of the gigantic territory of Russia are far too different in their national conditions, their historic past, their racial elements, state of culture, and development to wish to enter such a complicated State organism as is necessitated by a federative structure of republics.

The examples of the United States of America, Switzerland, or the Commonwealth of Australia are of no avail as object-lessons. These State organisations consist of members equal in their cultural progress, and having grown together organically by a slow and steady process of evolution. On the contrary, the different parts of Russia have very little in common in their political aspirations, and are even opposed to each other by old historic feuds, by differences of religion, economic conditions, and race. They have never joined hands of their own free will, but have only been welded together by the unifying rule of the Tsars of the Houses of Rurik and Romanoff. Once such a central power is non-existent and is not replaced by a power capable of exercising the same function of centralisation, the Little Russians, the Poles, the Lithuanians, Letts, Esthonians, Finlanders, the Tartars of the South, the Caucasians, the Hebrews, the populations of Siberia, and the half-civilised, partly nomadic tribes scattered all over the different outskirts of Russia only desire to be left alone to work out their salvation by their own means and resources, and to be no longer interfered with by an exacting rule from Moscow or Petrograd.

The Ukraine with Kieff, the cradle of ancient Russia, possesses its own Little Russian language, its own literature, and forms a cultural entity of its own. The Cossacks of the Don, who in the past afforded refuge to those oppressed by Turkish as well as Moscovian rule, and having enjoyed autonomy, being individual freeholders of their land, form a distinct cultural unity among the Russians. The same may be said of the Cossacks of the Terek and Kuban and Transcaucasia. Siberia, a storehouse of untold mineral, agricultural, and forest wealth, and conscious of its brilliant future as an economic factor in the world's market for raw products, food-stuffs, and other commodities, would deserve an organisation of her own. The Tartar Khanat of the Crimea, which by religion belongs to the Moslem world, has its own traditions; Finland, its own racial configuration; the Poles, their own proud historic past. The Baltic provinces, by their racial diversity and their peculiar economic conditions, have also a claim to be considered as a separate entity in a more pronounced way than this was accorded to them by the former Russian bureaucracy.

It is well to bear in mind that the Revolution in Russia had in the very beginning only the character of a national protest against misrule, but soon degenerated into an insurrection of the alien elements of Russia against the power of the Great Russian centre. The Great Russians who have welded Russia together by conquest and superior statesmanship, having been the mainstay of the country, find themselves in the minority in comparison with the people of the other races of Russia taken together. Old Moscovia has developed an appetite which has surpassed its power of assimilation—a very dangerous position which now has a strong bearing on the prospects of the future vitality of Russia. There is, therefore, grave danger that the idea of a federation of republics on the territory which up to the present formed the Empire may lead to a repetition of recent events in the Balkan Peninsula, where the Balkan States, after having emerged from the centralising and

detested rule of Turkey, could find nothing better to do than to fight each other in fratricidal strife.

A Federative Republic in which about 70 per cent. of the component parts of the population is illiterate would be an absurdity. It requires a fair amount of intellectual maturity and education to be able to play the part of a republican, whereas in Russia the great majority of the people requires, first of all, education and a strong and enlightened lead. At all times when a backward population has been saddled with a too-advanced political constitution the inevitable result has been that political factions, irresponsible wire-pullers, and all sorts of adventurers and demagogues get the upper hand, and use the votes of the uneducated masses as stepping-stones for personal ambitions on which to erect an arbitrary power devoid of any sense of responsibility. Instead of the one autocrat of bygone days, Russia is now in danger of being possessed by a gang of autocrats provided, not with sceptre and crown, but with the more illusive power of bewildering and deceptive oratory.

The idea of a Federative Republic in Russia would, according to all probability, lead to never-ending unrest, uncertainty in the near future, internal strife, and final decomposition, preventing the country from giving to her population adequate education, from developing her wonderful natural resources, and entering into her birthright of prosperity. Russia's only salvation lies in the return of authority and of a strong central power from whatever quarter such may arise. History repeats itself as far as the same causes produce the same effects. Another Nestor could chronicle: "Our land is rich and plentiful, but there is no order in it." Then a call rings out from the hearts of all well-intentioned patriots for a rule capable of according local autonomy without endangering the unity of the Empire.

Reaction will surely set in in a not far-distant future as a mighty rushing back-flow following the present impotent ebb of disintegration, the bacchanal of licence, and the apotheosis of self-will. Only true patriotism, and not idle

chatter about revolutionary ideals and political rights, can save Russia in this her darkest hour of trial. As of old, religion still plays a very prominent part in the psychology of the majority of Russians. It is here that the anchor of hope should be cast for a possible regeneration of the country and the restoration of law, order, and authority.

Patriotism and religious fervour are not dead in Russia. They have only been temporarily overpowered by the sudden storm of international socialism and the agnosticism of the so-called intellectuals (*intelligentsia*). Both these latter factors are of a foreign nature, and are strange to the soul of the Russian people. In the turbulent and torpid cross-currents of Bolshevism, patriotism and religion still constitute an immovable rock upon which the edifice of the State can be erected. The appeal to patriotism and religion does not mean a reactionary programme; it is only a call for stability, in which the present Government with its strong socialistic tendencies is hopelessly deficient. It does not even menace the Home Rule character of the Revolution, provided that the central power which the Great Russian has hitherto exercised is unconditionally maintained. The position of Russia as one of the leading Powers of the world can only be held under such conditions.

It is perhaps time for Russia to look for examples of prosperous and advanced democracies who have managed their affairs in an enlightened fashion and secured success. In this respect the British Empire, which in territory and number of population is even greater than Russia, might serve as an object-lesson. Great Britain has in the past experienced some difficulties similar to those which at present have befallen Russia, but has emerged from them with flying colours. Great Britain, with her strong love of freedom and personal liberty, her unequalled public spirit, practical statesmanship, her highly educated population, and the existence of all the necessary premises for the creation of a successful republican commonwealth, has found it none the less imperative to preserve the monarchy. It was certainly not a lack of understanding of republican

or democratic ideals on the part of the British people which maintained monarchy in England ; it was the practical consideration of the necessity of preserving the unity of the huge Empire which could not be otherwise held together than by retaining and confirming that principle as a counter-balance to Home Rule. The person of the King-Emperor assures the principle of homogeneity and co-ordination in the plurality of the separate parts of the Empire. Great Britain understood the advantages of local autonomy, and found in the monarchy the necessary counterweight which prevents the diversified edifice of the State from dissolving itself into its component parts. The success of this State system of particularism blended with monarchical solidarity has been unequalled. The self-governing colonies, able to shape their own fortunes according to local requirements, although of much more recent creation than Russia, have with gigantic strides emerged from primeval savagery and become highly cultured, prosperous communities, while Russia has remained practically stationary, and, on the other hand, Great Britain has proved herself to be much more united under the spur of Imperialism than Russia could ever hope to become.

The inference is patent. Russia would be safer in applying such methods to her future which in the case of Great Britain have already proved their worth. A republic may or may not be a good thing in itself, but for Russia under existing conditions it would no doubt be unsafe and irrational. According to the democratic idea, the people should have the means of expressing their will intelligibly. In Russia, however, the vast majority of her population do not even understand the nature of a republic, their whole political conception of the State being rooted in the idea of a monarch as the viceroy of the Deity.

The principle of democracy demands equal chances for all as to the development of knowledge, character, and talent, but is not necessarily bound up with one special form of State administration. On the contrary, such government should be adapted to the form of education,

the special conditions of life, and the historical state of progress of each country. A republic of the type of France, or a constitutional monarchy of the type of Great Britain or Italy, may equally assure these aims. In Russia 80 per cent. of the population belong to the peasant class, and are not able to, or even desirous of, taking an active share in the political direction of the country. In these circumstances, which will remain unchanged for the next generation if not longer, Russian democracy would seem to require, by no means the restoration of the old regime, which died a quasi-natural death unregretted by the vast majority of Russian citizens, but a truly representative form of government—whether it be republican or monarchic—which is able to offer sufficient guarantees of stability in the maintenance of law and order, and of conscientious fulfilment of its duties towards the nation.

The present regime in Russia is able to carry on its precarious existence only by the corrupt methods of confiscation and bribery. As long as there is a share to be taken in spoils from the State, landowners, and educated classes of the country, the Red Guards and other retainers of Bolshevism—workmen and peasants—will be kept in a good humour. It is evident, however, that this state of affairs can only last provided that there is something to confiscate and there are bribes to be had. When the country is entirely and utterly ruined, and trade and industry come to a standstill owing to the exaggerated pretensions of labour, communistic socialism will be at the end of its tether. A tremendous storm of indignation from the famished and ruined population will burst forth and sweep it away. Regeneration will follow.

Nothing can come from nothing. Negation denies construction. The disorganisation of the army, civil administration, local self-government, the undermining of the economic life of the nation, the breaking up of family ties, the destruction of Church and religious faith, the dissolution of law and order through despotic rule and anarchy, the corruption of existing moral principles, the dispersing of

the wealth of the nation, the repudiation of the State debt, have annihilated the very foundations of order without giving any assurance for the continuation of civilised human existence.

But tragic and inexpressibly painful as the present moment is for the Russian nation as well as for her Allies, Russia's prospects for the future are far from being hopeless. The ravages of revolution will pass away, but there still remain her great advantages of an unrivalled geographical position, immeasurable natural wealth, and her teeming, striving population. The industrial and agricultural production of this vast country is bound to increase by leaps and bounds when the turmoil of anarchy has died down, life has returned to its previous conditions, and Russia's credit is re-established. The most difficult thing to do will be to efface the consequences of the ignominious and treacherous peace concluded with the enemies of the Alliance. This can only be effected by the introduction of a new constitutional element of order and authority which will infuse regenerated vigour and vitality into the weakened State organism. That this may soon come to pass is the heaven-sent prayer of all Russian patriots and those of her friends abroad who have not lost faith in Russia's future.

It is in the interests of Russia's Allies that she should be saved from further anarchy and resuscitated as a great Power capable of fulfilling her financial engagements, of producing wealth, of carrying on international commerce, and of exercising that political influence in the world due to her territorial importance and her teeming population. But as disorganisation and dissolution of discipline and authority have gone so far that the elements of order have become powerless, and as, unfortunately, there is no reason to look for a regeneration of Russia from within in the near future, it is imperative to take into account a regenerating power that will come from without, or at least with outside assistance.

In the face of the Russian repudiation of her State debt, the British and French Governments made a declaration

that "the obligations of Russia continue to be binding upon the new State or group of States, by which Russia is or will be represented." This claim is, of course, in full consonance with international law and cannot be contested, but the question as to how these obligations are to be enforced is a more difficult one. Moral and peaceful persuasion will scarcely be of avail, not even by pointing to the fact that Russia's own interests are at stake in the ultimate issue. The further prolongation of anarchy, sapping the life-blood of the nation and impeding its recovery for generations to come even more disastrously than did the Tartar invasion, cannot deter the purpose of those who have deliberately created chaos and the utter disintegration of the civilised structure of State and Society. But it is certain that the longer the instruction of the growing generation, the development of industrial production, and the organisation of a regular course of human life are delayed, the deeper the Russian nation sinks into the mire of moral, economic, and political impotence. As anarchy grips closer with more deadly fingers, the last remaining shreds of order will be worn away!

The Russian people require, above all a strong lead and a truly religious influence: both have been denied them by the Revolution, and on that account alone the Revolution may be pronounced a hopeless fiasco. Russia's future does not lie in revolution, but in the restoration of order and authority, and as neither a Cromwell nor a Napoleon have been produced by the Revolution, the only way out of the impasse was to find another issue to secure these ends.

The loyal and well-intentioned elements in Russia had no alternative but to accept assistance from abroad. The Russian people, unfortunately, are not able at present to create for themselves a stable government. Their historic past amply shows that they are too easily misled, too often disunited among themselves and lacking in initiative. These characteristics are aggravated by the ruin of the agricultural and industrial capacity of the country, the utter disorganisa-

tion of the civil administration and of military power, civil war, and the bankruptcy of finance. The Allies appreciated the full significance of these facts, and rightly decided on an armed intervention. The proclamations then issued to the Russian people made it quite clear that there is a fundamental difference between such an action and the unwarranted occupation of Little Russia by German troops. Either intervention may be explained as saving Russia from herself for the sake of her own peace and order, but it is in the interests of the future relations of the Allies with Russia to avoid anything like an imitation of a mode of action which Germany has forced, and it would be doubly fatal to the Allies if they were to take steps of a character which might be considered by Russians as no less humiliating than the invasion of their territory by the Germans themselves. To that effect the Allied intervention should assist the elements of order in setting up a thoroughly Russian government worthy of the name without actually taking the rule of the country in their own hands. In Russia's own interests, therefore, as well as for her creditors, intervention in her affairs of State become more and more imperative, in order to counteract and control the influence which the Central Powers are already wielding in that direction. It is necessary to establish in Russia :

(1) A counter-weight to the independent and uncontrolled influence of Germany and Austria-Hungary ; and

(2) A benevolent temporary guardianship on behalf of civilisation and the comity of nations.

If these two propositions be right, then the result must be co-operative action in some sort of form, possibly similar to the attitude adopted by the Great Powers in subduing the Chinese Boxer Rebellion. Allied intervention should cope with civil war in Russia and avoid disruption of the country into two opposite camps, one siding with the Central Powers, the other with Great Britain and her Allies.

A Government authority would have to be created, relying upon the confidence and active support of all civilised nations having interests to defend in Russia,

which would assure to the country order and the credit of a civilised nation. This course should be taken as soon as it is possible from sheer necessity, since the very solidarity of civilised nations demands it.

It is the avowed object of Bolshevism to induce the proletarians of all nations to make the same wreck of State and public affairs which they have so thoroughly succeeded in doing in their own poor stricken country. Wherever and whenever anarchy occurs it is like a contagious pestilence and should be extirpated lest it spread to other parts of the world.

The present disintegration of Russia cannot by any means be considered as of a permanent nature. It is manifestly a pernicious growth, the outcome of the fallacies of extreme socialism and the result of an ephemeral misunderstanding which are bound to disappear in the light of common sense and patriotism. This anticipation is further supported by the fact that those provinces which availed themselves of the "right of self-determination" broke away from the centre of the Empire, not on account of centrifugal tendencies, but rather owing to Bolshevik misrule. Here again the present chaos in Russia shows no sign of being drafted into channels of a new political structure, but, on the contrary, distinctly bears the mark of sterility. The present dismemberment of Russia does not, therefore, sound the death-knell of her unity and power, but is bound to disappear with all the follies and extravagances of the Revolution.

The future of Russia depends entirely upon her capacity to overcome the present internal chaos. She has lost certain parts of her territory in her disastrous conflict with the Central Powers, but when she finally succeeds in shaking off the disintegrating influence of her socialistic revolution she will be able to reinstate herself as one of the Great Powers of the world. That she will do so may be reasonably concluded from the purely negative turn which the Revolution has taken. The chain of relentless destruction, reducing Russia to a political status of ephemerality and absurdity,

cannot last, but out of it must arise a mode of life and a form of political structure which will guarantee her previous industrial and commercial potentialities.

At present Russia offers a spectacle of turmoil not unlike that which followed the French Revolution, when one of the diplomatists who was accredited to Royal France made the remark: "La France a disparu de la carte politique de l'Europe, c'est un vide," to which a distinguished Frenchman made reply: "Oui, c'est un vide, mais ce vide est un volcan!" And so it was. France emerged from that volcano stronger than she was before. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same may be said of Russia.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BALTIC PROBLEM

THE Baltic Provinces deserve special attention ; a short survey of the main issues which confront Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and the islands of Dago and Oesel may be welcome. Thanks to their geographical position, their agricultural as well as industrial development, and their well-educated population,* they form a priceless jewel among the component parts of Russia.

The information contained in English periodicals and books about the Baltic question in its historical and political bearing is rather scanty and often misleading. Some periodicals even do not know how to style the nobility and bourgeoisie of the provinces and describe them as Baltic Germans. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk and the occupation of these provinces may have induced the Germans to speak of Baltic Germans as now belonging to Germany, but since such a peace is regarded by the Allies as null and void, the fate of the Baltic Provinces will only be determined when the whole political map of Europe is remodelled in the interests of all the belligerents, and not, as at present, at the dictates of Germany !

It is true that the nobility and bourgeoisie of the Russian Baltic Provinces are, for the greater part, descendants of those Teutons who colonised these provinces in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—namely, not less than seven or eight hundred years ago. But at all times and everywhere the criterion for the international designation of a population is their political nationality, not their original racial descent.

* The Baltic Provinces have the smallest number of illiterate persons in comparison with all the other provinces of Russia.

The founders of the United States of North America, who, like the Baltic stock, are not aborigines, but colonists—and of much more recent date—are known as Americans, be they of British, Dutch, German, Slavonic, or Scandinavian origin. Finlanders of Swedish descent are not called Swedes, but Finlanders: the Franks, the founders of France, were of Teutonic race, but although the Germans are also of that origin, the Franks, or the Français, as they call themselves at present, certainly cannot be styled Germans! “There are few people in this country who are not of Teutonic origin,” announced Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons recently, but emphatically he did not mean that Englishmen should be called Germans! Since the inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces—of Teutonic, Lettish, and Esthnish descent—became Russian citizens, they registered themselves whenever they travelled abroad as Russians according to their legal right, or as *Balten*. Those of Teutonic descent were never even called Germans by the Germans themselves, but *Deutschrussen*, i.e. Russians of Teutonic extraction. Russians, likewise, do not call the inhabitants of these provinces Germans (*Germantsy*), but reserve this appellation exclusively for the people of the German Empire. But, on the contrary, those of foreign descent naturalised in Germany *are* called Germans even though they may bear such names as Butler, Keith, Tilly, Mackenzie—corrupted into Mackenzen.

Reverting from past to present-day conditions, it should not be forgotten that the inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces have fought on the side of the Allies up to the time of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk; this consideration alone, therefore, would arouse their objection to being called Germans, an insinuation which might easily cast suspicion on them in the eyes of the British. Those descendants of the Baltic nobility who are now fighting in the ranks of the British Army would naturally resent being called Germans. Under the heading, “Damages for being called a German,” the *Times* of June 12, 1918, reported the case of one Louis Steinberg, “a Russian born in Courland,” who was awarded

£250 damages at the Northampton Assizes from defendant, who had described him as a German. That makes the position abundantly clear.

The beginning of the history of the Baltic Provinces resembles early English history in so far as the Saxon founders of the English heptarchy were of the same racial origin as those of Livonia. Up to the present the Esths, natives of Esthonia and Livonia, call the people of Teutonic descent inhabiting the provinces "Saxons." Looking through the historic vista of the past, the English Saxons may be reminded that there is a close relationship between themselves and the Baltic Saxons, although centuries of a different fate have, to a certain extent, obscured the remembrance of the tie between the people of these happy islands and those of the severely tried Baltic shores. Since their foundation by the Saxons both countries have been overrun by various invaders, but neither lost touch with the other. Two illustrations of this fact may be quoted: King James I of England gave the island of Tobago, one of the Lesser Antilles, as a present to his godchild, James, Duke of Courland, of the Kettler dynasty; then, again, many British families, such as Hill, Scott, Jacobs, Addison, Magnus, Miller, Proctor, Armitstead, Gregg, Gordon, Bruce, Keith, and others, immigrated to the Baltic Provinces and intermarried with the local nobility and bourgeoisie. Many families of Baltic noblemen have intermarried with Russian, Swedish, and Finlandish stock, not to mention numerous cases of Baltic noblemen who, having left their provinces, settled in the interior of Russia, intermingling for generations with the Great Russians. All points to the fact that in the course of their long history the educated classes of the Baltic Provinces have created for themselves a new ethnographic individuality and a particular Baltic type of civilisation and culture. In short, a new Baltic nationality is in the making.

The English have no quarrel with the Baltic Provinces. Before the outbreak of war there was a brisk trade going on between Great Britain and Libau, Riga, and Reval. It

would appear, therefore, that from the point of view of British interests it is advisable to regard the people of these provinces as friends.

The Baltic problem presents itself under a threefold aspect :

- (1) The lessons of the political past with significance for the future ;
- (2) Baltic particularism ;
- (3) The educated classes in their relation to the Lettish and Esthnish peasantry.

I

In the political map of Europe there are certain specially contested danger zones from whence the spark of international conflagration has again and again blazed forth in the past, and which in the interest of future peace demand peculiar treatment. Such are the Balkan Peninsula, the borderland between Italy and Austria, Alsace-Lorraine, and also the Russian Baltic Provinces, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and the islands of Dago and Oesel.

Once more in history the fate of these provinces is in the balance. While the Bolshevik Government, recognising, as already mentioned, a newly invented right of self-determination even to the extent of a complete severance of all races forming part of the population of Russia, has agreed to the political independence of Finland, and has furthered the same policy towards the Baltic Provinces, with a view to retaining them, if possible, as part of the prospective Russian Federation of Republics, Germany intended to make of these provinces a new *Bundesstaat*. The Russian and German idea coincides, therefore, in so far as home rule is concerned, and differs inasmuch as the Russian or German overlordship is involved.

The satisfactory solution of this political problem, with a view to attaining permanent peace, depends not in a small degree upon a thorough appreciation of the lessons afforded to the unprejudiced mind by the historic past of these provinces.

In prehistoric times Finnish Mongolic tribes occupied the territory stretching from the Caspian and Aral Seas to the shores of the Baltic. In the times of early Russian history Slavonic tribes which had their habitat west of the tribes of Mongolic race succeeded in subduing them and subsequently intermingling with them, thereby making a wide breach in their previous uninterrupted chain running from south to north. In the south the Kalmucks, Kirghis, Tcheremis, and other tribes; in the north the Finns in Finland, the Esthonians, who up to the present time populate Esthonia and the northern half of Livonia, the Lives, who held the southern part of Livonia, and the Coures inhabiting Courland, were not Slavonised. But the Lives and Coures fell a prey to the Letts, who, together with the Lithuanians, pushed forward from the south and occupied the territory which afterwards formed the Principality of Lithuania, Courland, and the southern part of Livonia. The last descendants of the Lives could some fifty years ago still be found in the west of Livland, and of the Coures in the west of Courland, but both tribes must nowadays be considered as extinct. The reason why the Letts fought their way towards the Baltic shore was the necessity of having an outlet to the sea.

In the twelfth century German adventure brought about a new change in the fate of the Baltic shores by sending colonists from the North of Germany, chiefly from Bremen, Lübeck, Hamburg, Hanover, and Westphalia, the abode of the great tribe of the hardy Saxons who gave Charlemagne so much trouble in subjugating and Christianising them. In 1201 Riga was founded by Bishop Albrecht.

Just as the Saxons had themselves been converted to Christianity by fire and sword, so they turned the same methods prevalent in that time upon the Letts and Esths. The Pope of Rome gave them his blessing, and under his auspices the Holy Livonian Order of the Brother-Sword-bearers was formed with a view to stamping out paganism in the Baltic lands. These fighting monks cannot be regarded as *Conquistadores*, as they were imbued with the

high religious ideals of that time. They had to give a triple oath of lifelong obedience to their superiors and swear to poverty and chastity. In their fortresses and castles they lived an austere life of prayer, and waged battle whenever they were called upon to fight. It was a hard task to convert the Baltic pagans, and in the fifteenth century crusades were preached in Northern Germany under the auspices of Rome for the Christianising of the Baltic shores. These efforts helped the Order of the Livonian Sword-bearers to foster emigration from Germany and to become a powerful State, which, however, had to defend itself against insurrections and the growing weight of the Moscovian Tsars, Poland, and Sweden. The Order, under the leadership of the Herrmeister Walter von Plettenberg, inflicted many a defeat upon the Moscovians, but Ivan the Terrible succeeded in devastating and subjugating the land. The State of the Livonian Order was hard pressed on three sides by the Moscovians, the Poles, and the Swedes, until in 1561 the last Herrmeister, Gotthard Kettler, had to surrender the Order, albeit securing for himself Courland as Temporal Dukedom suzerain to the Crown of Poland under the Kettler and, later, the Biron Dynasty. The last of the Kettlers married the niece of Peter the Great, Anna Ivanovna, and died suddenly, or was murdered, soon after the marriage ceremony, near Petrograd. His widow then resided in Courland until she was called upon to ascend the throne of Russia. During her time in Courland she had a liaison with an adventurer Buren, or Biron, whose ancestors hailed from Mecklenburg. This man was later made Duke of Courland through the instrumentality of the Empress Anna. He did not belong to the Baltic stock, and his immoral career cannot, therefore, reflect as a discredit on them.

The Livonian Order ceased to exist in 1561; Livonia at first became a Polish province, thence, after a series of fierce wars between Poland and Sweden, it passed into the hands of the latter, and subsequently was lost to Russia by Charles XII in the eighteenth century, after his disastrous

campaign against Peter the Great, by the Peace of Nystadt in 1721. Later, in 1795, after the third Partition of Poland, which, as already mentioned, held suzerainty over the Duke of Courland, the Duke had to abdicate, and the Diet of the Nobles petitioned the Empress Catherine to incorporate the province into Russia. From these incessant wars between the three Great Powers surrounding the ancient State of the Livonian Order, it appears that each considered its possession as a *conditio sine qua non* for further development. Especially the Moscovian Tsars and Peter the Great, who, finding it imperative to "open a window towards the West of Europe," deemed it necessary to possess that territory for the further development of the State, as the geographical position of these provinces is such that their position as an outlet to the sea, or as an essential prolongation of the coast-line, was indispensable to the growth of a first-class Power in the North.

These lessons in history teach that the Baltic Provinces have changed hands each time when the Power which owned them became too weak to defend them. Owing to their geographical position they have in the past been an apple of discord and have suffered terrible devastation through the ravages of war. In the present war they were conquered by Germany owing to the exceptional circumstances of the Russian Revolution which involved the military collapse of Russia. It remains to be seen, however, whether Germany could keep these possessions secure from reconquest. A glance at the map shows that they form a long stretch of territory along the seashore open to invasion from Russia.

The German plan is evidently based on the presumption that Bolshevik rule, with its code of international generosity at the expense of Russian national aspirations, will last for ever. When the present regime in Russia is superseded by a Government which is not enfeebled by international sentimentality, when chaos is replaced by order, impotence by might, then Russia, to be sure, would again make a great effort to reconquer the Baltic Provinces for precisely the same reasons which induced Ivan the Terrible and

Peter the Great to make their successful push to the Baltic shores. By binding these provinces to her political system Germany would, therefore, create in Europe another and more menacing Alsace-Lorraine question, involving herself in the necessity for further armaments, with the clear anticipation of another terrible world conflagration—a vision which is unbearable at the present moment when the civilised world, crippled by the slaughter of millions of men in the flower of manhood, and impoverished by wholesale destruction and lack of production of the necessities of life, is on the verge of famine and of the return of primitive savagery. The civilised world is crying out for peace and a permanent safeguard against the manace of war. To realise that end, disputed danger zones must exist no longer!

II

But what about the internal peace of the Baltic Provinces which has been constantly endangered by the struggle of particularism against bureaucratic centralisation, and by the aspirations of the Esthnish and Lettish Reform party against the nobility and bourgeoisie? Will a further prolongation of Russian sovereignty in the Baltic Provinces assure them a satisfactory peaceful development?

At the Peace of Nystadt concluded in 1721 between Sweden and Russia, Peter the Great granted Livonia and Esthonia, "on his behalf and on behalf of his successors," the formal right of home rule, with the promise of non-interference in educational, religious, juridical matters, and self-government. The same principle was extended to Courland in 1795 when the Empress Catherine incorporated this province with the Empire. However, these formal public obligations were disregarded. The provinces were subjected to methods of administration which embittered the local population. Religious tolerance was interfered with, local educational establishments were closed and replaced by inferior Government institutions, the University of Dorpat was systematically ruined, local jurisdiction was abolished,

finally the Baltic Provinces became the dumping-ground for second-rate Tchinovniks, who ruled the land in a fashion thoroughly uncongenial to the people. The native inhabitants were regarded as undesirable for administrative posts in the provinces. They had, therefore, to look out for occupation in the interior of Russia. Many of them distinguished themselves by superior statesmanship and talent. Field-Marshal Baron Roenne won the Battle of Poltava for his sovereign, Peter the Great—a battle which decided the life-and-death struggle which Russia was waging at that time with Sweden. Osten-Sacken and Totleben worked miracles in the campaign against the Turks; the names of Fersen, Dibitch, Witgenstein, Munich, and Toll are written in the annals of Russian military successes; Osterman, Nesselrode, Sievers, Korff, Reutern, and Bunge benefited Russia by their able statesmanship.

No doubt the sons of the Baltic Provinces have contributed to the greatness and power of Russia. They have served Russia to the best of their ability, faithfully and loyally, identifying their own interests with those of the Empire, but whenever the spirit of Moscovian aggressiveness and intolerance became more virulent they were treated harshly, unjustly, even cruelly. During the present great war the persecution of the Baltic stock of Teutonic descent was going on in face of the fact that none of them refused to fight for Russia, that many won high distinctions for valour on the battlefield or died for their country, and that whenever they had a chance to do so they served their country with all their power and energy. Whatever may have been their worth in the past they have always upheld order, law, and organisation, and in this respect their services were invaluable to Russia. But as soon as war broke out a veritable campaign was started for depriving them of office, and men were thrown out of employment who were the mainstay of the administration and industrial life of the country, for no other reason than that they were of Baltic origin. It was a case of "cutting off the nose to spite the face," for Russia was thereby sacrificing one of the buttresses

of her political and social structure. The systematic discarding of generals bearing German names during the war was a grave mistake, for these men were a most reliable, loyal, and efficient element in the Russian Army. In discarding men of their own nationality, but of Teutonic origin, holding positions in the army, civil administration, and industrial establishments, Russia did herself indeed a terrible wrong. These men simply could not be replaced. Their absence was one of the reasons of the quick degeneracy of the Revolution into rapine and anarchy.

Baltic particularism—namely, the tendency to preserve home rule which Russian bureaucracy has tried to stamp out, and which cannot be considered as unloyal—is shared by all the three racial elements, and is not based upon German sympathies, but rather on the belief that the Russian bureaucratic State-rule was not conducive to the welfare of the people. Baltic literature of the last fifty years has shown an astonishing foresight in prophesying that the rotten state of Russia economically and politically would bring her to a speedy downfall. No wonder, therefore, that Baltic particularism tended to avoid Russian administrative methods, and thought its salvation lay in local self-government. But this has not impugned Baltic loyalty.


It is, therefore, the more regrettable that during the present war people of the Baltic stock of Teutonic descent have been exiled to Siberia and other distant parts of Russia, robbed of their property, ruined, and treated no better than enemies. After the disaster of Riga, when the army retreated through Livonia, the local population were subjected to maltreatment and murder, while their lands were devastated. The Russian soldiery, finding in the homes of the Lettish farmers and freeholders, pianos, pictures on the walls, and modern comforts of cultural life, denounced them as "bourgeois," and treated them to the same persecution that had been meted out to the landed gentry.

But these lamentable events now, happily, belong to the past, and will not be repeated in the future. Russia and the Allies propose to remodel the political relations of the

civilised world on the basis of self-government and devolution. The danger of further bureaucratic centralisation of the previous Russian Empire, the suppression of local administration and of autonomy, has passed away. If Russia regains the territory she held before the war and the Revolution, it can only be achieved as an overlordship over countries ruled by their own laws, their own authorities, and following out their own destinies. Under these conditions there is every reason to believe that a further prolongation of Russian sovereignty over the Baltic Provinces would lead to their peaceful development and prosperity.

III

The same conditions must lead to a satisfactory co-ordination or fusion of the Teutonic with the Lettish and Esthnish elements. The Baltic nobility and bourgeoisie will consolidate and amalgamate themselves with the Letts and Esths now that the fetters of the Russian bureaucracy have broken, and any attempt at sowing discord amongst them must fail. The Russian bureaucracy used the Letts and Esths as tools against the nobility and bourgeoisie. All efforts made by the latter towards local reforms in a liberal and democratic sense were systematically thwarted. During the last fifty years the Diets of the three provinces submitted to the Imperial Government a series of projects of progressive reforms in order to bring the Letts and Esths into line in equality of rights with the Baltic stock of Teutonic descent. But all these projects found an early grave in the archives of the Government, since it was deemed expedient to keep open the grievances of the Letts and Esths as a constant irritant. Not content with this insidious policy of playing one part of the population against the other, the Russian bureaucracy endeavoured to instigate the Lettish and Esthnish peasants against their landlords, to infect the schools with extreme socialistic propaganda, and to disorganise the whole economic and social fabric of the country. The bureaucracy sowed the storm and reaped the whirl-

wind. It was in 1905 that the Lettish socialistic revolution in Courland overthrew the Russian governing power for the time being, and in 1917 that a Bolshevik regiment in Petrograd composed of Letts took a prominent part in upholding the Bolshevik regime. 

The prospects for building up home rule in Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland are very encouraging. It should be an easy matter to politically co-ordinate the Letts and the Esths with the Baltic stock of Teutonic origin who Christianised, civilised, organised, and managed the country for centuries, bringing it to a high level of agricultural, industrial, and social development assisted by the numerically superior Letts and Esths. There may be political differences between them which have been unduly exaggerated and aggravated by political agitators, but it remains a fact that until fifty years ago, the Baltic burghers and nobility of Teutonic origin lived in close and amicable and, it may be said, patriarchal relations with the Lettish and Esthnish people of town and country. The former patriarchal state of affairs had, of course, to give way to more democratic social intercourse, and the ruling gentry endeavoured to bring this about. While serfdom was abolished in Russia proper as late as 1861, Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland liberated their peasants in 1816, 1817, and 1819—namely, nearly half a century earlier; and while Petrograd organised the economic life of the Russian peasantry by means of the unpractical and retrograde common ownership of land, subdivided every ten years among the householders of the village, the Baltic landed gentry introduced private lease followed by freehold property among their peasants. The result was that the Baltic Provinces, in comparison with the other provinces of Russia, were more prosperous and more advanced in agricultural methods. The Letts and Esths, especially the former, when emigrating into the interior of the country and competing with Russian peasants, easily beat them by superior capacity for work and by more rational methods of cultivation. They were subjected by the landed gentry of their country to a school, hard perhaps, but at any rate a

school which the Russian peasantry have not had, and which guarantees for success in life.

At present the Baltic stock of Teutonic descent stand face to face with the Letts and Esths on the common ground of equality. There can be no question of superiority of the one race over the other, they are all willing to unite in their very devotion for their common Baltic home, and to work together for its welfare. As in the case of Switzerland, where the Teutonic, French, and Italian element keep their own national individuality, but form together one political unit, it would be quite possible for the Letts, the Esths, and the Baltic stock of Teutonic origin to remain true to their respective distinctive racial features. During the existence of the Livonian State, and afterwards up to the present time, no attempt was made to denationalise the Letts and the Esths. This may be taken as a pledge for racial tolerance in the future.

In judging the past of the Baltic Provinces it is not fair to apply modern moral standards to bygone centuries. The condition of the Letts have caused a certain amount of censure to be attached to the nobility of the Baltic Provinces, on the supposition of their having impaired Lettish progress in bygone times. That may be a very regrettable fact, but it is really difficult to see how it could have been otherwise, judging by the standard of that time. After all, the Letts were conquered by the Livonian Order, their aristocracy voluntarily assimilated itself with the invaders, who, with all due respect for the Lettish state of efficiency, had the advantage over them in Christian culture and civilisation, and their lower orders remaining peasants were not denationalised. While the old Prussians who inhabited Eastern Prussia were Germanised by the Germans to the extent that even their language has disappeared, the Letts were allowed to remain faithful to their ethnographical particularity. The modern Lettish national movement was, therefore, in the first place possible owing to Baltic racial tolerance.

Attempts to Russify the Baltic Provinces have, on the

whole, lamentably and hopelessly failed. The power of the Great Russians—forming 48 per cent. of the total population—as the State-building and governing race, was, to a certain extent, neutralised by the forcible methods of Russification adopted by the bureaucracy. Brutality, intolerance, and persecution merely provoke an intensified strife for the preservation of ethnographical and religious individuality. The more the local administration, the system of education, and the Protestant religion were subjected to interference, the more tenaciously the people clung to them to defend them against aggression. The educated classes of Teutonic and other descent, the proletariat and peasantry of Lettish and Esthnish origin, were all unanimous in their dislike of the forcible bureaucratic measures imposed upon them.

Russification in the Baltic Provinces bore no better results than the Germanisation of Posen and Gnesen, besides which it had special difficulties with which to contend. It would have facilitated matters if the people thus tyrannised had gained by the changes brought upon them. Unfortunately, however, just the contrary was the case. The population of the Baltic Provinces was, in every respect, more advanced than the rest of the Empire, for instance, in their agricultural methods, their standard of education, their economic prosperity, mode of living, ethical culture, and organisation. What incentive, therefore, could there be for the Baltic people to exchange these advantages for the state of affairs existing in the interior of the country?

The chief and fatal error of "Tsarish" Russia which impeded its progress in all directions, and also in its effort at Russification, was the neglect of national education. If the enormous sums of money provided for in the budget for military purposes had been spent on educating the masses, Russia would, to be sure, have avoided the present disaster which has befallen her. Russian bureaucracy suffered from the ridiculous and fatal fear of diffusing knowledge and instruction among the people, much as the Bourbon kings of the Two Sicilies encouraged ignorance and superstition among their subjects, under the supposition that it is easier


to rule over illiterate masses than to keep educated people in control. The whole trend of the Russian Revolution has now solved this controversy. The masses of the *Muzhiks* and *Tovaristschi* (peasants and revolutionary compeers) more easily fell a prey to extreme socialism and anarchy as their utter lack of education prevented them from discerning the fallacies of such subversive doctrines. They formed a plastic and inert material in the unscrupulous hands of socialistic wire-pullers.

The policy of Russification assumed that people not belonging to the nationality of the ruling centre cannot be relied upon as long as they have not been stamped with the impression of the dominant race. This policy, of course, entailed endless suffering, and, as a direct result of the persecution inflicted, local patriotism became more than ever tenacious of self-expression, and struck its roots still deeper into its native soil. So it was in Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, the regions inhabited by the Tartars, and in the Baltic Provinces. The supposition that people of different races cannot be trusted by the overruling Central Government is nothing short of a *testimonium paupertatis* and the uneasiness of a bad conscience. If, instead of being a slave-driving taskmaster, the Central Government had applied its energies towards furthering the welfare of all its dependent races, combining and co-ordinating with them in goodwill, tolerance, and freedom, there would have been no fear of a breach of allegiance. The three racial units forming the Swiss Republic, and the many ethnographical elements which are component parts of the United States of America, form solid blocks from which there is no danger of dismemberment. The Alsatians, who have never been subjected by France to denationalisation, being allowed to remain a German-speaking race, are, up to the present time, French in their sympathies, for the simple reason that they were content under tolerant French rule. The British Empire comprises in its fold very different races who are all always ready to fight together for the sake of the Empire. The

new Russia of religious and racial tolerance and of administrative devolution will follow this enlightened lead, and rise again a free federation of autonomous provinces, which will prove to be as politically homogeneous, prosperous, and happy as are the United States of America and the British Empire.

A new and better life must spring forth in the Baltic Provinces from freedom, tolerance, and local autonomy, where the Baltic stock of Teutonic descent stand for order and organisation, the Letts for adaptability and endeavour, and the Esths for industry and perseverance. These are, indeed, State-building qualifications out of which it would be possible to construct a democratic commonwealth of prosperity and progress, contributing to the maintenance of the peace of the world. Any racial chauvinism, intolerance, and preference of one race in comparison with another must ultimately lead to disastrous results. He, therefore, who would stand up for the good cause of Christian ideals should refrain from instigating one part of the population of the Baltic Provinces against the other, and rather strive to bring about understanding and harmony between them.

At the termination of hostilities, when the political map of Europe is readjusted, the status of Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia will have to be settled. In order to safeguard Europe from further strife for their possession, all the Great Powers should guarantee their immunity from external aggression.



CHAPTER IX

THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF RUSSIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BRITISH INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES *

IN order to place British opportunities in Russia upon a more practical footing in Russia it is necessary to investigate her tremendous productive forces and natural resources which have been hitherto rather neglected. For the purpose of showing the economic resources of the Russian State it is more important to refer to the years preceding the war than to the present time when the normal economic conditions of the country are out of gear. I have used as the chief source of my information the official publication edited by the Central Statistical Committee of the Russian Home Ministry, converting Russian *poods* into British tons, and Russian *dessiatinas* into British acres, the pood being taken as equal to 36.11 lb., and the dessiatina being taken as equal to 2.7 acres.

Means of Communication.—The rational exploitation of the economic potentialities of a country lies in the development of her means of communication. According to the *Russian Statistical Annual* published in 1915, the length of railways of general importance was in 1914 only 62,912 kilometres—namely, 1.1 kilometre to every 100 square kilometres of territory, and 4.1 kilometres to every 10,000 inhabitants of the Empire, while Great Britain can boast of 12.0 kilometres of railway to every 100 square kilometres of territory, and 8.1 kilometres to every 10,000 inhabitants. The United States have more than five times the length of railways

* Extract from a Paper read at the Royal Statistical Society in January 1917.

Russia has, although their population is approximately only one-half of the number of the inhabitants of Russia, and their territory represents only one-third of the Russian Empire.

No wonder then that under these conditions the great natural wealth of Russia has hardly been touched, that her industrial production is only beginning to tell its tale. Russia by the shock of the war has been awakened to the necessity of fully availing herself of her economic potentialities and of exploiting the great resources with which she has been endowed. To solve this great problem satisfactorily she not only relies upon her own strength, but also looks to her Ally, Great Britain, whom she believes is willing to assist and uphold her in her creative enterprise, organisation, and capitalisation. Being one of her creditors, Great Britain is directly interested in helping Russia to increase her exports, organise them on a sound basis, and develop her industries, which are quite able to provide Great Britain with all she requires from abroad.

Size and Population.—Russia is a land of gigantic economic possibilities. Extending over half of the continent of Europe and a third of Asia, she comprised before the war a continuous area of not less than 8,760,000 square miles. This area stretched over 163 geographical degrees from West to East and over 35 degrees from North to South. Russia is larger than the United States, Canada, and India combined; she is more than twice the size of the whole continent of Europe. Her population of 186 million inhabitants is equal to that of the whole of the American continent (North and South) and Australia taken together, or that of the combined population of the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy. It exceeds the aggregate black and white population of Africa, also that of the United States and Germany taken together.

This great Empire was only surpassed in size and population by the British Empire, which comprised before the war 13 million square miles with a population of over 440 millions of people. These stupendous figures will be even more

enlarged by the conquest of the German Colonies, the declaration of the British Protectorate over Egypt, and the acquisition of Cyprus, Palestine, and Mesopotamia by Great Britain during the present war. Russia has, however, two great advantages over the British Empire in its geographical continuity and ethnographical homogeneity. The Empire presents one uninterrupted great stretch of land, and its population—for the greater part—belongs to the white race.

The British and the Russian Empires, put together, account for approximately 40 per cent. of the world's population and 40 per cent. of the terra firma of the globe.

This gives an idea of the political and economical weight of the co-ordination of the two greatest State organisms which have ever existed, a co-ordination which seems to be ordained by the natural conditions of their very existence ; politically because their ideals and aims in assuring national independence to smaller friendly States are the same ; from the point of view of world-power because they are complements to each other, the one being the chief continental Power, the other the chief naval Power ; economically, because they can mutually provide each other with that of which they stand most in need, and which they can produce in greater abundance and in better quality than any other country.

Climate.—The climate of Russia is polar in the north, temperate in the middle zone, and reaches sub-tropical heat in its southern regions. The agricultural products of the soil are, in consequence, of a most varied nature. In the forests are grown pine, fir, cedar, larch, birch, oak, maple, elm, beech. In the fields wheat, rye, oats, hemp, flax, barley, jute, beetroot, mangold, rape, cotton, maize, rice ; in gardens and plantations tobacco, tea, grapes, all sorts of fruits—apples, pears, oranges, mandarines, tangerines, cherries, plums, figs, apricots, peaches—and vegetables of every imaginable kind, all in great abundance.

Timber.—The North of Russia is covered with the largest stretches of forest land in existence, of which much has not yet been properly surveyed, but which are rightly considered

as inexhaustible, provided that transport facilities are forthcoming. The other chief sources for the supply of timber, the Canadian, American, and Scandinavian forests, have been sorely depleted and cannot possibly increase, their yield; it therefore appears that Russia is bound to become, to an even greater extent than at present, the chief provider of the world's market of this valuable material for the use of building, for navigation, wood pulp, and many other purposes. While the supplies of wood from other countries are necessarily steadily diminishing, supplies from the almost limitless forests of European and Asiatic Russia are on the increase owing to the improved shipping facilities through the Kara Sea to the Yenisei, to the White Sea and Alexandrovsk on the Murman coast. The railway connecting Petrograd with Alexandrovsk and the projected railway lines to the mouth of the gigantic Rivers Yenisei and Obi will considerably increase the possibilities of the export of timber. It can be said, without exaggeration, that Russian resources of timber represent an untold wealth of the country, and that Great Britain, as well as other countries of the world, will, in the future, be obliged to draw on these resources. The timber trade in Russia stands next to the grain trade. The average annual exports during the years 1906-10 were: from Riga, 1,216,129 tons; from Libau, 164,516 tons; from Archangel, 633,709 tons; from Petrograd-Cronstadt, 962,903 tons; Windau, 262,903 tons. In the years preceding the outbreak of war, Great Britain received half her imports of wood from Russia, a proportion which will increase in favour of Russia in the future. It may, therefore, be assumed that in regard to timber, Russia occupies the position of a purveyor without the services of whom Great Britain could not exist for long.]

Fur.—The same may be said of another article of export coming from the North of Russia, valuable furs which make the London market the centre of the fur trade of the world. According to the *Russian Statistical Annual* published in 1915, the number of wild animals and game killed in professional

shooting for commercial purposes in 1913 and their total value comprises the following items and figures :

	Total number	Total value in roubles
Bear	1,444	17,724
Wolf	7,342	29,322
Common fox	20,156	128,073
Blue fox	21,228	232,254
Skunk	33,785	25,906
Siberian sable	17,007	21,824
Ermine	77,648	175,771
Marten	1,797	15,560
Sable	20	800
Squirrel	573,983	181,021
Hare	344,316	88,470
Musk	503	169
Reindeer	288	1,488
Elk	1,537	20,627
Roe	4,000	16,139
Boar	545	1,917
Wild cat	2,169	1,444
Tiger	453	4,659
Total	1,108,221	964,168
Hazel hen	1,049,545	247,347
Woodcock	246,438	70,445
Grouse	22,633	10,973
White partridge	188,792	29,714
Grey partridge	35,581	6,974
Bustard	1,294	1,005
Duck	131,817	27,787
Goose	14,380	9,559
Swan	1,072	1,376
Grebe	2,502	419
Total	1,694,054	405,599

These figures do not comprise the animals and game killed for sporting purposes. They must be very considerable, but are not shown in the official statistics.

Agriculture.—Russia is, notwithstanding her mineral wealth, primarily and chiefly an agricultural country. About three-fourths of her population are engaged in agricultural pursuits. The great plain, which stretches from

the Western frontier of the Empire to the Pacific Ocean, only interrupted by the Ural and the Altai Mountains, is favoured with very fertile soil. In the central provinces, the famous black earth yields for several years consecutively an excellent harvest without the need of any artificial fertilisation.

Russia is one of the world's principal producers of grain. According to estimates made by experts, she produces 51 per cent. of the rye, 25 per cent. of the oats, 33 per cent. of the barley, and 22 per cent. of the wheat grown on the surface of the globe. According to the *Russian Statistical Annual* published in 1915, the area under cultivation in 1914 comprised 133,658,843 dessiatinas (260,878,876 acres), of which were cultivated :

	Dessiatinas	Acres	Percentage of the total area
With grain (rye and wheat)	78,386,257	211,642,893	58·2
„ potatoes . . .	3,536,130	9,547,551	2·7
„ oats . . .	17,644,894	47,641,213	13·2
Of grazing meadows .	34,645,032	93,541,586	25·9

The harvest in 1914 comprised :

	Foodstuffs	Tons
Grain	3,680,026,100	59,355,000
Potatoes	1,621,300,300	26,150,000
Oats	808,764,900	13,045,000
Hay	2,973,149,500	47,945,000

This harvest showed an increase (+) or a decrease (—) on the average of the five years 1909–13 as to :

		Foodstuffs				
Grain (rye and wheat)	(—)	65,154,700	or	98·2	per cent.	of that average.
Potatoes	(+)	103,263,900	„	106·8	„	„
Oats	(—)	88,049,800	„	91·2	„	„

An ever-increasing quantity of Russian food-stuffs is

sent abroad. The following table shows the increase of those exports over a period of fifteen years from 1895 to 1910 :

	1895		1910	
	In millions		In millions	
	Roubles	£	Roubles	£
Exports of—				
Cereals (rye, wheat, and oats) .	333	35·1	750	79·2
Forest products	40	4·2	138	14·6
Eggs	20	2·1	64	6·7
Dairy produce	3	0·3	53	5·6
Miscellaneous, including beet-sugar	209	22·1	245	25·9
	605	63·8	1,250	132·0

Of this amount, a comparatively small quantity reached Great Britain. During the period 1887–1910, the Russian exports of wheat to Great Britain fluctuated from 125,000 tons to 1,445,000 tons. Russian grain went chiefly to Germany. That country received from Russia during the decade 1901–10 an average annual amount of 810,000 tons. It is to be hoped that the grain export of Russia to Great Britain will increase with the further development of an organised system of grain elevators, with the opening of the railway connecting Petrograd with the ice-free Murman port of Alexandrovsk and the hostile tariffs which Russia probably will have to meet in Germany.

In addition to the figures showing the enormous production of cereals and other food-stuffs in Russia, mention must also be made of cotton, which, although an industry in its infancy, is developing rapidly, promising to make Russia independent of all imported cotton. The total production of raw cotton in the Empire comprised, in 1914, 607,000 tons, exceeding that of 1913 by 143,000 tons, and that of 1912 by 180,000 tons. In 1914, cotton was cultivated on 1,068,828 acres. The yield in the best districts is 450 lb. per dessiatina. Russia's cotton industry comprises 10,000,000 spindles, her 360 cotton mills with 215,000 power looms

consume 2,000,000 bales of 500 lb. each. It is worthy of note that 90 per cent. of the machinery used in Russian cotton mills is of British make.

Russian agriculture is also connected with cattle breeding on a gigantic scale. Before the war, the live stock in Russia comprised approximately 70,000,000 sheep, 50,000,000 cattle, 31,000,000 horses, and 13,000,000 pigs. A very considerable trade is done in poultry, eggs, and game.

The vast distances of the Empire, the difference of climate in its various parts, and the great accumulation of goods at the special periods of the year when these are ready for sale and exportation, make the question of cold storage a subject of outstanding importance. British engineers have played an important part in establishing refrigerating apparatus, but more could be done by them in future to supply Russia with adequate means of assuring perishable goods a safe delivery to customers abroad.

Bacon.—In close connection with agriculture stand the bacon, tobacco, fruit, wine, tea, fish, paper, and beet-sugar industries. The bacon trade is chiefly due to English enterprise and capital, and here we have a good example of how English requirements can benefit Russian production and develop its possibilities. The experiment of supplying the Russian peasant with the best quality of pigs for bacon has enabled even poorer peasants to take up the occupation of fattening pigs. Hitherto only the wealthy peasant was able to do this as the heavy-weight pigs for sale in Russia had to be fed up during fifteen to eighteen months. The bacon factories have created a new demand for light pigs, which are ready in from five to six months. The advantage for the pork breeder is such that the output of pigs can easily be increased two or three times with the same capital. There are at present eight bacon factories: two in Siberia, one in Poland, one in the Baltic Provinces, and four in the Central Provinces, but as soon as the war is over and its economic effects have been overcome, this trade is bound to increase as—once properly organised—it must be of great economic value and promises to be a very lucrative business.

in a country like Russia which can supply an unlimited number of pigs.

Tobacco.—The cultivation and manufacture of tobacco is another very promising economic feature of Russia, which is already in a flourishing condition. According to the *Russian Statistical Annual*, the total area under cultivation of tobacco in Russia comprised, in 1913, 295,409 tobacco plantations, covering an area of 154,327 acres. Russia, therefore, already occupies the second place among the tobacco-growing countries. In 1913 the area under tobacco was, in the United States, 1,209,600 acres; in Hungary, 110,700 acres; in Japan, 75,600 acres; in Germany, 35,100 acres, and in Rumania, 27,000 acres.

Not less than 84·80 per cent. of the tobacco plantations are to be found in European Russia proper, while the rest are situated in the Asiatic parts of the Empire. The following figures show the number of plantations and the area under tobacco in the different parts of the Empire in 1914 :

	Number of plantations	Area under cultivation	
		Dessiatinas	Acres
European Russia proper	250,394	35,406·85	95,598
Vistula Provinces	6	Not mentioned	—
The Caucasus	23,747	20,916·6	56,464
Siberia and the Steppe Region	21,253	760	2,052
Turkestan	9	75	202

In the northern parts the tobacco is of the common sort known as *mahorka*, while in the Crimea and the Caucasus the finer brands grown at Sukhum, Trapezund, Sotchi, and Kutais are cultivated. Immense areas extending from Novorossisk to the Turkish frontier along the Black Sea shores known to be suitable for tobacco growing are not yet cultivated. But as the demand for the finer brands of Russian tobacco is growing in Russia as well as abroad, a very considerable development of the Russian tobacco industry is only a matter of time. Undoubtedly any enterprise in that direction has the most brilliant prospects.

Sugar.—The beet-sugar industry in Russia—one of great importance—is steadily growing and is bound to increase considerably in the near future. Only lack of capital and proper organisation has prevented Russia from becoming the first among the nations engaged in the sugar industry. Climatic conditions and the quality of the soil would favour much larger crops of beetroot than those obtained hitherto. Assistance for the introduction of better methods in this culture is required. A vast field awaits the enterprise and energies of the British in the introduction of modern methods in the beet-sugar cultivation into Russia. The following table, taken from the *Russian Statistical Annual* published in 1915, shows the expansion in the cultivation of beet sugar, 85 per cent. of which is obtained in the centre of European Russia, and 15 per cent. in the Vistula provinces :

	Area of cultivation		Quantity of beetroot harvested and used in the fabrication of sugar	
	Dessiatinas	Acres	Poods	Tons
1912-13 . .	684,266	1,847,518	639,002,130	10,306,486
1911-12 . .	712,501	1,923,752	817,123,700	13,179,414
1910-11 . .	604,212	1,631,372	799,567,210	12,734,955
1909-10 . .	499,360	1,348,272	423,839,000	6,836,113
1908-09 . .	498,528	1,346,025	497,805,210	8,029,116

The progress in sugar production in Russia is revealed by the fact that in—

1885-86 . . 38,980,000 poods (628,800 tons) were produced in Russia.
 1892-93 . . 64,180,000 „ (1,025,200 „) „ „
 1910-11 . . 117,190,000 „ (1,896,200 „) „ „

In the past Russia had to meet the competition of Germany and Austria in the sugar market, and her exportation of sugar was limited on the strength of the Sugar Convention of Brussels. The war has altered her position and will make it possible for her to export sugar on a much larger scale, supplanting German and Austrian sugar on the

British market. Before the war her sugar import into the United Kingdom was far behind that of Germany and Austria, as is shown by the following figures for the year 1913 :

British Imports of Refined Beet Sugar

From Germany	.	.	.	.	465,453 tons.
From Austria	.	.	.	.	198,063 „
From Russia	.	.	.	.	2,939 „

Fruit.—Fruit-growing is another flourishing industry which is not sufficiently known abroad, chiefly owing to the fact that the exportation of fruit from Russia has hitherto only been carried out in a purely spasmodic way quite unsuitable to the market. Here again our friends the British could be of assistance in helping us to organise this promising industry. In the Crimea, fruit-growing is a lucrative business. Fruit-preserving factories are expanding. Little Russia, Ciscaucasia, the Black Sea and the Caspian region, Bessarabia, Podolia, Simbirsk, and Saratov are also rich in the production of apples, pears, nuts, and other fruits. Ferghana, Bokhara, and Khiva abound with almonds, pistachios, pomegranates, oranges, and other southern fruit. The different products manufactured from fruit, for instance, the fruit jellies, jams, and preserved fruit of Kieff, deserve special mention for their excellence and would find ready sale in Great Britain if they were only brought to the market in a manner more attractive to the eye.

Wines.—Russian wines, which are almost unknown in Great Britain, will certainly be largely exported in the future. The Crimea and Bessarabia produce light table wines; Turkestan and the Caucasus, heavier table wines and champagne. They are of very good quality, but up to the present not sufficiently matured, and their price is moderate in comparison with that of French wines.

Tea.—Tea is grown in plantations near Batoum and has proved to be of good medium quality. As there is a great area suitable for tea-growing along the shores of the Black

Sea, it is probable that in the future Russia will only import the finer brands from China, India, and Ceylon, and satisfy her requirements, to a great extent, by home-grown tea.

Fisheries.—A source of great wealth lies in Russia's fisheries. There does not exist a complete valuation of the total yearly output of the fisheries, but it is not improbable that their value exceeds those of any other countries. The fisheries are divided into geographical zones. According to the *Russian Statistical Annual* published in 1915, the output, value, and number of persons engaged in this industry in the year 1911 are represented by the following figures :

Zones	Output of fisheries in poods (ooo's omitted)	Output of fisheries in tons	Value in roubles (ooo's omitted)	Number of persons engaged in fishing
The Caspian region .	23,167,	373,700	66,367,	172,000
The Upper Volga . .	2,916,	47,000	2,280,	10,000
The Azov and Black Seas	4,182,	67,500	6,262,	35,000
The Baltic	2,697,	43,500	5,394,	21,000
The North-West Lakes .	1,809,	29,100	2,928,	11,000
The Murman and White Sea Coasts	900,	14,500	2,000,	14,000
Total in European Russia	35,671,	575,300	85,231,	263,000
The region of the River Obi	753,	12,100	2,379,	4,300
The region of the River Yenisei	162,	2,600	486,	900
The region of Lake Baikal	280,	4,500	788,	2,500
" " " Yakuts	57,	900	71,	500
" " Far East .	4,500,	72,600	4,200,	8,000
" " Turkestan .	2,500,	40,300	4,000,	17,000
Total in Asiatic Russia .	8,252,	133,000	11,924,	33,200
Grand total	43,923,	708,300	97,155,	296,200

According to this table the Volga-Caspian fisheries stand first. A large amount of this catch, and especially the more,

valuable kind of caviare, is exported abroad. In Astrakhan immense refrigerating plant and storage accommodation serve this purpose. The richest sturgeon river is the Kura. It yields annually not less than 320 tons of caviare. Besides the sturgeon, the Caspian region contains carp, silurus, bream, barbel, salmon, and other species.

The Caucasian region is famous for its herring fisheries, the Black Sea for its beluga. The Baltic Sea fisheries are chiefly engaged in the catch of sprats, pilchards, cod, eels, smelts, flounders, salmon, and sig. Riga and Reval are the chief centres of the canning industry. The fisheries of the lakes of the North-West are also of great importance, although they require organisation.

The Northern region of the Murman and White Sea districts is chiefly engaged in open-sea fishing for cod, haddock, flat fish, wolf-fish, salmon, navaga, herring, and seal.

The Far Eastern fishing industry is engaged chiefly in the catch of salmon, the bright red nerka, and herring. In 1910, over forty millions of herrings were caught in this region. The estuary of the Amur is especially famous for its quantities of salmon. The fisheries in these regions will attain much greater dimensions when properly organised.

The Turkestan fishing industry, comprising the basin of the Aral Sea, is chiefly engaged in the catch of the silurus, bream, vobla, sandre, carp, barbel, pike, and sturgeon.

Fish farming, which was started in the Polish and Baltic Provinces, has a great future in Russia owing to the natural conditions prevailing in the Empire, which are favourable to such farms.

Paper.—The manufacture of paper in Russia is favoured by the unequalled wealth of timber grown on Russian soil. Yet Russia is poor in supplies of wood pulp, a material which is indispensable for the requirements of paper-mills. This rather surprising fact can only be explained by lack of organisation. Russia's manufacture of paper has remained far behind the ever-increasing demands of the market, with

the result that the price of paper has, in a comparatively short time, risen to nearly 400 per cent., and that great quantities of paper had to be imported from Finland and abroad. This state of affairs is quite abnormal. It is a sign of lamentable inefficiency, as natural conditions have provided Russia with the means to satisfy her own demands, and also the requirements of buyers from abroad. It is to be hoped that, owing to powerful stimulus from Russia or friendly foreign quarters, this industry will be provided with a more thorough organisation.

Minerals.—The mineral resources of Russia, lying in her soil, have hardly been touched and await the help of our friends and allies for their development in the near future. According to the *Russian Statistical Annual*, 1915, the output of minerals in the Empire in poods (one pood is equal to 36·11 English lb.) for 1912 and 1911 is as follows :

	1912		1911	
	Poods	Tons	Poods	Tons
Gold . . .	3,569	57	3,584	57
Platinum . . .	337·3	5	352·5	5
Silver . . .	1,100	17	947	15
Lead . . .	103,740	1,673	75,585	1,219
	(ooo's omitted)	(ooo's omitted)	(ooo's omitted)	(ooo's omitted)
Zinc . . .	715,	12,	746,	12,
Copper . . .	2,047,	33,	1,594,	26,
Pig-iron . . .	256,266,	4,133,	219,363,	3,538,
Iron and steel . . .	227,541,	3,670,	202,707,	3,269,
Manganese ore . . .	50,192,	810,	43,123,	695,
Coal . . .	1,887,000,	30,435,	1,784,690,	27,979,
Naphtha . . .	565,300,	8,634,	558,749,	9,012,
Salt . . .	116,364,	1,877,	122,940,	1,983,

According to their places of origin, the output of these minerals in 1912 was as follows :

	THE URALS		THE NORTH AND NORTH-WEST		THE WESTERN MINERAL REGION	
	In poods	Per centage of the total output	In poods	Per centage of the total output	In poods	Per centage of the total output
Gold . .	670	18·8	—	—	—	—
Platinum . .	337·3	100·0	—	—	—	—
Silver . .	400	36·4	—	—	—	—
Lead . .	6,010	5·8	—	—	900	0·9
Zinc . .	—	—	—	—	534,600	74·8
Copper . .	1,082,000	54·9	—	—	—	—
Pig-iron . .	50,600,000	19·7	66,000	0·0	23,900,000	9·3
Iron and steel	39,400,000	17·3	15,441,000	6·8	24,600,000	10·8
Manganese ore	150,000	0·3	—	—	—	—
Coal . .	60,000,000	3·4	—	—	394,500,000	22·3
Naphtha . .	—	—	—	—	—	—
Salt . .	25,838,000	22·2	137,000	1·2	263,000	0·2

	MOSCOW AND VOLGA REGION		THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST		THE CAUCASUS	
	In poods	Per centage of the total output	In poods	Per centage of the total output	In poods	Per centage of the total output
Gold . .	—	—	—	—	—	—
Platinum . .	—	—	—	—	—	—
Silver . .	—	—	—	—	267	24·3
Lead . .	—	—	—	—	95,430	92·0
Zinc . .	—	—	—	—	180,200	25·2
Copper . .	—	—	—	—	595,000	30·2
Pig-iron . .	8,300,000	3·3	173,400,000	67·7	—	—
Iron and steel	20,100,000	8·9	128,000,000	56·2	—	—
Manganese ore	—	—	14,742,000	29·2	35,300,000	70·5
Coal . .	12,900,000	0·7	1,299,400,000	67·3	4,300,000	0·2
Naphtha . .	—	—	1,000,000	0·2	548,300,000	97·0
Salt . .	—	—	84,340,000	72·5	78,000	0·1

	TRANSCASPIA		TURKESTAN		WESTERN SIBERIA	
	In poods	Per centage of the total output	In poods	Per centage of the total output	In poods	Per centage of the total output
Gold . .	—	—	—	—	365	10·2
Platinum . .	—	—	—	—	—	—
Silver . .	—	—	—	—	433	39·3
Lead . .	—	—	—	—	1,400	1·3
Zinc . .	—	—	—	—	—	—
Copper . .	—	—	—	—	294,000	14·9
Pig-iron . .	—	—	—	—	—	—
Iron and steel	—	—	—	—	—	—
Manganese ore	—	—	—	—	—	—
Coal . .	—	—	6,000,000	0·3	43,200,000	2·3
Naphtha . .	12,000,000	2·1	4,000,000	0·7	—	—
Salt . .	3,100,000	2·7	545,000	0·5	1,463,000	1·3

	EASTERN SIBERIA		ALL RUSSIA EXCEPT FINLAND
	In poods	Percentage of the total output	In poods
Gold . . .	2,534	71·0	3,569
Platinum . . .	—	—	337·3
Silver . . .	—	—	1,100
Lead . . .	—	—	103,740
Zinc . . .	—	—	714,800
Copper . . .	1,000	0·0	1,972,000
Pig-iron . . .	—	—	256,266,000
Iron and steel . . .	—	—	227,541,000
Manganese ore . . .	—	—	50,192,000
Coal . . .	66,700,000	3·5	1,887,000,000
Naphtha . . .	—	—	565,300,000
Salt . . .	600,000	0·5	116,364,000

It appears from this table that the Ural Mountains are the chief centre for the supply of minerals, with the exception of salt, of which 72·5 per cent. is produced in the South and South-East of Russia; zinc, of which 74·8 per cent comes from the Western mineral region; pig-iron and iron and steel, of which 67·7 per cent. and 56·2 per cent. respectively is derived from the South and South-East of Russia; and naphtha, of which 97·0 per cent. is found in the Caucasus. But these figures, of course, cannot give an idea of the potentialities of the hitherto undeveloped mineral resources of Russia.

Coal.—Coal is present in the soil of many parts of the country in great quantity. The richest coal-field of European Russia is situated in the Donetz basin, which supplies 55 per cent. of coal and 80 per cent. of the coke consumed in the Empire. Besides, coal deposits are found in Dombrova in Poland, in the Ural and the Moscow basin. Siberia possesses enormous coal-fields. The Kutznetsk basin surpasses the Donetz deposits; the Ekibastus coal-field on the Irtysh River extends over twenty-five square miles. In Western Siberia, the Sudzhensky district, the Tcheremkova field near Irkutsk, the Karraginsky mine, which belongs to the Spassky Copper Company, and the Minusinsk region in the eastern part of the Altai, contain rich and practically

inexhaustible deposits of coal, which can be mined without great difficulty and at comparatively small expense. Their exploitation has been hitherto handicapped by the insufficiency of transport facilities and the lack of industrial development of the country. There is no doubt that with the establishment of proper communication and the investment of sufficient capital, a brilliant future awaits these coal-fields.

In Eastern Siberia and the Pri-Amur region, the southern reaches of the Ussuri River and the Island of Sakhalin must be specially mentioned. The coal of Sakhalin is of excellent quality and has the reputation of being equal to the coal found in the Cardiff collieries. The region watered by the Selinga and Burea Rivers, tributaries of the Amur, is known to contain coal-fields of great magnitude. The coal-mines of the Caucasus, of Turkestan, and of the Tkvarchelsk district on the shores of the Black Sea are full of promise, although they are only partially worked at present.

This stupendous wealth of coal supplies Russian industry with possibilities which will assure to skilled labour, capital, and railway extension an unprecedented reward and prosperity.

Mineral Oil.—The resources of mineral oil in Russia are as considerable as those of coal. The Baku oil-fields extend over an area of 2700 acres according to the estimates of geologists. Recently in the Apsheron Peninsula the Surakhany and Binagody grounds have considerably increased their output of oil. The oil deposits at Grosny are also very rich. There is oil at Tcheleken, an island near the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, near the River Emba in the Urals, in the somewhat overrated oil-fields of Maikop, in the Ferghana region of Turkestan, in Transcaspia, and the Island of Sakhalin.

The right of exploitation of oil-bearing lands was sold by auction by the State to the highest bidder. The royalty to be paid to the State had gradually increased and had, in some cases, reached 50 per cent. of the total oil extracted ; consequently the price of oil had considerably increased.

In order to counteract the rise of the market price of oil, the Government restricted the auctions of oil-bearing plots in the Baku region. According to private statistical information, the restriction of the auctions caused a decline in the output of oil in 1913. The naphtha industry in Russia, which in 1901 provided 50 per cent. of the total output of the world's mineral oil, at present has also to contend against the competition of the enormously increased production of oil in North America. However, Russia possesses so many hitherto untouched oil-fields that there is no fear of any serious set-back provided sufficient capital and labour be applied. There is no doubt that after the restoration of peace, the naphtha industry in Russia will acquire much greater dimensions than it has hitherto attained.

Gold.—Gold is found throughout Siberia in the south as well as in the northern region, the *taiga*—but this industry is still in its infancy; areas which are known to be gold-bearing, the Amur region, for example, have not yet been prospected. During the last years the industry has remained stationary owing to lack of capital, lack of transport facilities, and the prohibition of the Russian Government to employ Chinese and Korean labour. At present British capital invested in gold-mines does not surpass £6,200,000—namely, 2·8 per cent. of the total amount of British capital invested in gold-mining. A series of railway lines to open up the Southern Ural Mountains and Western Siberia are under construction, the Altai railway being already completed. The main centres of gold-mining are situated along the Lena River in the neighbourhood of the principal tributaries of the Amur in the Amgun River system, the Southern Ussuri region, on the shores of the Tartar Straits, and in the Southern Altai. Gold is chiefly found in alluvial deposits on application of dredgers and excavators. The Minusinsk and Achinsk districts contain also gold quartz mines in which the gold is obtained from ores.

Platinum.—The platinum industry may be considered as a monopoly of Russia, since not less than 95 per cent. of

the world's output of that rare and valuable metal is found in the Russian Empire. The richest deposits are situated on the Iss River at the Demidov or Tagil estate, and also at the Nicolay Pavdinsk, Polyakov, and Syssert estates. Nearly all the platinum found is alluvial.

Iron and Steel.—Another promising factor in the industrial energy of Russia is her iron and steel industry, which is in some places already fully established and provided with modern plant, but which in future is bound to increase to much greater dimensions. At present the chief centres of this industry are found in the Krivoy Rog basin along the River Guletz and its tributaries in the Ekaterinoslav and Kherson provinces. Its ores have 50 per cent. to 70 per cent. of pure metal, and the reserves of that ore are estimated at 200,000,000 tons. The adjoining Korsak Mogila deposits of iron in the Tauris provinces are likewise of great importance. It is interesting to note that an enterprising Englishman, Mr. John Hughes, was the pioneer of this industry, which produced annually something like 3,000,000 tons of iron. Big seams of 5 to 12 yards of brown ores which contain 35 per cent. of iron are found on the Sea of Azov; its reserves are estimated at 300,000 tons. The Kertch fields contain about 500,000,000 tons of extremely rich iron; owing to their proximity to the sea, these fields enjoy special advantages for export. Extensive deposits of magnetic iron ore occur in the central part of the Ural Mountains with big deposits of brown ore on the eastern slope. In Poland ironworks have been active since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and have steadily developed. The main source of pig-iron is situated in the South of Russia.

The great expanse of Siberia is provided with iron ores in enormous quantities. The deposits of Abakan, Nikolaievsky Zavod, and Petrovsky Zavod are foremost. The Abakan deposits situated near Minusinsk on the surrounding land watered by the Yenisei yield 66 per cent. of magnetic ores. The Minusinsk railway, now under construction, will greatly facilitate the transport of this ore. The deposits of

the Nikolaievsky Zavod are situated on the Angara River, which flows from the Baikal Lake and are about eighty miles distant from the important town of Irkutsk. They contain 50 per cent. to 75 per cent. of magnetite, hematite, and limanite ores covering an area of several hundred square miles. In the smelting works English machinery is used. The Petrovsky Zavod lies near the city of Chita. Here the ore contains 54 per cent. of iron. Both the Nikolaievsky and the Petrovsky deposits are only worked on a small scale chiefly owing to market conditions. More efficient organisation, a greater supply of capital, and the progress of industrial development in this part of Siberia are bound to result in considerable extension of these works. The rich iron veins of the Pri-Amur region and numerous iron deposits in out-of-the-way portions of Siberia have hardly been tapped. They await the introduction of transport facilities and the investment of capital.

Copper.—Copper-mining is a comparatively old industry in Russia, which was started in the eighteenth century. Till 1911, the works of Demidov and the Bogoslovsky Works in the Ural were the most important centres of copper production in Russia. In 1911-12, the Kyshtim Works improved their plant and gradually took precedence. According to the last report published by the corporation, the mines and plants of this flourishing concern were working under conditions which enabled it to produce 10,000 tons of copper a year. Besides the Kyshtim corporation, which is an Anglo-Russian company, many other British companies were formed for the extraction of copper, as, for instance, the Syssert, Tanalyk, Irtish, and Russo-Asiatic. New copper works will soon be started in the Ural—a sign that this industry is rapidly attaining bigger proportions. In the Caucasus the copper-mines are exceptionally rich: the Zangezursky district in Transcaucasia is noted for its wealth of this mineral. Unfortunately, its development is hampered by the lack of transport facilities. The Spassky Copper Company in Western Siberia is owned by a company of British capitalists; its importance will be considerably

increased when the projected Western Siberian railway has been completed. Copper is also found in the Kirghiz Steppes. If all the land known to contain copper were to be worked, there seems no end to what might be achieved. The Kirghiz Steppes, the region of the Yenisei, the Altai and the Semipalatinsk districts have been geologically surveyed for copper and found to contain very large tracts of land with abundance of rich copper ore. A brilliant future awaits those whose enterprise is turned in this direction.

Salt.—All this points to the fact that to a very considerable extent the mineral wealth of Russia is merely surface scratched, and is very far from being fully developed. For instance, mineral salt can be found in Russia in quantities sufficient to supply the wants of the whole world for centuries; yet these resources of rock-salt contained in the Ural Mountains, the Caucasus, and the Gouriev and Emba districts have hardly been touched. The lake-salt production, the principal centres of which are in the Perm and Astrakhan provinces, the Bakhmut and Slaviansk districts, and the lakes of Baskunchak and the Crimea, is also very much neglected, with the result that the quantity produced in Russia is unable to supply the Empire's total consumption of salt. The Amur district, which, owing to its large fish industry, is a big consumer of salt, imports from Japan, China, and Germany about 500,000 tons annually, an economical abnormality entirely due to the lack of transport facilities which in future will have to be remedied by the lowering of the railway tariffs for the transportation of salt to the Far East of Siberia.

Mica, Asbestos, Tungsten, Osmium, Iridium, Talc, Phosphates, Graphite, Mercury, Lead, Zinc, Silver, Quicksilver, Aluminium, Nickel, Cobalt, Antimony, Bismuth.—Russia is rich in deposits of mica, asbestos, tungsten, osmium, iridium, talc, phosphates, graphite, mercury, lead, zinc, silver, quicksilver, aluminium, nickel, cobalt, antimony, bismuth. But only a limited quantity of all this mineral wealth is available for the market, so that Russia is still obliged, to a considerable extent, to rely on the import of these commo-

dities from abroad, in spite of the fact that not only could she be independent of all foreign supply, but she could provide the whole world with a share of her enormous mineral wealth. Here, undoubtedly, lie industrial and commercial opportunities which will be appreciated in Great Britain.

The present position of the home production of minerals in Russia, their exportation, importation, and the percentage of their consumption provided for by the home production in the years 1911 and 1912, is shown in the following table taken from the *Russian Statistical Annual*, 1915 :

Importation, Exportation, and Consumption of the Products of the Mining Industry in 1911 and 1912 in tons

Mineral products	1911				
	Production in Russia	Importation from abroad	Exportation from Russia	Consumption in Russia	Percentage of consumption provided for by home production
Lead . .	1,220	43,000	—	44,000	2·8
Zinc . .	12,000	20,000	—	34,000	38·0
Copper . .	26,000	8,000	—	34,000	73·8
Pig-iron . .	3,534,000	55,000	1,000	3,589,000	97·9
Iron . .	2,843,000	27,000	20,000	2,816,000	100·9
Steel . .		18,000	52,000		
Coal . .	28,060,000	5,128,000	94,000	33,012,000	84·7
Salt . .	1,983,000	12,000	2,000	1,993,000	99·5
Naphtha . .	9,012,000	16	—	9,012,000	100·0
Manganese ore	696,000	—	565,000	131,000	—

Mineral products	1912				
	Production in Russia	Importation from abroad	Exportation from Russia	Consumption in Russia	Percentage of consumption provided for by home production
Lead . .	2,000	44,000	—	46,000	3·7
Zinc . .	12,000	19,000	—	30,000	38·0
Copper . .	33,000	4,000	—	37,000	81·4
Pig-iron . .	4,133,000	107,000	74	4,240,000	97·5
Iron . .	3,670,000	47,000	20,000	3,697,000	99·3
Steel . .					
Coal . .	30,435,000	4,940,000	161,000	35,215,000	85·8
Salt . .	1,877,000	73,000	9,000	2,941,000	95·8
Naphtha . .	9,118,000	50	500	9,117,000	100·0
Manganese ore	955,000	—	955,000	—	—

These figures show that Russia was able to supply the total of her own requirements only in regard to naphtha, while being in a position to provide the foreign markets with naphtha to a small extent and manganese ore. The whole production of this latter mineral is exported abroad. In 1912, Russia had to import from abroad 96·3 per cent. of the lead she consumed, 62 per cent. of zinc, 18·6 per cent. of copper, 14·2 per cent. of coal, and 4·2 per cent. of salt. The amount of the production, importation, and exportation of other metals is not given in Russian official statistics.

This state of affairs is economically unsound, as the present output of the mining industry in Russia falls lamentably short of the vast possibilities represented by the enormous wealth of the Empire. But there can be no doubt whatever as to the brilliant future that awaits this branch of Russian industry.

On the strength of the above it appears, therefore, that judging from the unbounded natural economic resources Russia may become the chief supplier of food-stuffs and raw material of the world if only she reverts from her primitive means of production to more scientific methods, and if in general better organisation is applied and the means of communication and transport are improved and augmented.

At present Russia's export is chiefly of an agricultural character. The average value of exports from Russia for the five years from 1909 to 1913 shows that out of a total yearly average value of exports of £142,280,000, not less than £90,590,000, or over 63 per cent., is accounted for by food-stuffs and live stock, £49,000,000 represents the value of crude and semi-manufactured goods, and only £2,690,000 manufactured articles. Russia should aim not only at increasing her exports in general, but also that of the high-priced manufactured or semi-manufactured articles in particular. That cannot be done otherwise than by improving technical knowledge, skill, and practical experience, and further investment of capital in industrial concerns. Here is an opportunity for British enterprise and money. The Russian Government has already recognised the educating influence and the advantages to be derived by Russia from

friendly capital and engineers assisting the economic development of the country.

The development and proper organisation of the productive forces of the country will not only increase the exports from Russia, but also prevent the importation of articles which the country can easily produce herself. In 1913, Russia imported :

Article	Value in £	
	£	£
Plants and seeds	2,913,500	
Fresh fruit, lemons, nuts, and plums	2,477,900	
Fish and oysters	3,820,200	
Tallow, animal fats, and beeswax .	2,025,300	
Prepared leather and manufactures of leather	2,789,600	
Carpentry and fretwork	667,900	
Boot-blackening	600,000	
Vegetable oils	575,600	
Resin and pitch	494,700	
Wood pulp and cellulose	219,600	
Higher class paper	1,100,000	
Toys	992,400	
Raw and manufactured silk . . .	4,247,000	
Thread and yarn	3,006,900	
Woollen goods	4,582,100	
Lace	765,500	
Wines	2,058,800	
Furs and pelts	1,632,400	
Paraffin and vaseline	239,500	
Live stock	1,761,500	
Bark-tanning for tanning . . .	771,900	
Flax, hemp, and articles thereof .	708,400	
		37,910,700
Bar-iron, steel implements, tools, nails, constructional material, drain-pipes, glass physical appa- ratus, hardware, etc.	15,279,400	
Chemical goods, pharmaceutical goods, spices	4,749,700	
Coal and coke	8,777,000	
Machinery	12,944,700	
Agricultural machinery	3,984,500	
Raw cotton	11,404,100	
Other goods	28,999,900	
		86,139,300
		124,050,000

For a country with the economic resources of Russia it is evidently economically unsound to import flax, yarn, furs, live stock, plants, leather, tallow, beeswax, fruit, fish, and so forth. Russia has the possibility to suppress all these imports and to turn the trade balance by saving yearly the greater part of the huge amount of £124,050,000 which represents the value of these imports.

British opportunities in the economic resources of Russia must show themselves also in the development of the trade relations between the two Empires. Up to the outbreak of the war British trade with Russia has been continually declining to the advantage of the Germans, as is shown by the following official returns of exports and imports of Russia in millions of roubles :

	In 1909	In 1910	In 1911	In 1912	In 1913	Increase or decrease in 1913
Exports of Russia to—						
Germany . . .	387.0	390.5	490.5	453.8	452.6	— 1.2
Great Britain . .	288.7	315.0	336.6	327.5	266.9	— 60.6
Imports of Russia from—						
Germany . . .	354.8	441.0	476.8	521.1	642.8	+ 121.7
Great Britain . .	128.0	153.5	153.9	139.3	170.4	+ 31.1

These figures reveal a very unsatisfactory state of affairs for British commercial interests. There is no doubt that Great Britain could easily replace the imports from Germany into Russia by her products. The table of the principal imports from Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the United Kingdom into Russia in 1913 (see opposite page) will bear that out.

Many schemes have recently been put forward from different quarters for the promotion of British trade in Russia, but first of all it is necessary that certain primary conditions for carrying on trade between the two countries should be fulfilled. The dearth of tonnage and the exigencies of warfare do not at present give private enterprise a free

	From Germany and Austria-Hungary	From the United Kingdom
	£	£
Agricultural machinery	1,254,000	1,103,000
Aluminium and aluminium wares	1,102,000	—
Boots and shoes	108,655	800
Brass and brass wares	762,100	18,200
Cables, cordage, twine, and nets	134,960	43,900
Cast-iron goods (stoves, baths, etc.)	166,700	—
Clocks and watches	113,145	—
Clothing (female)	104,150	6,300
Colours, paints, varnish	168,650	61,000
Copper goods	165,040	8,000
Cotton prints	64,000	8,500
„ stockings and socks	145,900	—
„ velvets and plushes	95,590	—
Electrical appliances	280,300	6,500
„ dynamos and machinery	233,400	59,900
Enamelled hollow-ware	122,200	4,600
Fertilizers	632,870	59,100
Fireproof bricks, retorts, etc.	198,810	—
Furniture	119,050	2,000
Hollow glassware (bottles, etc.)	74,600	900
Gloves	145,260	—
Implements and tools	1,175,450	252,800
Internal combustion engines	654,000	—
Jewellery and trinkets	183,650	200
Knives	147,400	2,000
Lamps	513,500	200
Road traction-engines and rollers	378,900	187,000
Printing machinery	157,320	—
Milling machinery	212,115	—
Medicines	495,560	22,200
Motor-cars and parts	789,200	127,700
Musical instruments	434,450	4,270
Photographic goods	245,720	—
Pins and needles	83,370	—
Rubber tyres	60,850	2,100
Scientific instruments	442,380	99,000
Silk manufactures	254,500	11,500
Machine tools	604,200	85,000
Toys and games	122,200	10,600
Metal tubes, pipes, etc.	186,900	30,000
Umbrellas and parts	29,950	300
Wooden goods	194,750	4,500

scope to any appreciable extent. The Government controlling the shipping is, under existing circumstances, unable to satisfy the demands of the commercial community. Moreover, the expenses of carriage and the risk of destruction to which goods are exposed on sea are prohibitive. In Russia proper, the reduction in the available means of communication, the general utter disorganisation of the country, the danger of all private property from being "expropriated" or simply appropriated by robbery or theft, form insuperable barriers to the carrying on of regular trade relations. Finally, the medium of payment has been made of no effect by the depreciation of the legal tender. As long as paper roubles are thrown upon the market in unheard-of quantities by an irresponsible Government, regardless of the calamities to the finance of the country, currency in Russia cannot acquire any stability and will not be an adequate medium of payment outside the boundaries of the State. In some instances a sort of barter has been resorted to in order to avoid this difficulty, but this expedient is only availing in exceptional cases. Unless, therefore, a fundamental change takes place in all these unfavourable circumstances, the prospects of British trade in Russia seem to be problematic. But there is every reason to hope that in a not far distant future the situation will undergo a radical change with the introduction of law, order, and authority, and after the conclusion of a general peace between the belligerent parties. It is difficult to foresee in detail in what position trade in Russia will then find itself, as much will depend on the conditions under which peace is established, and which will also probably affect Russia irrespective of the stipulations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

But judging from the information available at present, it should be borne in mind that Russia is willing to give preference to British goods provided that they are offered at no less advantageous conditions as German goods. Here is, therefore, a great opportunity for British merchants. Great Britain was made alive to her opportunities in Russia

by the extraordinary success of German trade in that country. The view British merchants generally took of Russia, from a commercial point of view, was that the language difficulty, the obstacles in the way of transport in that vast territory, the long credit system, the unpalatable experiences with faulty debtors, and the slow methods of justice, made it, on the whole, not worth while to waste energy and money in a country where the inconveniences and risks seemed so great as to be insufficiently compensated by adequate gain. That is, to be sure, not the way in which British business people will look upon Russian affairs as soon as the country returns again to normal conditions. The enormous profit the Germans have been able to show in their trade with Russia have proved to Englishmen that the supposed difficulties in trading with that country can be overcome with proper organisation, forethought, and energy, and that it pays well to apply such methods.

As Russia has agreed to the prolongation of her commercial treaty with Germany of 1904, and the Russo-British commercial treaty of 1858 containing the "most-favoured nation clause" has been revoked, it would seem that it is essential for the British Government to conclude a new commercial treaty with Russia, thereby securing for herself all the advantages Russia is giving to Germany. This, however, would not suffice to place British and German goods on an equal footing. Owing to the fact that Germany enjoys in Russia a treatment based on a commercial treaty, carefully prepared to satisfy her own special export trade requirements, she would hold greater advantages than her commercial competitor, Great Britain, if the latter only enjoyed the advantages given to Germany.

The "most-favoured nation clause" has, up to the present, been considered the highest card to be played in the game of economic policy, and as a never-failing inducement for export trade. It was assumed that nothing better should or could be expected for export trade than the obtaining of the same rights and privileges which had been

given or would be given by the receiving State to any other State. The adherence to that policy has been one of the reasons why German commerce has found it comparatively easy to supersede English commerce in Russia and nearly crush it out of existence. It is a false assumption to believe that the chances of each State afforded the privilege of the "most-favoured nation treatment" are identical. As a matter of fact they are not. For instance, the requirements of British and German trade on the Russian market are very far from being the same. The difference in the geographical position of Great Britain and Germany, and other circumstances, favour German trade in Russia in a special way. Germany's close proximity to Russia, her particular conditions of industrial production, and the fact that among the population of Russia there are many of German extraction who preserve their relations with Germany, enable her to sell her goods to Russia under more favourable conditions than Great Britain is able to do. The new commercial treaty to be concluded between Great Britain and Russia would, therefore, have to take into account the special practical conditions of British trade in that country, assuring to Great Britain advantages which would be peculiarly suited to her trade. That could only be done by customs tariff agreements, which would benefit the interests of Great Britain and assure her special advantages, even though they were automatically extended to Germany by the "most-favoured nation clause" of the Russo-German Treaty of 1904. In Great Britain many important symptoms point to the fact that a radical change of policy in the direction of new commercial agreements is imminent. The "most-favoured nation clause" has already been denounced. The war has taught Great Britain the necessity of a closer understanding among the Allies not only from a military but from an economic point of view. The old controversy between free-traders and protectionists has been decided by the logic of international events in favour of protection, not for the sake of protection as an economic system, but for political requirements. Henceforth the consideration

of the British Empire in commercial agreements between the Allies are recognised as being of greater importance than the principle of free trade. Germany is preparing a new *Zollverein* of the Central Powers of Europe. Great Britain can hardly fail to deduce from this the lesson that she must join hands economically with the Powers which do not belong to the *Mittel-Europa* scheme. It would, therefore, appear that the conclusion of commercial agreements entails for Great Britain the necessity of abandoning free trade for a political and economic system of differential treatment of allied, neutral, and enemy countries.

The next question which arises—full of enhanced importance—is, by what practical business methods the development of British export trade to Russia could be best fostered.

The different methods of procedure in promoting British export trade to Russia have been amply and publicly discussed in this country, and such propaganda has already secured very good results in spreading useful information and in arousing British energy and enterprise. It is, however, worth while to recapitulate the chief principles to be followed in this campaign in order to afford British goods in Russia the same chances which are obtained for other nations.

The first step is, of course, to get into personal touch with prospective buyers in Russia, avoiding the services of the international “middleman.” To achieve this object, capable and trustworthy representatives should be delegated. Agencies are not so much required as direct representatives who should be provided with catalogues in the Russian language containing prices in the Russian currency, with the Russian weights and measures. Prices should be quoted c.i.f. not f.o.b., as was the custom in the past.

What British manufacturers need to do is to establish branches of their own in some of the chief centres of business, and place them under the management of young, energetic, educated men, well versed in the advantages offered by the particular manufactures exported by their own firm,

and having a good knowledge of the Russian language as well as the adaptability to suit themselves to their surroundings. These representatives should aim at getting into close touch with the people with whom they hope to do business, and at the same time to study carefully the local market and its particular requirements. Such men should find no difficulty in becoming well acquainted with Russian life and custom, so that a sympathetic relationship should be soon established in their business circle, ever growing wider and wider.

The language question should not present any difficulty. In Russia a series of centres have been established where the English language, life, and literature are studied. The same has been done in Great Britain with regard to the Russian language, life, and literature. The result of these mutual efforts to establish a closer relationship between the two countries have been most gratifying. However, the collapse of Russia has had a deterrent effect upon this movement. But Russia's temporary weakness should not affect the importance of learning the Russian language. Without the necessary study of that language, and acquiring the ability to converse and write in it, it is impossible to get into intimate touch with Russian life, understand the Russian character and things Russian, and to choose a line of action conducive to the exchange of intellectual and commercial values. It is of no use to scoff at the commercial success of the Germans in Russia if Englishmen are not prepared to attain the same linguistic knowledge which is one of the guarantees of that success.

To those whose knowledge of the Russian market is limited, it is of importance to bear in mind that the peasants have not much capital at their disposal. The buying capacity of the rouble has, as already mentioned, fallen to an unprecedented low level, and the rate of exchange of the Russian currency is alarmingly depressed, making it more difficult than ever for the Russian buyer to provide himself with articles for which he has to pay the corresponding price in British currency. Accordingly, there should

be an endeavour to supply the market as cheaply as possible. Nobody would suggest that trash should be sent, but, at any rate, it does not seem necessary that the goods exported should be of the finest or first quality.

The thorny question of credit should be handled with the utmost delicacy; there should be a "give and take" in the matter. It must not be expected that the Russian, accustomed to long credit, will be agreeable to the cash-down principle of the English, but it may be assumed that he will be ready to come to a compromise with the Englishman on this important point. The great trouble is, after all, not so much long credit as the fact that British banks will not buy foreign bills. They will collect, but will not purchase them. Probably the question of facilitating the payment of the Russian buyer will be effectively taken in hand by commercial banks lately formed for that purpose, or by those already of long standing. Such banks having at their disposal adequate information relating to those manufacturers requiring financial facilities should be able to accept Russian business even in cases demanding credit to be extended for eighteen months or two years. The banks should form the necessary connecting-link between the British manufacturer and the Russian consumer, financing the former and charging the latter with the commission and interest to be paid. The peculiar circumstances of Russian economic life demand long credit. Not less than 85 per cent. of the people live on the land. It is, therefore, impossible for the merchant to pay cash because he never knows what the harvest will yield. He must be given grace until the harvest has been gathered. The Germans studied this point, saw the difficulty of the consumer, and decided to give long credit. That was one way in which they ingratiated themselves with the Russians. The British manufacturer bluntly refused to accommodate the customer: the British attitude of "take it or leave it" was fatal to success in the Russian trade market.

The following example will illustrate the lack of pliability on the part of the British manufacturer compared with the

great adaptability of his German rival. A Swedish firm wished to install a new pipe system at their works, and had a big contract to offer. They first went to the English market. Already they had a system of pipes in existence, but wished to replace them by other pipes with a particular kind of curve. The English firm, whom they approached, gave an answer in the negative as the making of the required pipes would entail a great amount of a peculiar kind of work; however, they offered to supply another kind of pipe system of their own particular design. The Swedish firm having first given preference to the English market, but having been disappointed, then applied to a German house. These people examined the specification, offered to supply the pipe system desired, and give prompt delivery. The result was a big Swedish contract went to Germany simply because the English firm had practically declined to observe the orders of the Swedish concern, preferring to sell something they happened to have in stock at the time. The English firm would not take the trouble to satisfy the special conditions of a good foreign inquiry, even at the cost of losing the transaction altogether. Analogous examples could be quoted *ad infinitum*. They disclose how it has come about that the British have allowed themselves to be ruled out of order commercially by the Germans.

Special attention should be paid in acquiring trustworthy information as to such prospective customers deserving credit and those who do not. In this respect British firms have shown in the past a regrettable carelessness resulting in great loss to themselves. When complaints are put forward on this account it invariably transpires that no inquiries had been made beforehand as to the standing of the Russian firm concerned. The Russo-British commercial position has suffered a great deal in the past from such painful experiences: when an Englishman is victimised in that way he is often inclined to generalise from his individual case that "the Russians cannot be trusted," though he himself is not free from blame. Englishmen desirous of trading with Russia should take the same careful precautions

they would observe in their own country. They should set up a better system for acquiring commercial information of a confidential nature. The Germans have a very thorough system of private inquiry by means of which they know who can be trusted. It is done by branch agencies established by certain banks keeping a private register of all more or less important firms, which is constantly checked by information supplied by responsible representatives. A similar method of commercial intelligence exists in England. It is, after all, not difficult to ascertain whether a certain firm is of good repute and to what extent it can be credited. British firms should establish a kind of Information Bureau in Russia, and thus safeguard their own interests. Such work can be best done, or at least supervised, by the firm's own representatives.

There has been of late a movement in favour of a better organisation of the Consular Service to suit mercantile requirements, but as long as consuls have not been provided with permanent practical commercial advisers entrusted to carry on the painstaking task of collecting practical up-to-date information of a commercial nature, firms will find it to their interest to obtain the required information through the medium of special organisations of their own, or co-operative representation in the country with which they have to deal. Of course they will also avail themselves of the information to be obtained from the Commercial Intelligence Branch of the Board of Trade, which lately has been reorganised and given a larger radius of action.

There is no doubt that the future will give exceptional opportunities for the British to revive their trade with Russia on an unprecedented scale. The economic and financial salvation of Russia lies in the development of her industry, agriculture, and enormous mineral resources. Great Britain is able to assist her in this stupendous task provided that she is willing to avail herself of the opportunity. All kinds of machinery, implements, and plant will be required to assure a big output of industrial products and manufacture. Germany alone will not be able to cope

with such requirements, just as Great Britain by herself would not be in a position to entirely satisfy Russia's demands in that respect. There is room for both—Great Britain and Germany—in Russia. The share each secures in business transactions will depend upon individual energy and enterprise.

The wastage of war and the destruction wrought by the Revolution in Russia are enormous. Production is almost at a standstill. Here again is a chance for the Briton to assist the Russian by his superior organising power and technical knowledge. Agricultural methods must be improved to increase the productivity of the soil: to this effect the Russian peasant should be provided with the latest implements, in great quantity, which are a British speciality. A system of irrigation, the construction of more canals, and the deepening of existing waterways, together with the building of a network of new railways, are badly needed to allow of a more intense exploitation of the riches of the soil. To this end machinery and engineering plant must be imported from abroad. Russia's home production of machinery cannot possibly meet her demands. Such harbours as Archangel or Vladivostock should be provided with harbour works, improved shiploading appliances, additional cranes, grain elevators, refrigerating plant for the fishing trade, and the like. It will hardly be possible for the Russian engineer and industrial works to cope unaided with these requirements.

During the war the British have had the advantage of pushing their commercial interests in Russia, and there is reason to believe that they have availed themselves of this advantage by opening for themselves new trade relations to be developed at the cessation of hostilities when the condition of transportation and exchange have become more favourable for international trade. But there is no time to be lost in arranging for British commercial expansion in Russia at this present moment, thereby counteracting German penetration which is exploiting the helplessness of that country.

CHAPTER X

THE POTENTIALITIES OF RUSSO-INDIAN TRADE RELATIONS

THE subject of the potentialities of Russo-Indian trade relations would bear a more lengthy exposition than I can possibly give from my own personal research and experience in India. Therefore a complete and exhaustive treatise is not intended, but I propose rather to draw broad outlines upon the subject. Another reservation is necessary in so far as the war and the Revolution in Russia brought about quite exceptional conditions of life which do not affect the potentialities of Indo-Russian relations. In the future, when peace is restored, national trade will be carried on under normal conditions. Mention is therefore not made of the special difficulties which have arisen in Russia and which are, of course, a great drawback to trade and commerce.

Up to the present these relations were in their infancy, and were kept within very narrow limits. The considerable growth of the exportation of Indian and Ceylon tea into Russia—which is bound to follow an upward course in the future—is almost the only instance of the development of Indo-Russian trade relations worth mentioning; but it is known that such development has been retarded by a series of adverse circumstances which in all probability will be eliminated in the future, much to the mutual advantage of both countries.

Two such colossal economic units as Russia and India (with a thriving population of 180 and 330 million souls respectively), endowed with most favourable climatic conditions, and a fertile soil containing those mineral resources which are essential for industry and manufacture,

situated on the same continent, at no great distance apart, must necessarily come into close economic contact with each other.

Among the adverse circumstances which in the past have hampered the expansion of Indo-Russian trade relations, the political factor played a very considerable part. India mistrusted Russia, always fearing a possible invasion from the North. Not only the Anglo-Russian agreement with regard to Central Asia, but more especially the Russian Revolution, has brought about an entire change in this respect. Russia has no tendency of aggression and aggrandisement at the expense of her neighbours. Her new political creed is to live and let live. She desires all nations to determine their own fate, and declines the application of force in welding their destinies.

One condition which was against the development of Russo-Indian trade relations was the lack of means of communication between the two countries. There is a line of steamships from Vladivostock to Calcutta which must be developed in the future. Again, Odessa should be linked up with Bombay and the Persian Gulf by another steamship line; and the most beneficial results may be expected by connecting the Russian railway system with that of India through Persia, via Quetta. Negotiations on this scheme have already reached a very advanced stage, and it is only the war that has brought this very important enterprise to a standstill, which is bound to be renewed as soon as peace has been re-established, when Persian affairs will also be satisfactorily settled. This railway project is bound to be a potent factor for the development of Russo-Indian intercourse. It was the late Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Sir Alfred Lyall, who very rightly said, "The overland route between Europe and India is manifestly destined to be one of the chief highways of the world" . . . and, he added, "nowhere in the civilised world, even among jealous and hostile States, have strategical reasons been held to be so imperative as to prevent the junction of the main railway lines between two continental countries."

Another drawback to Russo-Indian trade was the German middleman. If one compares the imports of Germany from India, chiefly through Hamburg, with the export of Germany to Russia, one finds that Germany has brought into Russia many articles which are of Indian origin. A special report on Indo-Russian trade recently published by the Indian Government discloses the grip which Germany had on the supply of tropical raw material exported to Russia. Just before the war various methods of profiteering by German transit trade made itself felt in Russian imports of Indian products. For instance, the trade in jute between India and Russia via Germany was three times as large as the *direct* trade in the same article between the two countries. The transit through Germany is, of course, as unnecessary as it is undesirable.

With the object of avoiding it in future, and of establishing direct trade relations between Russia and India to the greatest possible extent, a deputation was sent from India to Russia for the purpose of studying the question. In its report, the deputation took a very optimistic view of the potentialities of direct trade between India and Russia. The abolition of the sale of vodka resulted in an increased consumption of another and better stimulant—tea; and, on the other hand, for the same reason, the purchasing power of the Russian peasant classes has been augmented. To foster India's export trade into Russia, joint enterprise is recommended in the form of a co-operation of firms willing to enter the Russian market. Of even greater importance is the advice set forth in the report that, on the conclusion of peace, agencies for the sale of Indian goods in Russia must be ready for immediate action. Russia cannot afford to postpone her measures for reconstruction. If she cannot secure the goods of which she stands in need from any other source, then she will be obliged to procure them from German agents. This warning should be emphasised. With a few exceptions, British firms have, for the moment, drifted into a state of lethargy regarding Russian trade. British concerns pretend that the present state of unrest in Russia precludes

any practical action of theirs in that country. Be that as it may, it remains true that the British commercial world must be ready when the great opportunity comes at the cessation of hostilities! Agencies in Russia should already be appointed, and provided with adequate information regarding the necessary requirements of the Russian market; addresses of prospective customers should be supplied; catalogues in the Russian language should be drawn up, with quotations of prices, c.i.f., in the Russian currency, etc.* This must be done *before* peace is concluded in order that operations may be begun immediately war is at an end. To prepare for this contingency it is necessary not to wait for special boons and advantages in the form of preferential treatment by Russia, but rather to anticipate a less profitable issue, for instance, such as the realisation of the peace programme which the Soviets are advocating—namely, that a separate understanding with the Customs should *not* be concluded! In such an eventuality Great Britain and India would have to fight German commercial rivalry in Russia on equal terms. But, even so, British and Indian enterprise had the great advantage of being able to *prepare* for this emergency when the Germans were excluded from Russia. By the time that general peace *is* declared British commerce should be firmly established in Russia, and in order to accomplish this no great difficulties need be surmounted, for, as the *Indian Pioneer Mail* of September 1, 1917, very aptly puts it: "A very large party in Russia is impressed with the necessity of definitely severing the German connection."

When I published a letter in the *Times of India*, in which I advanced a proposition that trade relations between England and Russia hoped to receive a new impetus to the benefit of both countries, this view met with cordial sympathy, and I received a series of interesting letters from private individuals and Chambers of Commerce in India concerning the manner in which it was thought Indo-Russian trade could be improved. For instance, the Indian Merchants Chamber and Bureau expressed their

* See chapter ix.

hearty approval of the intention to develop Indo-Russian trade, which, from *their* point of view, would be of mutual benefit to both countries. Another letter, written by a Hindu, said that Providence itself demanded that India should be linked up in trade and commerce with Russia, and that, therefore, "friendly intercourse between the two greatest countries in the world" should be encouraged. Still another letter from a Hindu merchant expressed surprise that Russia had not appeared in the commercial world before. "If we take into account," he wrote, "what the Russians have achieved commercially in Persia, and in other parts of Asia, one must come to the conclusion that the fact that India has been left out is not from lack of enterprise, but rather the result of insufficient information. After having beaten their competitors in the Persian market and elsewhere, they will have no difficulty in establishing themselves in India. It will be easy for Russians to take the place Germans have held in the past in India, by trying to comply with the tastes and special requirements of the population, as Russia has already had experience in trading with the Asiatic people of her dominions."

Some Chambers of Commerce and private firms suggested a reduction of Customs duties in India, or a preferential tariff to be conceded to India. Since the Paris Economic Conference, this idea has become considerably more practical than it was before. It has been recognised that the most-favoured-nation clause which Russia applied to goods originating from the British Empire does not meet the requirements of British trade, and would have to be replaced by a device assuring the British goods more favourable conditions for importation into Russia. But even under the old tariff many raw materials of different kinds are free from Customs duty in Russia. India, as a chiefly agricultural country producing to a great extent raw materials, cannot complain in this respect. India produces much raw material which is necessary to the trade and manufacture of Russia; it therefore stands to reason that there should be an excellent opening for Indian exports to Russia. Besides,

many Indian articles, as, for instance, jute, woollen manufactures, leather goods, silk, indigo, tobacco, oils, raw cotton, rice, coffee, spices, rubber, oil-seeds, hides, skins, shellac, and lac, gum, etc., have a good chance of finding a market in Russia, in spite of the Customs tariff of that country. Trade in India tea has, as already mentioned, a bright future in Russia, which is foremost among the tea-drinking countries of the world, and appreciates more and more the fragrant leaf grown in India and Ceylon. Russia, on the other hand, is in a position to provide India with products of her rapidly growing industries, at prices which may prove far lower than those of articles imported into India from other countries. Russia abounds in natural resources, and her large population provides her with cheap labour. There is, therefore, practically no limit for Russia in being able to undersell the manufactured goods which other countries export to India. Owing to the lack of enterprise on the part of the Russian merchant, far too little attention has been paid hitherto to the different classes of goods which are produced or manufactured in Russia, and which might be exported to India.

For example, Russian sugar should prove a welcome import into India, as this country is bound to increase her sugar importation, owing to her growing demand for this material, and the decline of her own production. The beet-sugar industry in Russia produces an annual amount of sugar far in excess of the internal demand. Another Russian product which should find a good market in India is kerosene. Russia in 1904 to 1905 supplied India with not less than 53 per cent. of its imported kerosene; in the following year her share of the import of kerosene fell to 4 per cent., owing to the disorganisation of the oil industry in Baku. When the disturbances in this district were over, the supply of Russian mineral oil to India again increased. It is highly valued, and although it has to meet the competition of the Standard Oil Company, New York, the Burma Oil Company, and the Asiatic Petroleum Company, it is sure to hold its own. Burma will, of course, remain the chief purveyor of

mineral oil to India, holding as she does the triple advantage of possessing very cheap labour in its production, of being so near to the Indian market, and of exemption from the duty of 1 anna per gallon levied on all foreign oils imported into India. However, there is reason to believe that foreign oils, including Russian kerosene, need not fear the competition of Burma oil. There is room for both in the country.

Another opportunity to expand trade relations between India and Russia lies in the importation of Russian cotton goods. These manufactures have already found their way to Quetta by transit through Persia, where they are much appreciated. The cotton manufacturers of Moscow and Ivanovo Vosnesensk, are producing for the markets of the Central Asiatic provinces of Russia a description of printed cotton goods, the designs on which are a pleasing interpretation of Turkestan, Persian, and Central Asiatic patterns. Their skilful adaptation to Asiatic tastes, their cheapness, and their good quality recommend them not only to the population of Central Asia but also to that of India. On the authority of merchants in India who have good business experience, I may say that the Lodz printed goods, grey and white shirtings, cambrics, drills and other cotton manufactures, have a good chance of finding buyers in India.

The earthenware and china goods which Russian manufacturers produce for use in Turkestan are likewise adapted to the tastes of Central Asia and Northern India. In Baluchistan, Peshawar, and the Punjab, one already meets all sorts of chinaware of Russian origin, as for instance, teapots, cups, milk-jugs, sugar-basins, bowls, and plates, which are specially made for the use of the inhabitants of Turkestan. These articles have a good sale, and the demand for them is rising. Now they reach India through Afghanistan or Eastern Turkestan, Ladak and Kashmir. On the long journey the goods change hands several times, their price growing accordingly. However, the high price for Russian china in India does not diminish its sale, and this in itself is sufficient proof of its possibilities on the Indian

market in the future, when easier ways of communication are established.

To those articles of Russian manufacture which should find a ready sale in India upon a large scale should be added gold brocade, galloons, lace embroideries, and gold thread. These articles are manufactured chiefly for the use of the Greek Orthodox Church, and are inexpensive. In India they would serve the purposes of various classes of the population, who like to embellish their garments and headgear with showy gold adornments. Russian gold thread is known on the Indian market, and the demand for it is very steady. This trade is bound to assume bigger proportions in the future, as Russian manufacturers are endeavouring to study the requirements of the Indian market, and to find out what sorts of Russian gold lace are most suitable to the taste of Indians.

Of other classes of Russian goods which may be suitable for import into India, mention may be made of liqueurs, such as kümmel, kirsch, gin, etc. ; cigarettes, a speciality of Russia, which are second to none, and are comparatively cheap, meeting the requirements of a gradually increasing demand ; Swedish matches, top-boots, which find buyers in Afghanistan and Northern India ; deal, ply-wood, vegetable oils, oil-cakes, hides, grease, etc.

It is time that Indian buyers should become acquainted with Russian industrial productions. To that effect, Russian people have been advised to send out catalogues written in English, to avail themselves of travelling agents in India, to appoint representatives on the spot, providing them with the necessary samples of Russian goods. It would also be desirable to establish museums in certain places, possibly in rooms connected with the Russian Consulates in India. By such and analogous methods, the importation of goods from Russia to India, followed by an increase of exports from India into Russia, could be fostered. India has nothing to lose and much to gain from such growth ; she is dependent to a great extent on imported industrial products and manufactures ; her interest lies in providing

herself with the most suitable and cheapest article of which she stands in need. Russia is willing and able to render her valuable services in this direction. Commerce is a potent lever in welding mutual interests together, fostering mutual appreciation and friendly intercourse. The existing alliance between the British Empire and Russia favours the establishment of strong and broad commercial relations between Russia and India. It is now time to take advantage of this favourable juncture.

Lancashire has nothing to fear from Russian trade in India. For some time to come Russia will not be in a position to compete with Great Britain in the importation of manufactured goods, and even if such were the case, Great Britain would not be the loser. The Indian market can accommodate *both*. Under the wise administration of Great Britain, the purchasing power of the ryot is steadily rising, and the requirements of civilized life are spreading. Great Britain will not be able to cope with the demand by herself alone, and may, therefore, be glad to avail herself of some assistance from Russia, more particularly so as, in return for such exports to India, Russia will carry on an importation trade from that country, thereby contributing to the further development of Indian wealth and importance.

Of course in advocating the development of Russo-Indian trade relations it is not laid down that India should merely export raw materials to Russia in exchange for manufactured goods. Such a course would be quite incompatible in a great country which is developing steadily, and in which industry and manufacture are bound to come to the fore. A fair exchange of the commodities of the two countries would meet the purpose of both. The very nature of international trade excludes force. Each country exports precisely those articles she is in a position to sell, and which at the same time are required by her international customers. If in future India is able to export to Russia manufactured articles instead of the raw products she now exports, and if, on the other hand, Russia needs such merchandise, this sort of commerce will no doubt be established. Russia is free

market in the future, when easier ways of communication are established.

To those articles of Russian manufacture which should find a ready sale in India upon a large scale should be added gold brocade, galloons, lace embroideries, and gold thread. These articles are manufactured chiefly for the use of the Greek Orthodox Church, and are inexpensive. In India they would serve the purposes of various classes of the population, who like to embellish their garments and headgear with showy gold adornments. Russian gold thread is known on the Indian market, and the demand for it is very steady. This trade is bound to assume bigger proportions in the future, as Russian manufacturers are endeavouring to study the requirements of the Indian market, and to find out what sorts of Russian gold lace are most suitable to the taste of Indians.

Of other classes of Russian goods which may be suitable for import into India, mention may be made of liqueurs, such as kummel, kirsch, gin, etc. ; cigarettes, a speciality of Russia, which are second to none, and are comparatively cheap, meeting the requirements of a gradually increasing demand ; Swedish matches, top-boots, which find buyers in Afghanistan and Northern India ; deal, ply-wood, vegetable oils, oil-cakes, hides, grease, etc.

It is time that Indian buyers should become acquainted with Russian industrial productions. To that effect, Russian people have been advised to send out catalogues written in English, to avail themselves of travelling agents in India, to appoint representatives on the spot, providing them with the necessary samples of Russian goods. It would also be desirable to establish museums in certain places, possibly in rooms connected with the Russian Consulates in India. By such and analogous methods, the importation of goods from Russia to India, followed by an increase of exports from India into Russia, could be fostered. India has nothing to lose and much to gain from such growth ; she is dependent to a great extent on imported industrial products and manufactures ; her interest lies in providing

herself with the most suitable and cheapest article of which she stands in need. Russia is willing and able to render her valuable services in this direction. Commerce is a potent lever in welding mutual interests together, fostering mutual appreciation and friendly intercourse. The existing alliance between the British Empire and Russia favours the establishment of strong and broad commercial relations between Russia and India. It is now time to take advantage of this favourable juncture.

Lancashire has nothing to fear from Russian trade in India. For some time to come Russia will not be in a position to compete with Great Britain in the importation of manufactured goods, and even if such were the case, Great Britain would not be the loser. The Indian market can accommodate *both*. Under the wise administration of Great Britain, the purchasing power of the ryot is steadily rising, and the requirements of civilized life are spreading. Great Britain will not be able to cope with the demand by herself alone, and may, therefore, be glad to avail herself of some assistance from Russia, more particularly so as, in return for such exports to India, Russia will carry on an importation trade from that country, thereby contributing to the further development of Indian wealth and importance.

Of course in advocating the development of Russo-Indian trade relations it is not laid down that India should merely export raw materials to Russia in exchange for manufactured goods. Such a course would be quite incompatible in a great country which is developing steadily, and in which industry and manufacture are bound to come to the fore. A fair exchange of the commodities of the two countries would meet the purpose of both. The very nature of international trade excludes force. Each country exports precisely those articles she is in a position to sell, and which at the same time are required by her international customers. If in future India is able to export to Russia manufactured articles instead of the raw products she now exports, and if, on the other hand, Russia needs such merchandise, this sort of commerce will no doubt be established. Russia is free

from any bias against manufactured goods coming from India. The law of supply and demand automatically decides what sort of articles should pass from one country to another. If India wants to transfer her trade in raw products for the more profitable exportation of semi- or wholly-finished articles, she can do so as soon as she has developed her manufacturing industry, which will enable her to place those products on the world's markets.

CHAPTER XI

A PLEA FOR RUSSO-BRITISH INTELLECTUAL COALESCENCE

THE plea for Russo-British intellectual coalescence aims, not at the passing events of the moment, but is founded on the lasting character of the two great nations.

Up to the beginning of the twentieth century Great Britain intellectually did not pay much attention to Russia, and an intellectual Entente between the two countries could not be achieved. This was chiefly due to a general lack of interest in foreign mentality, preconceived ideas about Russian backwardness, and a superstitious fear of the alleged insurmountable difficulties of the language. British exclusiveness began to relent with the adoption of Continental collectivist ideas regarding enactments about old-age pensions, compulsory life insurance, and matters concerning education. It vanished when the unity of purpose in the present great struggle against a common enemy brought Great Britain into close contact with her Allies, and with them Russia. Even before the war, nearer acquaintance with Russia, promoted by many eminent British statesmen, social workers, and writers, had already revealed to the nation that the previously anticipated backwardness of Russia to a great extent did not exist, or was but a semblance of it, being actually a mere variety of British ideals due to differences in climate and surroundings.

LT

A new and more correct idea of Russia has arisen as a result of the study of that country's art, literature, and science. English people engaging in those studies discovered that Russian art, literature, and science could no longer be overlooked as being of small importance. The love which

*LT

manifests itself in this country for all the revelations of the Russian character in art, learning, and practical life is the outcome of the tacit or open recognition by Englishmen that they can find in Russia much to enrich their own lives, and to broaden their outlook on human affairs.

The benefits to be derived from an intellectual Entente embrace different aspects. Both countries are in many respects complements to each other, not only from an economic and political but also from an intellectual point of view. To begin with, English education is pre-eminent for its appreciation of the practical side of life, while the Russian pedagogy is more theoretical. Both sides have carried their peculiarity to an extreme which makes mutual adjustment desirable. Great Britain, with her rich cultural experience of the past, has the possibility of educating her youth first of all on practical lines, and in so doing she consciously and avowedly lays stress on the building up of character. Russia, lacking such experience, had to revert to theoretical methods, which from that point of view bore good results. There are textbooks in Russian which would easily bear comparison with similar volumes in the English language, and which are even considered by competent authorities to be superior. During his years of study, the Russian youth acquires in the aggregate a greater range of knowledge than the English student. Russian educated men generally possess a more universal training and a greater amount of knowledge than Englishmen. But the former are often deficient in the practical application of such knowledge, and here they may be improved and made more efficient by being taught English ways. In the struggle for life Englishmen are superior to Russians. The success in life of the English is partly due to factors in which Russians are inferior—namely, firmness of character, tenacity of purpose, and eagerness for work. English education does not consist so much of cramming into the students' heads the greatest possible amount of positive knowledge as in making them fit to be useful workers in State and Society, an aim which is palpably much more concrete and useful, and produces not so brilliant but more

177 181
8-12

valuable results for the ultimate object of preparing the youth for his proper place in the world. Russians are often highly educated intellectually, but they are lacking somehow in balance of character. 7

Sports and the inculcation of the sporting spirit is another side of the question. Up to the present, sports are very little known, and equally little appreciated, in Russia, but after the war this will change, as the example of Great Britain has taught a useful lesson. It was chiefly due to the sporting spirit of the nation that Great Britain was able to improvise an army of many millions. In Russia military training was considered superior to sporting games. But if, as every one hopes, this war is to put an end to militarism, it will become necessary to adopt a system which, while possessing all the advantages of military training, has none of its drawbacks. Games are indeed in many ways preferable to military training, especially from the point of view of the development of initiative and character.

On the other hand, by a study of Russian literature and character Englishmen might conceivably benefit. Russians are more sympathetic in their attitude towards foreign nationalities, the historic development of their country has led them to be more appreciative of foreign nations than the English. Owing to the geographical position of their island and the remarkable successes they have achieved, the English have in the past paid too little attention to the methods and experiences of other nations. The war has been a revelation to England, and at the same time an invaluable lesson from which she will derive immense benefit in the future. Her eyes have been opened to the necessity for getting into closer industrial and intellectual touch with other nations, and above all with her Allies. Amongst these Russia stands in the first rank owing to her actual and potential commercial, industrial, and intellectual wealth.

Russian and British intellectuality could supplement and to a certain extent correct each other to great advantage, more especially as to their respective mental attitudes when forming a judgment. The English mind is more positive

how
could
benefit
R

syncret

and creative, while Russian intellectuality excels in criticism. Englishmen often are so much engaged in reaching the practical end in view as quickly as possible that they do not always attain the best possible results. Russian endeavour, on the contrary, is often deficient in attaining that result which under the circumstances, although not representing perfection, is the only possible solution. The English are more ready to compromise, thus proving their statesmanlike spirit, while Russians are possessed with a craving for the ideal. Russians desire to comprehend a subject from every point of view, as completely as can be imagined. This excessive introspection hampers action. The Russian lingers and delays in true Hamlet fashion. Russians have always seen in Hamlet a type of their own national character. On the contrary, Englishmen think there is "no time like the present," and they recognize that "the tide in the affairs of men" should be "taken at the flood." They strive to be ready for their opportunity, and this was rightly described by Gladstone as the "secret of success." How opposite is the underlying significance of Russian proverbs such as: "Business is not a bear, it will not escape into the wood"; or, "Before crossing the water first discover the ford." This shows the standpoint of the Russian towards action. He is all for circumspection and reflection. Russian literature is full of descriptions of types of "cunctators." The Russian expression for being in the act of doing something is a verb which means "to gather oneself," implying a somewhat complicated process. It is pulling oneself together—a collecting, as it were, of coat, hat, goloshes, latch-key, and so on, before the stage of readiness to go out can be reached. The example of English reckless energy would certainly benefit the too-contemplative Russian, who often misses his chances. Vice versa, the Russian capacity of criticism may serve as a wholesome corrective to too great impetuosity of action.

The view taken by the British and by Russians of time and space is vastly different. Russians seem sometimes to overlook that very real entity which has been called, not without

reason, "the enemy"—time, upon which men are unavoidably dependent. A Russian labours under the illusion that he is more or less master of time, that there does not exist a clock which pitilessly and relentlessly marks the minutes and hours. He does not want to be reminded of the shortness of his span of earthly life; and that each passing moment brings him nearer to the end; that if the right moment is not taken advantage of, it slips into eternity and cannot be recalled. Realization of time is life, as human existence is circumscribed by its passing nature. Too soon the moment comes when it is too late, when the time for volition and action has lapsed. Englishmen, on the contrary, live, so to say, with a constant eye on the clock. The Russian is absolutely unable to enjoy life under the ban of the consciousness of time. It is beautiful to imagine yourself to be free from the trammels of time, and to be guided only by the impulse of the moment, but Russian life would certainly become more fruitful of good results if the spendthrifts in time would only realize a little more fully the necessity of conforming to the duty of each moment.

As liberal and uncompromising as Russians are in respect of time so the British are as regards space. The difference in social conditions and the historic past of each nation exercise an influence in the moulding of their particular individuality. Great Britain, an essentially seafaring nation, has established her rule in almost every quarter of the globe. Owing to the necessity for constant intercourse between the Mother Country and the distant Dominions of the gigantic British World-Empire, love of exploration, adventure, change of surroundings, restlessness, and constant travel have become characteristic features of the British nation. Space, an obstacle which had to be overcome, appeared as a negligible quantity, a factor which, with the help of more and more perfected means of communication, seemed practically non-existent. An Englishman travelling in a comfortable and luxurious liner, or in the saloon carriage of an express train, can accomplish the correspondence connected with his business, social entertainments, and so forth without realis-

ing that he is passing rapidly through space. Be it in the name of duty or enterprise or for the sake of pleasure, the Briton becomes a globe-trotter, a week-end hunter, and a travelling enthusiast. It would be instructive to compare if possible the amount of money spent on travelling *per capita* in Great Britain and in Russia. The difference must be enormous. Like the British Empire, Russia possesses a stupendous stretch of territory, comprising no less than one-seventh of the dry surface of the globe. But Russians do not sufficiently explore their own territory, for they have not sufficiently developed the energy required. Their territory forms one compact block, and offers no special difficulties in the establishment of intercourse across it. Communication on that great plain which stretches from the Pacific to the Urals, and farther to the Carpathians; and on the great waterways which traverse Siberia and European Russia from north to south and from south to north, is comparatively easy—too easy to challenge and develop human energy, as in the case of seafaring, that great school for strengthening human endurance, enterprise, and energy. Russians do not know their country sufficiently well, and, with few exceptions, as in the cases of the Cossack leader Yermak, Prjevalski, and some others, the travellers and explorers of Russia have been mostly of foreign nationality. While Britishers travel too much, Russians travel too little. Both go to extremes in this respect, and, as it is said “*Les extrêmes se touchent*,” here again they may, by coming into closer intellectual touch, exercise a beneficial and moderating influence on each other.

Amongst the peculiarities of Great Britain there is one which is not to be found in Russia—namely, the conscientious objector. The existence of this species, which is a monument to English sentimentality, is, from the point of view of common sense, unintelligible. The simple idea of justice requires that obligations of the individual towards the State should be extended to *all* its citizens without exception. Everybody has, as Kant puts it, to act in such a way that his action can be taken as the standard applicable to all.

To show the absurdity of the standpoint of the conscientious objector it is only necessary to assume that all citizens of a State were conscientious objectors ; and it becomes apparent at once that the State and community under such conditions could not exist at all. The conscientious objector is a remnant of past hierarchical rule, when religion and State rule were undivided and were supposed to serve the same ends. There is, however, no longer any doubt that the laws of Moses and the Christian religion do not advocate killing, and that, on the other hand, the State cannot exist if its citizens are not ready to defend it with arms against foreign aggression. If those who take advantage of the order of the State assuring peace are not ready to defend it, but prefer to leave such necessary duty to their fellow-citizens, they are profiteering. During the present war, public anger has been justly manifested against able-bodied men who declined to join the ranks, and made a profitable business by taking advantage of those who had to leave their calling for the defence of their country.

There is a difference in the idea of freedom as conceived by the British and by Russians which makes an Anglo-Russian Entente specially desirable. There is, of course, no difference in the *civic* liberties as they exist in modern civilised States. Russia possesses now the personal rights—"les droits de l'homme"—which are common to civilised countries ; but the Russian "broad nature," the necessity for a wide outlook on humanity, leads the Russian to regard freedom from a vastly different standpoint. For the Britisher it means the possibility of observing a mode of living and conduct pleasing to the individual, *without* causing interference to the freedom of others and in conformity with the rules which he himself and the community recognise as binding. Freedom, being a social conception, involves self-imposed restrictions upon one's volition. Public opinion, not less than the law, determines the limits of free decision of the individual in so many ways that freedom appears often to be not very unlike life in a work-house, where nearly everything is prearranged, regulated, and systematised for the benefit of the community as a whole.

attitude
freedom

private, whenever he has a chance of getting into personal touch with him.

Of course a simple-minded child of nature cannot possess the highly evolved mentality of a man of public affairs. Russia has, in a few months, reached a degree of political freedom * for which Great Britain required centuries of slow and steady reform. By this abrupt movement historical continuity was lost. England felt her way towards progress with caution, in the light of Burke's dictum: "With inclination to preserve and capacity to reform." The superquickness of progress which has fallen to the lot of Russia produced in the mind of the reformers a hope to accomplish the impossible, to realise Utopia, and let the solid ground of practical experience slip away from beneath their feet. An appreciation of the organic evolution of State and social institutions in England should have had a beneficial influence in Russian politics and steadied the forces which brought about the revolution.

Since Russia has become a democracy she is liable to be compared with the older democracy of Great Britain, and the question arises in consequence as to the actual conception of democracy, apart from its literally meaning that the people are the ruling power. A levelling of the differences which divide the various classes of society is, of course, the true aim of democracy, but all depends upon the standard of the "level" taken as normal. Human society can be levelled from below or from above. It may be laid down that the mode of life, moral principles, and manners of the lower strata should be the rule for the whole community; or, on the contrary, the tendency may exist that the masses should adjust their ways and customs to those of the higher educated classes. With all their democratic tendencies the British avowedly follow what may be styled the cult of the gentleman, that is to say, that the higher standard of life is considered to be the universal aim. This distinctive feature of British democracy has given it the polish of aristocracy. The preponderance which the British exercise

* I leave out of account revolutionary degeneracy. See chapter v.

in international life is due to a great extent to their aristocratic frame of mind. The British gentleman, to whatever class of society he may belong, has taken the lead in culture and civilisation all the world over.

Now what constitutes the character of a gentleman? It is honesty and straightforwardness of character combined with gentleness and suavity of behaviour. It is this frame of mind which colours all the actions of the British and gives them that quiet confidence of self-possession which marks a high station in life. Of course such a type of gentleman is the outward sign and result of a thoroughly balanced personality, which can only be attained by a combined adequate education in the moral as well as the mental sphere. As in the case of British democracy, similarly with Russian democracy, the different classes of society may be brought into harmony by establishing a standard taken from the higher social strata. Intellectual coalescence between the British and the Russians from this point of view seems an aim worthy of endeavour and realisation.

One of the pillars of British commercial success is the reputation of the British business man. Russians may have a clear conception of a gentleman, but their idea of the qualifications which are the hall-mark of a capable business man is not always in accordance with British ideas on the subject, which define a business man as synonymous with regularity, consistency, reliability, and serious endeavour. Anything that is erratic, amateurish, and without observance of a steady line of conduct, prejudices the British mind and must therefore be avoided by those who desire to entertain business relations with the British. Russian Consuls in Great Britain have often to listen to tales from perplexed Englishmen who had entered into commercial relations with Russians, only to find that without rhyme or reason no answer was forthcoming, even in response to advantageous propositions. The root of the matter lay in the fact that, if for certain reasons the Russian did not want to keep up relations with the other side, he simply did not consider it worth while to give the matter any further attention. Such

change
an independent course of action is evidently outside business etiquette, and, consequently, does harm to Russo-British intercourse. A little more attention to the business formality to which the British are accustomed and the matter would soon be put right.

From the point of view of humanitarianism Great Britain is already in close and sympathetic touch with Russia by the great work done by the Red Cross Society in tending the sick and wounded, in feeding the hungry and relieving much of the distress entailed by the conditions of war. That work appeals to the British, who are themselves so untiring in their zeal for philanthropic institutions and in their lavish liberality and munificence extended to the poor and needy. The moral sense of the human race is rooted in sympathy. Where this quality predominates, there the moral sense can be fostered and will grow and develop strongly. A prominent characteristic of the Russian is sympathy, showing itself in an unreserved readiness to help, without any calculation or reflection of a selfish nature. Christian love and brotherhood are deeply rooted in the Russian soul, which is closely akin to British humanitarianism in indissoluble co-ordination of purpose.

sympathy
The encouraging and strengthening of the ties of intellectual affinity between the two countries may be best attained by fostering mutual earnest study of things Russian in Great Britain, and of things British in Russia by means of textbooks, the acquirement of scholarships, professorships, the attending of lectures, interchange of the results of research in the domain of science and knowledge, and last, but not least, by personal visits each in the other's country. Much has been done already, but much more can be done in future.

In the symphony of friendly coalescence the present Russian chaos has struck a strident note of dissonance. Just as during the great French Revolution, Burke, in the House of Commons, passionately denounced the rule of the mob, so in the case of the Russian proletariat, now proclaiming themselves masters of the situation, the British find

themselves totally out of sympathy with Russia. But these adverse waves on the ocean of Russian life are but passing phenomena unable to affect the depth of the national current.

May the present world-war be the forerunner of closer and more potent ties of intellectual and moral brotherhood, for the sake of mutual progress and prosperity and the advancement of the common ideals of civilisation, culture, and religion.

CHAPTER XII

THE SUPPRESSION OF VODKA

AMONGST the many after-war problems which are already looming large and important in the reconstruction of affairs of the State, the prohibition of the liquor traffic is more and more recognised as a *sine qua non* of further national progress. For the further education, moral and physical development of the whole nation, it is necessary to appreciate certain facts regarding the prohibition of alcohol in countries which have already adopted it.

The suppression of vodka in Russia merits special attention. Such a measure was only made possible because this country had, a few years previously, introduced the State monopoly of vodka-brewing and vodka-selling. Private interests were not involved, and when that monopoly was abolished the sole loser was the State Exchequer, which lessened its annual income by the colossal amount of 800 million roubles a year. From a financial point of view this decision was heroic.

In Great Britain it has now been realised that the only practical way of bringing about total prohibition is to introduce a measure for the State Purchase of the Liquor Trade, and there is some hope that the Government may take this step, which should bear the same beneficial results as in Russia, satisfactorily solving the burning drink problem.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the suppression of vodka for the welfare and progress of the Russian nation. A well-known worker in the temperance cause, Mr. D. Tchelyshov, writing in *The Messenger of Temperance* ("Viestnik Tresvosti"), stated that before the suppression of vodka was brought into force in 1914, over one million working men in the best years of their manhood

annually drank themselves to death in public-houses ; that hundreds of thousands of alcoholic sufferers filled the hospitals ; that innumerable public-house keepers allowed countless peasants to drink away all their substance, even to the extent of selling their furniture and the roof over their heads to buy vodka ; that the number of victims of delirium tremens was so great that over 27,000 insane persons had to remain at large for want of sufficient accommodation in asylums, which were filled to overflowing with these drunkards. This picture of physical, moral, and economic ruin can be matched by one equally appalling, portraying infantile mortality and degeneracy due to the curse of alcohol.

Between the years 1894 and 1914 not less than four and a half million children under the age of five years died annually from the want of natural nourishment, and as the result of having parents addicted to alcohol. In the general hospital of the town of Yaroslav, out of a total of 2014 patients, not less than 908 men and 24 women were admitted for complaints which were inherited in each case from a drunken father. Such and analogous statistical figures show to what extent this mortal evil was sapping away Russia's vital strength. By the suppression of vodka Russia had overcome her worst enemy, and created for herself a new life and a new future.

If a child is induced for the first time to taste alcohol his face shows disgust, because he feels, instinctively, that it is injurious to health. Indeed, it may be scientifically proved that its use is not in accordance with the natural conditions of the life of man. The action of the child clearly shows that alcohol is an acquired taste brought about by the depravation of humanity. If alcohol be taken in small quantities its harm is not so easily discernible, and there are many who, being convinced of the necessity of avoiding drunkenness, are still of the opinion that alcohol should not be entirely discarded as a beverage. The entire suppression of vodka, however, is due to an appreciation of the necessity of introducing not only freedom from drunken-

ness but the abolition of alcohol altogether. Any one who has made a study of the question of the abuse of alcohol will have come to the conclusion that entire abstinence is the only possible way to fight this drink evil, for very patent reasons. As long as alcohol is obtainable the temptation will exist, for the great majority, to use it in excess, and with the avowed intention to get drunk. Vodka is a tasteless drink. The Russian peasant drinks vodka, not for the benefit of tickling his palate, but for the mere pleasure of drunken sensations, and if this fact is fully realized it will be seen that the only way to sober him is to deprive him altogether of his vodka. Consequently, so that all classes of society should pay the same penalty of the law, the same edict must fall on those to whom the danger of drunkenness may be no menace. *Salus populi suprema lex esto*. Even opium-smoking indulged in with great reserve may not bring about serious results to health; nevertheless the sale of opium for this purpose has been prohibited entirely, greatly to the benefit of public welfare. So it must be with regard to alcohol. It is, however, a fact that even small quantities of alcohol may do harm, and that, generally speaking, it is not possible to fix a margin where the use of this drug may become actually dangerous to health. Its use produces, in the great majority of cases, a craving for more and more, thus proving its corrupting influence upon the mind.

The question of drinking alcohol has a totally different effect in Russia than in England. It endangered the existence and progress of the Russian nation more than it does in this country. In comparison with England, Russia is a country which is backward in cultural development and in the diffusion of knowledge. The actual result is that ignorance of the deadly consequences of this pernicious habit and the absence of so many factors of cultivated life which stem the tide of drunkenness have aggravated the whole situation of intemperance in Russia.

More whisky is drunk per head in England than vodka is consumed *per capita* in Russia, but the masses in England have a more nutritious diet of food than the people of

Russia, which counterbalances as a sort of antidote the bad consequences of alcohol. The Russian peasant, who forms not less than 80 per cent. of the population, is, as a rule, very poorly fed; he eats meat only on special holidays. The effect, therefore, of alcohol upon his empty stomach is much more pernicious than if it were taken after a good meal.

Another factor which helps to keep the use of alcoholic beverages confined within certain limits is the English national love of all sorts of sports. Every one knows that the use of alcoholic beverages impairs the physical and mental capacity of the human body. It is, therefore, imperative for sportsmen who wish to take advantage of all opportunities which their organism affords to abstain—at least for the time being—from the use of strong drink.

In Russia, the peasant class has had practically no other recreation from the toil and wear and tear of daily work than the habit of drinking alcohol. The pleasure which alcohol gives is the joy of change, of masquerading, of distraction from the ordinary state of things. After having taken a certain amount of the drug the surroundings appear invidiously changed, the pulse begins to beat quicker, the outlook on life seems to be brighter, the victim is under the illusion that he is physically stronger and mentally fitter. Of course a reaction sets in very soon, and especially when alcohol is taken in any great quantity; the tempting illusion is soon followed by utter despondency, waning strength, and general incapacity. But at least the first hour of illusion, when the whole aspect of life seemed to have changed for the better, does not fail to exercise its attraction.

When this unfortunate state of affairs in Russia had been changed the peasantry had gained threefold: the great amount of money which was spent upon liquor was deposited in savings banks, or used for the comforts of life; the health of the population had thereby improved enormously, and the mentality of the peasant, which formerly—owing to strong drink—was in a comatose state, had now been awakened to the self-consciousness of the duties and rights of man. Intellectually, the Russian peasantry was

in a state of fermentation ; they had broken the bonds of drink-slavery, and behaved like enfranchised slaves or inexperienced children, who do not know their limits, and think that all the world is at their command. This feature has given to the Russian Revolution its vagaries and excesses ; but it is easy to discern that this orgy of freedom, or rather licence, is purely temporary, and must lead to saner and wiser methods of statesmanship.

The suppression of vodka has benefited the Russian peasant by liberating him from the money-lender, the " koulak," to whom he often pawned all he had in order to satisfy his craving for drink. The money-lender—more often than not utterly unscrupulous—thus held his victim, who was hopelessly in debt, completely at his mercy.

Another aspect of temperance in Russia is the influence it will have on the forthcoming competition with the Jews.

A man who is accustomed to alcoholic drinks is distinctly hampered in competing against one who is a total abstainer. The seven million Jews, the majority of whom are total abstainers, and who, in addition to their well-known strong tribal solidarity, have now obtained perfect equality with other citizens, will exercise, in almost every walk in life, a powerful economic force with which Christians must count. The suppression of vodka will enable Christians to compete with the Jews. Such legislation may, therefore, be looked upon in the light of a blessing, saving them from being out-distanced by the Jews in their struggle for life.

A further benefit which the suppression of vodka in Russia has brought about is the decrease in crime. It is a very well-known fact that crimes are only too often the direct result of the use of drink, and if the victim of alcohol lacks the moral balance and resistance which education gives he is more inclined to become a brute, a beast, an irresponsible being, following only bad instincts and depraved tastes when in a state of intoxication. Morally, the use of alcohol, as of any other poison, is neither good nor bad ; it belongs to the so-called *ἀδιαφορα*—viz. to actions whose moral signification depends entirely on the consequence to which

it leads. It seemed so cruel to deprive the Russian peasant of the only distraction he had in his hard life of toil, and it would be very cruel indeed if reformers were to stop at the suppression of liquor without giving the people something better instead. Herein lies the whole crux of the question of how to fight the drink habit in the future. A human being who is accustomed to spending his leisure in imbibing alcohol must be saved from such a habit, not only by deprivation, but by gaining the taste for other enjoyments and pastimes of a healthier nature. In this respect the use of coffee and tea, which also quickens the pulsations of the heart without the concomitance of the disastrous effects of alcoholic poison, have proved of enormous value in Russia as most effective and valuable substitutes, although, of course, they alone are not sufficient to cope with the emergency. In order to obtain the full benefit of the temperance movement Russia needs a widespread establishment of institutions devoted to elevating pleasures. In this respect Great Britain may serve as a model for Russia. It would be the salvation of the whole problem to inculcate the sportive spirit in Russia; to create all sorts of unpretentious workmen's or peasants' clubs, libraries, lecture-halls, meeting-places; to found societies for the propagation of useful knowledge, and to teach the peasant how to lead a thoroughly healthy, clean, and pure life. The more certain forms of social intercourse are cultivated the more the human mind is improved, because it is then necessary to live in a more thoughtful manner. By teaching the peasant the secrets of more elaborate forms of life it will be easier for him to give up the vodka glass, thus making him more efficient in all he does. The suppression of vodka has been the first and necessary step in this evolution.

It has also an important bearing on religion. The law of Moses and Christianity do not specially prohibit the use of alcohol, but there cannot be any question that the use of this drug, especially with regard to its consequences, is contrary to the tenets of both. Religion means the raising of life to a higher plane. God, as the Principle of Life, is

opposed to the wanton destruction of life. Alcohol is a deadly poison which annihilates living organism if used in sufficient quantity. It is a liquid fire consuming life, the antithesis to the Source and First Cause of all life—God. It also impairs the higher psychic powers; for instance, telepathy, and the intensity of prayer as a medium of elevating the soul to the realm of the Infinite. It materialises and brutalises the higher aspirations of man. According to the famous Russian writer, Count Leo Tolstoy, "it is an invention of the devil himself."

Thus it may be seen that wide horizons are opening up for Russia as a direct result of the suppression of vodka. Nowhere has the experiment of introducing abstinence from drink been made on a greater scale, and had more promising results. The temperance movement in Great Britain is gaining more and more in power, and perhaps it may receive a new impetus by the example of Russia. If Great Britain would follow Russia in abolishing the use of spirits in the same way as the use of opium, cocaine, and other deadly poisons have been prohibited by law, the beneficial results would probably even surpass those obtained in Russia, because Great Britain is a more advanced country. It would also be much easier to suppress the use of spirits in Great Britain, as the English are more capable of acting together with one accord than Russians have been able to do up to the present. In such a strong-minded and practical nation as the English it is difficult to understand their weakness for the bottle. But a change for the better has already come about within the last twenty years. There is no more boasting as to who can drink the most. The knowledge of the deleterious effects of alcohol is steadily spreading, and the value of a healthy life from a moral point of view, as also from a point of view of eugenics, is more and more realised. Thus, let us hope that the day is not distant when the Russian and English nations will shake hands in a common sense of brotherhood in temperance. There should be a brotherly "give and take"; Great Britain may take from Russia the example of the total

suppression of spirits, and give to her in exchange British methods of spreading enlightened recreations, sports, and development by moral and physical training.

This, of course, is only true of the time prior to the Revolution, but we may take it to apply again in the future when the effects of the excesses of the Revolution have been wiped out, although at the present moment it is a lamentable fact that, in the absence of any government worthy of the name, vodka-brewing is practised privately on an enormous scale, but we may confidently anticipate that Russia will re-establish her excellent movement for the suppression of vodka as soon as there is once more a restoration of law and order.

CHAPTER XIII

THE INTERESTS OF POSTERITY

AT the present critical time when the gigantic struggle between civilised nations inflicts tremendous loss of life, and is accompanied by a rapid falling off in the birth-rate, the question how to repair the enormous damage, and possibly improve the conditions of regeneration in the future, seems to be of paramount importance.

The supposition that the declining birth-rate of the populations of Europe is a matter of congratulation in consideration of the alleged shortage of the world's food-supplies does not hold good, since Russia and Rumania—having concluded peace—are now again at liberty to devote their energies to the production of food-stuffs ; and America, according to latest information, will have a big surplus of corn to be exported abroad this year. But apart from this consideration, there cannot be any doubt that the decline in the birth-rate deserves the most careful attention and organised endeavour in order to counteract it. All efforts to elucidate the problem and to make proposals tending to cope with this social evil should be welcome.

It is common knowledge that the existence of the race in its ultimate issue rests with the woman. If she does not conceive, give birth, and rear the future generation, all man's energy in conserving human life is in vain. It has, therefore, been ordained by nature that womanhood should be the primary factor in the very existence of the human race. Woman's part in the plan of Creation is indeed far the noblest, most responsible, and important. But from a physical point of view she is the weaker vessel

in comparison with man. She is hampered in a thousand ways by the functions of her sex, and it is impossible for her to develop the same muscular force. However, throughout the ages, this drawback has lost much of its significance by the progress of civilisation and culture. Legislation and the collective will, represented by the executive power of the State, have superseded the right of forcible action which in former times was assumed by the individual, and, on the other hand, Society has laid down the rule that men should not use their superior muscular strength against women. The object and glory of chivalry was to induce men not to use the privilege of force in their dealings with the weaker sex. Violation was made a criminal offence. The position of women has been further improved by granting them prior consideration whenever danger threatens. "Women and children first" is the unwritten law.

It would, therefore, appear not only from the point of view of the order of nature, but also in the organisation of civilised society, that the idea of the preponderating importance of women over men has received an unmistakable and adequate expression. But this is not the view of the movement for the so-called emancipation of women. This movement has not only the laudable object of improving the social status and education of women, but also strives to launch them into public and political life on the same level footing as men, setting them up as rivals in all walks of life. There is no reason for supposing that such opposition could not be successfully carried on, and the present enlistment of the services of women under the stress of the exigencies of war conditions has amply confirmed this view. But it is quite another question whether such an order of things in the long run under the ordinary circumstances of peace would benefit the nation.

The functions assigned by Nature's laws to men and women are so totally void of rivalry that there should be no idea of antagonistic competition. It is well to remember that the two sexes did not always exist in animal life, but

only form a stage in evolution removed from the auto-generation of self-contained beings: the appearance of the two sexes, therefore, marks but a relative independence. As one limb may be considered distinct from the other, so are the two sexes, but both serve a common end and are incomplete without the other, forming a *conditio sine qua non* for their mutual existence. The right appreciation of this order of nature is the key to the entire relation of the sexes towards each other, and in their separate independent positions in the world. Spinsters may be as useful as possible in public work, but they are, through no fault of their own, unable to take their full share in the predestined part allotted to the sexes. From a physiological point of view it may be said that a human being who has no relations with the opposite sex remains in a state of incompleteness. As a matter of fact, such a person never enters entirely into the inner meaning of life, for its most essential significance is progeny. Celibacy is one of those artificial institutions which often leads to immorality, or else deprives men of their birthright of happiness and the full bloom of their lives. A man or woman is, *de facto*, only part of a whole, and it is erroneous to look upon either as an independent unit. Each is meant as a complement to the other, to help each other in his, or her, own particular sphere. If this law of nature be disregarded, if women through stress of circumstances or by misconception of their real vocation neglect the paramount duty of their life, then civilised humanity will die out! Intellectual attainment, and any satisfaction derived from public work, politics, and administration are of less importance than simply being true to the dictates of the primeval law of nature. A true man is one who is capable and willing to earn his livelihood for his family and for himself, and a true woman is one who is wife and mother. The chief aim of both should be to procreate themselves in their children. The Jews teach that children are a blessing of the Lord, and indeed no more visible and palpable manifestation of God is given than in the highest forms of life. True, those suffering from

incurable maladies liable to be transmitted to posterity should refrain from marriage, and not every man or woman is in a position to enter upon such a state, and again, since there are more women than men in the world a surplus of women must necessarily remain single—but this does not touch the argument; there should be a solution to the problem which would assure to every sound man and woman their legitimate right to conjugal love.

Women who attach a predominating importance to theoretical learning are prone to overlook the fact that the procreation of gifted children, and their future education, require the broadest and most extensive knowledge of the world, forethought, and intelligence. All great men have had pre-eminently gifted mothers. Goethe makes the prototype of learning, Faust, apply to the mystical Realm of Mothers for wisdom ("Das Reich der Mütter"). There is indeed a mystical signification in the appearance of a newborn child upon earth! Each of us seeks self-expression through some sort of channel—may it be in speech, literature, art, or music—but the sublimest and most perfect utterance of the soul is the child, the continuation, personification, and embodiment of the parents' physique and psyche. We still know far too little about the mysterious laws of heredity, but we do know that children do not fall from heaven like meteors, the origin of which we cannot trace, for we recognise children as the direct offspring of the foregoing generation, a new link added to a chain, homogeneous in its essence. It follows that the whole life of a man through good and evil tendencies is reflected and reproduced in the children he bears. Herein lies the secret of the transmigration not only of the soul, but also of the body, which is not yet sufficiently understood in the fullness of its details, but the principle of which can be gauged with mathematical accuracy. This points to the whole compass of the responsibility towards the future generations and of producing children to be promoters of good, and workers for the progress of humanity.

The momentous question as to how far women are ready

to accept all responsibility towards the future generation lies at the bottom of the growth and decay of the many civilisations which have followed one after the other. Be it the Indian civilisation of the Vedic period, the Summerian, Armenian, Persian, or Egyptian epochs of splendour and development, or classical Greece and Rome, the chief reason of the decadence and downfall of each and all is unquestionably the fact that overcivilised nations die out because their women cease to bring forth children, partly avoiding child-bearing for the sake of personal comfort and economy, and partly losing the very faculty of conception by the overindulgence of intellectual development detracting them from the interests of family life.

It is a well-known fact that the higher education of women has an adverse influence on the procreation of children. The birth-rate of the working classes is 30 per cent. greater than that of the intellectually trained, and it is not without significance that in countries which enjoy woman's suffrage, like Finland and Australia, the birth-rate is lower than in other countries, and that in America and in France, where the women are more highly cultured and take a more active part in public affairs than in Great Britain and in Germany, the birth-rate is prominently on the decline. Russia, the land of the peasant woman, living a life of devotion to home and family, is an example of undiminished racial vitality. The birth-rate in Russia is 46·8 and the death-rate 29·8 per 1000, while in Great Britain the birth-rate is only 23·9 and the death-rate 14·2; in France even less: 18·7, and the death-rate 19·6; in Germany the birth-rate is 29·8 and the death-rate 16·2. While the birth-rate in Western Europe is alarmingly declining, Russia augments her population of 180 million inhabitants by nearly 3 million souls per annum. According to this ratio the Russian population will in the year 2000 exceed 500 million souls. This calculation is not only theoretically but also practically sound, as Russia has actually sufficient room for keeping that number of inhabitants. By empirical law it has been ascertained that emigration is imposed when there are not

more than 4 dessiatinas (nearly 11 acres) per head of the population. Russia has reserves of fertile land which exceeds 16 dessiatinas per head of the population. A simple calculation proves that she can keep 500 million souls. This is borne out by the statistical figures established by the celebrated analytical chemist Mendeléeff in his "Researches on the Vital Forces of Russia," and is of the greatest possible value for the future of the Aryan race, which in its ultimate instance lies with the Russian. It has been said jokingly: "Rouskaya baba Pobedeet"—the Russian woman will win! And so it will be in the long run.

According to Tolstoy: "The ideal woman is one who having assimilated the highest life-conception and life-faith that she is acquainted with, abandons herself to the feminine instincts irresistibly implanted in her mind, and produces, rears, and educates children capable of working for the good of mankind according to the life-conception she has assimilated." A well-known medical authority, Dr. R. Murray-Leslie, recommends that "a woman should only develop intellectually along lines that are consonant with the natural development of her capacity for race creativeness." This is practical wisdom that runs counter to modern opinion, which does not look upon marriage and motherhood as woman's chief aim. But civilised humanity is at present in a grave predicament to which women alone can come to the rescue. More than ever, therefore, women should realise what the race demands from them and the direction in which their plain duty lies.

Having thus so far cleared the ground from a general point of view, let us now treat the subject in detail, suggesting measures which would assure the interests of posterity. The war, with its dreadful waste of human material, and the steadily decreasing birth-rate, has added to the practical importance of the science of systematising the rearing of proficient humanity. People are nowadays particularly anxious that the institution of marriage should come under more favourable conditions for the

fulfilment of its primary purpose—the procreation of useful lives.

The interests of posterity have found a powerful advocate in eugenics within the boundaries of morality. It is morality which binds civilised society together. If eugenics disregarded morality it would defy its own ends by disintegrating the existing organisation of State and Society, without which rational and efficient methods in the procreation of healthy progeny would be impossible. In order to increase her population during time of war, Germany has adopted measures which are right and proper in the management of a horse stud, but which are degrading to human society and seriously undermine sexual morality. Such a mode of procedure lies outside the scope of eugenics, which do not aim at destroying morality, but, on the contrary, rather tend to promote a higher and more enlightened standard by the conclusion of suitable marriages, in the regulation of divorce, and the condemnation of irregular sexual relations injurious to posterity. So much for the correlation between eugenics and morality.

Hitherto marriage has been left to the decision of the individual. This can hardly be expected to remain so in the future. Marriage as the lawful compact for bringing about the birth of new human lives cannot be left unreservedly to the free will of the single individual, as upon it rests the very foundation of State and Society. It cannot altogether be considered only from the standpoint of the satisfaction and pleasure it affords, the element of duty being too pre-eminent. The fact that two human beings—who may in many ways differ from each other—are living together in such close proximity, involves the mutual blending of character and the sacrificing of personal comforts and self-indulgence. Such relationship demands a renouncing of egotism for the higher ideal of life found in family responsibilities, and the privilege of perpetuating the species. In all its aspects marriage bears not only a private but a public character. It cannot be considered otherwise but in the light of a social function with attendant social obliga-

tions. Every up-grown man or woman represents, as it were, a social investment, and is bound to recompense Society for this very fact in two ways—i.e. by useful work and by the procreation of new lives profitable to State and Society. Leaving out of account the prophylactic measures tending to prevent the propagation of diseased and useless beings, we have to elucidate the methods by which the birth of serviceable citizens may be augmented.

While the lower classes of Society—significantly called “proletarians” by the Roman historian, Suetonius—are very prolific, the upper classes, and especially the well-to-do, as already mentioned, are deficient in this respect in a truly alarming manner. The reasons for this phenomenon are only too patent. The pleasures of Society, the comforts and luxuries of life, and the available monetary means are, to no small extent, taxed by the birth and upbringing of children. While in the lower classes the upbringing of children does not entail much expenditure—since in their early years they are turned into money-earning assets, adding their support to the common family purse—the upper classes give their children a costly and lengthy education, providing them afterwards with financial assistance so as to enable them to keep up the same level of comfort and social distinction to which they have been accustomed in their own homes. Proletarians have every incentive to produce children, while the upper classes make it very onerous for themselves, and in consequence often avoid such responsibility. Especially aggravating is the case of those who have come to age, and yet remain single, in order to lead a life of selfishness and self-indulgence.

This cannot be tolerated. It should be established as a principle that it is the duty of every one, who is not hampered by illness or mental or moral depravity, to provide for progeny by an adequate number of children. In order to safeguard the future of the race it is necessary that families able to produce children should average over three. People who by physical reasons are not hampered in the procreation of children should be assessed according to their

wealth and standing regarding an obligatory minimum number of children, and where the services of a doctor are required in order to counteract sterility, such services should be enforced. Single men who are able to marry should not be allowed to carry on a life useless to progeny.

The case of so-called illegitimate children deserves special attention. Up to the present, children born out of wedlock are regarded as pariahs of society, although they themselves are in no way responsible for the slur of their illegitimacy of birth. Illegitimacy of birth is, of course, a purely conventional conception and has nothing to do with nature's laws. If State and Society recognise the birth of sound children, who may become useful citizens, to be desirable and necessary for their purposes, there is no reason why "illegitimate" children should be restricted from the full rights of citizenship. The title *Wohlgeboren* or *Hochwohlgeboren*, which is used in Germany to accentuate legitimacy of birth, is in the eyes of the Englishman superfluous and ridiculous. It is only necessary to go a little further. The very notion of illegitimacy should be abolished. As soon as a woman can prove to the satisfaction of a judge that a certain man is the father of her child, that man should be compelled by law to marry her, and the children born before marriage would *eo ipso* be legitimatised *per subsequens matrimonium*. This would contribute to stamp out the obsolete notion of illegitimacy of birth. The French legal principle, "La recherche de la paternité est interdite," is immoral and should be reversed. If a man is unable to marry owing to the fact that he already possesses a wife in the eyes of the law, or because of too close ties of blood-relationship, the child born out of wedlock should be adopted by the father with full endowment by the rights of legitimacy.

Such principles do not imply that those who for certain valid reasons remain unmarried are of no value to the community. In England women are in the majority to 6 or 7 per cent.; it therefore stands to reason that each one cannot be married. It has often been proved that

unmarried women are invaluable in devoting their services in private and public life. There are many professions where single-women workers are particularly efficient owing to the fact that they have no family ties. But as useful as they be to the community, their status, which is contrary to nature's laws, can only be recognised as an exception, confirming the general social rule that every able-bodied man or woman should be married. Children should be taught that it is their duty to prepare for married life in every way conducive to that end, and that for a man it is a shame to remain unmarried. In Japan public opinion regards an unmarried man to be immoral.

One of the stumbling-blocks towards the promotion of eugenic marriages is the financial question. Many cannot marry from sheer lack of means, and often partners for life are chosen out of considerations of a financial nature. Here the State should step in: a beginning has already been made by granting "bonuses" to mothers to help them over their term of confinement. Further legislation in this direction may be expected in the form of dowry allowances and premiums in the case of the birth of children, with further allowances for their education.

In order to facilitate eugenic marriages it is also of importance to provide young people with adequate chances for finding suitable partners who, from the point of view of character, education, and physical development, would be fit comrades for life. Up to the present, considerations which have nothing to do with eugenics have too often interfered with the choice which would otherwise be made. Herein lies a deep problem to be solved, which has its roots in the distribution of wealth and the way it is acquired. In an ideal social community differences of wealth should be only the result of merit and capacity, and could not militate against eugenics. However, in the present state of human affairs there are many ways of acquiring wealth which belong to the *partie honteuse* of our civilisation, as, for instance, gambling, all sorts of speculation, and innumerable methods of dishonesty. Eugenics, in this respect,

stand and fall, therefore, with the nature of the financial structure of human society. Judging from the trend of modern legislation there is, however, hope that this aspect of eugenics may benefit in the future in consequence of the promotion of a sounder distribution of wealth.

The greatest danger to eugenic marriages—yea to the very existence of marriage itself—lies in immorality and vice. Christian civilisation has hitherto displayed a culpable indifference and indulgence in this respect, which can only be explained as the outcome of hypocrisy, of a false idea of freedom, and of an utter disregard of the social side of the problem. Prostitution has been openly tolerated, and public control has not even been exercised against those fatal diseases following in the wake of immorality. It is hard to believe that public authority could be so inert as to ignore the wholesale infection of men, morally and physically, brought about by prostitution. Contagious diseases, such as smallpox, bubonic plague, and others, have received special attention, and the medical world have striven to keep down the spreading of these scourges. But little has been done to prevent a woman, infected with a most deadly disease, which by the law of heredity passes its curse on from one generation to another, from poisoning the blood of all those who are unfortunate enough to come into contact with her.

In countries now in a state of war, the public thoroughfares are densely thronged with young soldiers, and in the open streets immorality has been stealthily and rapidly fostered, to the growing scandal of public opinion. Certain measures have been taken to minimise this danger, but still the evil exists.

It is, therefore, high time that radical methods were adopted to prevent a further undermining of the health of the race.

Prostitution should be recognised in its true light as a crime against the whole structure of State and Society, and should be punished by the severest legal measures. Fallen women should be temporarily deprived of their liberty by

being placed in special asylums devoted to their moral uplifting. At the same time men who take advantage of prostitutes should also undergo punishment. It is necessary to go to the root cause of the matter and eradicate the source of the evil itself. In many occupations where women are employed the salary paid to them is not a living wage, and in order to supply themselves with the bare necessities of life a woman is forced to walk the streets. Again, so very many girls have never had a fair chance of matrimony, and having lost all hope of attaining that end, throw themselves away with the avowed intention of obtaining at least the phantom of the pretence of the pleasures of wedded life. It should be the duty of public authorities to inquire into the lives of honest girls and to afford them financial assistance in getting introductions which might lead to matrimony.

The realisation of public purity lies in the destruction of the great avenues of licence leading systematically to immorality.

Every man is endowed with a necessary amount of sensuality which is a vital function of his being. This fact should be taken into consideration in order to place in true perspective all public performances which are, to a more or less degree, suggestive and counted to play upon a man's passions. If women are allowed, as is the case in so many pantomimes and variety halls, to make an exhibition of their forms with the express intention of exciting the sensuality of the audience, it is, after all, not astonishing that excesses—which would not otherwise occur—are committed after visiting such places of amusement.

The stage must be cleansed and purified from all performances of a suggestive character. It is not too much to put forth these demands as a *sine qua non* of the necessity of promoting eugenics if the increasing of the population be considered of paramount importance.

There are women who shrink so greatly from the risk of child-bearing and the anguish it entails that they prefer to remain childless. Such a reason for the diminishing

birth-rate need now no longer exist, since medical science has discovered the means to bring about safer and altogether painless birth by the use of scopalamine morphine, generally known as "Twilight Sleep."

"Twilight Sleep" has already been applied in innumerable cases, and it was quite lately asserted in the Press that doctors are becoming more and more convinced of its value. It has, however, to meet the objection of those who believe that suffering in child-bearing has been ordained by the special will of God. This standpoint is tantamount to an admission that medical science interferes with the Divine order of things. There was a time when theology was the only faculty which was recognised, the study of medicine being placed on the same footing as witchcraft and sorcery. Accordingly, all schemes for alleviating the ills and sicknesses of humanity were regarded from a fatalistic point of view as working against the purpose of Providence. The use of anæsthetics and surgical operations, intended to counteract pain, were considered to be impious and contrary to the intention of the Creator. This blight of religious superstition on the intellect, thwarting scientific progress, has lifted during the present age, now that people are more and more anxious to pierce the gloom of ignorance appertaining to the darkness of mediæval times.

Without wishing to impugn the authority of the author of Genesis, it is clear that this document has no value in its literal interpretation. In the first place it cannot be regarded as a scientific discourse, setting forth how women should bring children into the world. It is but an attempt at an explanation of the primary conditions of human existence portrayed upon a religious background. The author wrote at a time when the use of anæsthetics was unknown; he, therefore, formed the conclusion that it was necessary that a woman should suffer pain in child-bearing. Further, he described that the work of man should be done by the sweat of his brow. He did not know the future of the forthcoming machine which spares working humanity much sweating. Civilisation and progress have changed

the conditions of the existence of humanity so greatly that the tale told in the first book of the Bible is actually no longer true to life. Such words, therefore, cannot be taken to decide whether it is morally right that women should suffer in childbirth, since this ideology belongs to the primitive past and cannot possibly have a bearing on modern medical science.

In close connection with eugenic marriages is the question of divorce. Civilised countries have been compelled to discard the obligation of the consecration of marriage by religious ceremony, and have introduced in its stead civil marriages before a registrar, as the essential part of the compact, a religious ceremony being left to the inclination and decision of the persons concerned. The reason for this reform lay in the just appreciation of family life as the very foundation upon which State and Society depend; the interference of the Church into such paramount public interests could not be any longer tolerated.

Hitherto, unfortunately, this enlightened principle has not been exercised in cases for divorce to the same extent as it has been brought to bear upon civil marriages, although both institutions are equally important to the vital welfare of the community. The dissolution of marriage by law is still to a great extent under the influence of religious ideas which do not take into account its public significance. Just as the institution of civil marriage leaves the interests of the Church out of account, so the institution of divorce should likewise be ruled only by considerations bearing upon State and Society.

Divorce should be made possible in all cases where marriage does not fulfil its primary object, i.e. the procreation of children, as, for instance, in cases of protracted absence or illness which makes the birth of children impossible, or undesirable on account of hereditary taints, such as epilepsy, venereal disease, habitual drunkenness, cruelty, incurable lunacy, mental debility, etc. This would set at liberty for remarriage those who are otherwise well fitted to produce healthy offspring, and would consequently avoid many

tragedies which fall upon the victims of that barbaric and mediæval conception of marriage as an indissoluble compact riveting partners together to the end of their lives.

There is nothing miraculous, nothing infinite in marriage, nor in the reason for its existence and the purpose it has to serve. Marriage was made for man, not man for marriage. If individual happiness is not achieved by marriage, such relationship should cease to exist. To set free couples who crave to be relieved of their marriage ties is serving the laws of nature and morality, which are both opposed to force where only love should prevail, and a true benefit is conferred upon humanity by thus intercepting sterility and ill-bred posterity.

The coming social reconstruction will involve the application of practical methods of eugenics in all its aspects regarding marriage, much to the progress of humanity towards greater well-being, efficiency, and happiness.

CHAPTER XIV

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW UPON DUELLING

THE question of duelling has a symptomatic importance for personal as well as national ethics. For those who unconditionally adhere to the belief that might creates right and worship war as the highest manifestation of the world's justice, the practice of duelling is right. On the contrary, for those who recognise the law as supreme, the infraction of it by force cannot possibly be right. The duel, representing a wilful and criminal infringement of the law, can therefore not be right. The Anglo-Saxon world has gone to war for the sake of maintaining the law recognised by the nations, and for this very reason it also discountenances the practice of duelling.

It was due to the repeated immigration of political refugees from France and to pronounced influence from her neighbour, Germany, who served as a model in State and social organisation, that Russia adopted duelling in consonance with Continental European ideas. It was intended to regulate social usages in matters concerning quarrels and offences, and to develop a code of honour on the lines of European civilisation. The propagation of British ethical ideas had not yet found a suitable *terrain* in Russia, chiefly owing to the more or less open antagonism which kept the two nations apart from each other for so many years.

Duelling was artificially encouraged in Russian society, officially introduced in the army, and systematically organised by authoritative publications. For instance, General Mikoulin's ponderous volume gives all possible details about the rules to be observed in duelling. The

Revolution, however, has now brought about great changes of a democratic and radical character in the social standing of the soldiers with their officers, and must also affect what was considered the prerogative of the latter—viz. duelling. From the democratic point of view of equality in honour there is no plausible reason why duels should be confined to officers only. But if on account of equality of rights the privilege of duelling must be extended to the privates of the army, this would at the same time entail a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole institution of duelling. The Revolution may therefore revolutionise also the existing regulations about duelling of officers of the Russian army. But even a greater influence upon the practice will probably be exercised by the close, friendly relations which very happily unite Great Britain and Russia. There seems no more fruitful aspect of these friendly relations than in a co-ordination of the English and Russian point of view upon the duel *honoris causa*.

It is a strange coincidence that it was approximately at the same time that England suppressed duelling and Russia introduced it, for very different if not diametrically opposed reasons. This institution existed in England for centuries as a relic of feudal times, until civic progress and the dictates of reason prevailed against it. On the contrary, Russia, who was not labouring under the same historical conditions as England, and had hitherto not believed in duelling, adopted it in her somewhat indiscriminate imitation of Continental Western methods. The present-day social influence of England upon Russia may now produce a fundamental change in the aspect of duelling in that country, as a result of the foreign, not Russian, origin of the practice, and the desire to follow the lead of England in this matter.

There is perhaps no civilized country in the world which has more reason to reconsider its views on duelling than Russia, who has had the great misfortune to lose through it two of her most gifted poetical geniuses, Pushkin and Lermontoff. And since Russia has, thanks to the Revolution, shown her intention of becoming an up-to-date country, she

is doubly interested in shaking off the old fetters of the *ancien régime*, and amongst them the mediæval practice of duelling.

One of the most interesting and convincing proofs of biological change and evolution is shown in the rudimentary organs contained in the bodies of living beings. These organs have now no functional value, and often bring about obstruction, disease, and even death. They are the remnants of a previous form of existence, and though they were of importance and necessity then, they have, under present conditions of life, lost their utility and reason for existence. Science has recognized the desirability of removing such organs, as, for instance, the appendix, which is a constant danger to the life of the individual. As in the case of the individual, so with human communities. There, owing to a conservatism which tends to interfere with the capacity for adaptation, coupled with a mental backwardness which does not sufficiently realise the change in the conditions of social life, we see the survival of customs, habits, and rules which have long ago lost their significance and necessity, and are an encumbrance and danger to society. This applies particularly to duelling, which is still in vogue on the Continent, but has been recognised as an exploded method of settling disputes which has no place whatsoever in modern civilised society.

The war has in so many ways brought about enlightenment and progress that we may suppose that it will also exercise an influence upon the custom of resorting to the duel. Russian public opinion has now expressed itself openly in favour of English methods of education, English customs and habits, and the question is whether British influence, which is at present felt so strongly in Russia, will also make itself felt as regards the practice of duelling.

The English point of view is not only in harmony with the existing law, which in all civilised countries considers duelling to be a punishable offence, but it is also in full consonance with the stage of civilisation which we have reached, and which cannot in any way be regarded as inferior to that of

ancient Greece and Rome. To the Greeks and Romans duelling was unheard of, for the simple reason that the idea of citizenship prevailed so much over considerations of a purely personal nature that the possibility of avoiding the law by a personal vindication of one's honour was unthinkable. And this is exactly the way in which all the Anglo-Saxon world, the British Empire and the United States of America, look upon this question at present.

An Englishman appreciates honour, but his idea of it is bound up with the idea of citizenship. An Englishman leaves it to the law and to public opinion to vindicate his honour, because he recognises the law and public opinion as paramount under all circumstances, just as it was in the days of the Greeks and Romans. He does not admit personal interference. If any one has been slandered and his good reputation injured, he knows that his best course is to bring the matter before the law courts, where he will receive satisfaction by a judgment which will be publicly recognised. If he has suffered through ill-treatment, provocation, or bad behaviour, he knows that the rules of society and public opinion are so strong that the offender and not himself will be the sufferer, and in that way also he gets satisfaction, and there is no need for a vindication of his honour by a duel.

If a man, through some act of aggression against him, is not in danger of losing the esteem of his own class, his honour cannot be involved. Only too often, when honour was supposed to be the motive for settling a dispute by a duel, the true motive was personal revenge. But personal revenge by the use of deadly weapons cannot be admitted in a civilised community, where the law must in all cases be the weapon for redress. That is why an Englishman is always ready to apologise if he has been found guilty of transgressing against the rules of society and good form. If an Englishman under such circumstances does not apologise, he is not considered to be a true gentleman, and his position in society is endangered. The power of public opinion is so strong in this respect that the consequences are of great importance to every Englishman, and he has to submit

Buckle, in his "History of Civilisation in England" (vol. ii, p. 137, note 71), says quite truly: "The learned professions have each their own tribunal, to which their members are amenable, and the highest ranks of society, however imperfect their standard of morality may be, are perfectly competent to enforce that standard by means of social penalties, without resorting either to trial by law or trial by battle."

Defenders of duelling often proclaim that good manners in society can only be assured by the possibility of duels. But this is not so, judging from English society, which is more fastidious as to forms and manners than many Continental societies which uphold duelling. Some people think that Englishmen use in speech with one another such strong language that the manners of society suffer through it, and that this would not occur if there were duelling. As a matter of fact, good English society observes a very elaborate phraseology, and even men who are incensed against one another would not resort to strong language, because, as already mentioned, they would be regarded as ungentelemanly and vulgar. Good English society has a horror of vulgarity, and is certainly not less refined than society on the Continent. Of course, Englishmen do not suffer from an overstrained point of honour, and they would not feel themselves offended if, for instance, they were once convicted of having said or done an unwise thing.

It is also sometimes said that a man must always be ready to prove his courage, and that this can only be done by duelling. That is a point of view which can scarcely be admitted. Apart from the fact that a duel is not at all a test of courage, every man has a right to be considered courageous, whether he is a duellist or not. Besides, there are many and better ways of showing courage. During the present war no one can accuse the millions of British fighters of lacking in courage, yet they have never fought duels. Napoleon was the sworn foe of the duel. One of his best-known sayings is "Bon duelliste, mauvais soldat."

During the agrarian upheavals in Russia in 1905, when the

landowners had to prove their courage in order to maintain themselves on their estates, it was rather strange to see that notorious duellists, who were always ready to make a show of their alleged courage, were the first to desert their estates and to seek safety in flight. It can hardly be considered as a fair test of courage to fight under moral compulsion exercised by perverted public opinion on the combatants.

But the surest sign that the duel is a relic of the past can be traced in the anti-democratic spirit which underlies it. A democracy like Great Britain or the United States could not tolerate it. Democracy means that every honest man has the same sense of honour irrespective of his walk in life. The English meaning of the word "gentleman" is an honourable man commanding respect in all classes of society. The term can apply whether he be a duke or a small merchant. Following this train of thought, "honour" means nothing else than the esteem assured to any man who has descent manners, is honourable in his business dealings, and is a useful member of society. According, therefore, to the democratic ideal, the conception of honour applies to all classes alike. Duelling stands in open contradiction to this conception. Amongst the lower classes there has never been a question of duelling, owing to the fact that this practice has its origin in the feudal idea of chivalry. In the year 501, Gondebald, King of the Burgundians, passed a law authorising trial by judicial combat, and from there this custom spread to every country of Europe. The judicial duel is the direct parent of the modern duel.

Of course only freeman could fight. The underlying idea was that he who was in the right had special help from God, and must therefore be the victor. The right to fight out quarrels by arms was also derived from the idea of the feudal State, where the central Government had a comparatively small part in regulating the affairs of the State. The settling of differences was thus left in the hands of the individual, owing to the weakness of the central power and prevailing superstition.

Fighting duels has been, as already said, the privilege of

the higher classes. But it is not quite clear wherein lies the limit for people who are supposed to be worthy of fighting duels and those who are not. In older times only the nobility and the military were considered to have this right, while later on University students were also deemed to possess the right to take satisfaction and demand it by duels. But when industry and commerce made themselves felt as important factors in the life of the State, the representative of those classes began to claim the same right. However, the right to demand satisfaction by a duel is still not supposed to belong to all men and all classes, and it is this feature which makes it unacceptable to the modern democratic structure of society. The duellists form, so to say, a caste—a society acting contrary to the law, such as the Camorra in Naples, the Maffia in Sicily, or the Black Hand in America, associations which, of course, pursue different aims, but, in common with the duellists, are in open opposition to the existing law and addicted to violent methods.

Unbridled pugnacity, which pays no regard to human life or considers duelling a kind of sport, can no longer be tolerated in modern communities, where it is considered to be the duty of each individual to respect the rights and personality of the other. It is a rather curious fact that the less a man is living by his own exertions, the more inclined he is to lay stress on amour-propre and sensitiveness on the point of honour. Men of the working classes and those who have to earn their own living have no time to indulge in such egotistic and petty pretensions. In England the idea of class-honour has, broadly speaking, been replaced by the ideas of honesty and respectability comprising all classes of society—ideas which are, from an ethical point of view, infinitely sounder, and are applicable to all members of society. Honesty and respectability cannot be ensured by duelling or any other illegal act, but are only acquired by a conduct of life which secures such a reputation. It is said, "By their fruits ye shall know them." There is a patent difference between the conduct and behaviour of duellists and non-duellists. The duellist does not need to be so care-

ful as to his behaviour, because he has a weapon at his disposal which is supposed to repair any wrong done, and gives him the opportunity of putting himself in the right. It is a well-known fact that when a duellist sees that he is in the wrong he endeavours to put himself right by challenging his enemy, and it is also a fact that the duellist claims to be able to make good any offence committed by offering "satisfaction" with arms to the injured party. On the contrary, the non-duellist does not harbour such illusions, but endeavours to avoid being aggressive, or quarrelsome, or trespassing on the rights of his fellow-men. He is, moreover, always ready to apologise if he is in the wrong.

The absence of duelling has strongly influenced modern English ways in social life, and forms a distinct characteristic of Englishmen. It is considered very bad form according to English ideas to be quarrelsome, to contradict, or to provoke an oversharp discussion. For the same reason in English messrooms it is the custom to avoid speaking of women. Respect for individual personality is responsible for this. It is truly said of Englishmen that "their passion for personal freedom has made them chary of treading on one another's toes."

The absurdity of challenging any one to a duel and making his honour dependent on it is illustrated in the case of a man who enjoys a good reputation and has proved during a long lifetime to be of a high moral character. If such a man is provoked by unseemly behaviour on the part of another, it cannot conceivably endanger his reputation, and it would be absurd for him to fight a duel on this account, as his reputation is already established. In this respect the careers of the great English statesmen are especially noteworthy and can be models for others. Many a public man in England has in the heat of political controversy been accused by his adversaries of stupidity, arrogance, and so forth, without the slightest disturbance to his own self-respect or that of others towards him. These men had espoused the cause of the public interest, and had acquired a discipline of character by which they subordinated their own personal feelings to

the public aims they were prosecuting. The provocation of duels amongst Parliamentarians and Ministers of State on the Continent always produces a pitiful impression in England, where it is considered that such men do not sufficiently realise the great public interests in which they are engaged.

According to Continental legislation, duellists are not considered as ordinary criminals. In England this point of view was abandoned at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1808 a Major Campbell was sentenced to death for duelling, and in 1813, in the case of Captain Blundell, who was killed in a duel, the surviving combatant and the seconds were convicted of murder and sentenced to death by hanging. In 1844 the Articles of War were amended to the effect that "Every person who shall fight or promote a duel, or take any steps thereto, or who shall not do his best to prevent a duel, shall, if an officer, be cashiered, or suffer such other penalty as a general court martial shall award." By the same Article it was expressly declared that to accept or to receive apologies for wrong or insult, given or received, were suitable to the character of honourable men. English society, always being on the side of the law, adjusted its opinion about the duel in conformity with these enactments.

The problem of settling disputes affecting honour has also a religious aspect, which, strange to say, is on the Continent ordinarily left entirely out of account. It is supposed that in affairs of honour not only considerations of public order and the requirements of the law but also the tenets of religion must give way. Such a point of view amounts to anarchism coupled with egotism. In the Middle Ages, when the Christian religion confined itself mainly to miracle stories, it was perhaps easier to overlook its ethical meaning. But at the present day, when the moral principles of the Christian religion have been more and more placed in the foreground of religious teaching, it is hardly possible to overlook the fact that the vindication of honour by wilful vengeance is diametrically opposed to a Christian line of conduct. The necessities of the State may perhaps serve as

an excuse for infringing the Christian moral code, the more so as we are told Christ urged that we must render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. A Christian soldier has to fight when the State commands him to do so. But in the case of duelling this excuse does not exist, as the modern civilised State forbids expressly this sort of private warfare. The principles laid down by the First Epistle of St. Peter, ii. 19-21, the Gospels of St. Matthew, v. 39, and St. Mark, xi. 25, make it abundantly clear what the Christian attitude towards duelling should be :

(1) " For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully.

" For what glory is it, if when ye be buffeted for your faults, ye shall take it patiently ? But if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God.

" For even hereunto were ye called : because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow His steps." (1 Peter ii. 19-21.)

(2) " But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil : but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." (St. Matthew v. 39.)

(3) " And when ye stand praying, forgive, if ye have ought against any : that your Father also which is in heaven may forgive you your trespasses." (St. Mark xi. 25.)

Can one conceive the possibility of one of the Saints, or Apostles, or Martyrs taking part in a duel ? Even the heathen—as, for instance, the Hindus, whose religion is too often underestimated by Christians—would never fight a duel, because it contradicts their religion. But Christian duellists may be good church-goers, and consider themselves orthodox and yet do not seem to realise that to fight a duel is in direct opposition to the fundamental Christian principles to which they profess allegiance.

A duellist cannot excuse himself on the grounds of having acted on the spur of the moment on passion or strong provocation, which could be considered as somewhat mitigating the offence and minimising his personal responsibility, as duelling often takes place days after the act of provocation,

and amounts, therefore, to premeditated and cold-blooded murder, the outcome of a long-standing vindictiveness. Continental jurists, who wish to give the duel a different appearance from premeditated murder, attach great importance to the fact that in duelling certain rules must be observed; that both adversaries are on the alert and can defend themselves, and so forth. But in reality these circumstances only serve to aggravate the offence from the point of view of crime, as they clearly manifest the *animus delinquendi*. One would think that European civilisation, which God be thanked has reached the age of reason and looks down with scorn on the superstition and absurd practices of the Middle Ages, would have long ago abandoned duelling as contrary to common sense. As a matter of fact, it often happens that in a duel the offended party and not the offender is the one to suffer.

Duelling is altogether unfair and unsportsmanlike. There is no handicap provided for the better swordsman or the superior shot. The great exponents of duelling are too often sure to avoid any danger by killing their adversary before he can possibly have a fair chance of defending himself. Having the issue in their own hands, there is really no bravery on their part in being willing to face their adversary. The equipment of a French journalist of repute is not only his style, but also his mastery in fencing. Rochefort and Paul de Cassagnac could insult a man with impunity, because should a duel be the result they were quite safe, owing to their proficiency in fencing.

If needs be, a boxing bout is a much better test of personal courage. At a public meeting in London an orator was interrupted by the remark, "You are a liar!" "If you repeat that once more I shall punch your head," ejaculated the orator. "You are a liar!" repeated the interrupter. Whereupon the orator left the platform and carried out his threat, amidst the applause of the meeting. Before continuing his speech, he said: "I know I should not have done that as a gentleman, but before being a gentleman I am an Englishman." This way of dealing with the offender was

certainly more humane, more courageous, and more sensible than fighting a duel under similar provocation. At an English railway station a girl came out of a railway carriage and, pointing to a man who followed her, addressed herself to a gentleman standing on the platform, saying, "I have been insulted by that man." The gentleman, without a moment's hesitation, went up to the man, told him of the girl's accusation, and, receiving a rude reply, dealt him a blow which felled him to the ground. This act of chivalry was much more to the point than a duel could possibly be. In a Tube lift in London, where people were standing closely packed together, a man whose toes had been trodden on struck his neighbour with his fist on the chin. The gentleman who received the blow remained unperturbed, and said in a quiet but determined tone, "I shall give you in charge of the police." He did so, and his aggressor was brought to justice and received a well-deserved punishment. This manner of dealing with petty instances of bad behaviour is palpably preferable to duelling. It requires that self-control which Englishmen justly consider one of the primary aims of the education of a gentleman.

Englishmen do not acknowledge the mediæval, selfish, and overdrawn sensibility called the *point d'honneur*, which produces a kind of hot-house atmosphere in which the pernicious fungus of the duel thrives and prospers.

But even admitting the claims of the *point d'honneur*, it remains a fact that an infinitely small number of offences and quarrels touching honour lead to duels. Social relations have become more and more complicated and varied, and are not of a nature to admit of settling them by the rudimentary practice of duelling. Many men have somehow trod on each other's toes without bringing their grievance to a head. Many avoid each other's company, or are simply not on speaking terms, without, however, feeling the necessity of resorting to a duel. The consciousness that in the great majority of cases duelling offers no possibility of a practical issue diminishes more and more the number of duels.

It is a rather strange fact that duellists trying to vindicate their honour leave out of account the fact that the offence committed may be in itself dishonourable, as, for instance, in the cases of impropriety with women, false accusations, slander, and so forth. The combatants in a duel are considered to be both men of honour, as according to the code of honour no duel can be fought with a man who has lost his honour. Now, if a man has offended another by a dishonourable action, he has lost his honour, and, strictly speaking, such a man should not be called out to a duel. If none the less a duel takes place, it implies the unwarranted and nonsensical rehabilitation of a man who has lost his honour. A typical example may serve as an illustration. Duellists are especially uncompromising about the obligation of fighting a duel in cases of seduction of a near female relative and a refusal on the part of the seducer to marry her. There can be no doubt that such an action is dishonourable. And yet a duellist finds himself bound to call such a despicable man out to a duel, and in doing so to give him the privilege of being considered a man of honour by the very fact that he is challenged to fight a duel. In countries where duelling is out of the question—for instance, in Norway and Sweden—no one would dream of doing a scoundrel the honour of fighting him in a duel; he may be horsewhipped or punished otherwise—that would certainly be more to the point. In England public opinion ostracises men of that sort; they become outlaws of Society.

According to a duellist's point of view, a man loses his honour if he does not take revenge by a duel for an offence committed against him or his women-folk. It needs no further explanation that the wrong committed must be redressed by all possible lawful means. Revindication of honour is indispensable. But the question is whether the duel can be considered as a proper method of redress, and whether in case of an offence committed against a woman a man is under the obligation to fight a duel for her sake. In our present state of civilisation a woman has the possibility of vindicating her honour herself, and only so far as she

expressly wishes in doing so to be assisted by a man has the latter the right to take the matter up in her place. This way of dealing with the matter recognises the principle of equality of personal rights of women and men, and gives at the same time a chance to women to develop their sense of moral responsibility. Owing to the tutelage exercised over them by men throughout the past centuries, they are sometimes deficient in that respect.

Up to the present time a difference was made in principle between the honour of a man and that of a woman. This was due to the different positions occupied by men and women in society. It was argued that it was the man's duty to uphold social order in the State, local community, family, and so forth, and to that end he must guard his person against any attempts to deprive him of the character of an esteemed and recognised member of society. On the other hand, the woman's duty was limited to her position as a wife and mother, and anything which endangered that position would minimise her personal value in the eyes of human society, which is built up on the institution of marriage. The man loses his honour when he ceases to uphold the laws of that society, the woman when she endangers the proper observance of her present or future duties as a wife and mother. But this difference in man's and woman's honour has now been effaced to a great extent by the changes which have taken place in the position of women. In the modern State women have become factors in public life, and claim equality of rights with men. Accordingly, the honour of a woman can no longer be limited to sex honour, but must be in its essence identical with the man's honour.

Up to quite recently men considered it their duty, from motives of chivalry, to defend the honour of women, and this proved to be the most prolific source of duelling. But things are changing. There are nowadays many women who consider that this sort of chivalry is very far from complimentary to them, and places them in an inferior position, by reason of their supposed inability to defend themselves.

As long as physical force played the chief part in regulating the affairs of Society, this was necessarily so, but since the arm of the law and the police take the place of physical force, and women derive the same benefits from these safeguards as men, this sort of chivalry has become out of date and unnecessary. The duel is supposed to be a prerogative of man, but all that has been said about its uselessness as a true weapon of justice in settling the quarrels and affairs of men applies in the same way to those of women. If a woman's reputation has been damaged, from a dramatic and theatrical point of view perhaps it may be desirable to fight a duel, but a real reparation can only be secured by the law, when the offence committed can be publicly redressed by evidence to the contrary. If an offence committed is in itself irreparable, it is obvious that a duel cannot be an adequate remedy, as a duel is in itself a cataclysm, and though it may satisfy vengeance, it cannot redress. The fact that an offender is ready to place himself at the disposal of a man who will shoot at him, or thrust him through with a sword, is considered by duellists as a circumstance which must give satisfaction to the person offended. But, after all, it is a poor thing for some one who has suffered an irreparable wrong to be allowed to wreak his vengeance on the wrongdoer. There is no moral sense in it.

Of all the writers and philosophers who have expressed themselves against duelling, Montesquieu in his "Lettres Persanes," La Bruyère, Greville de Girardin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Eduard von Hartmann, and Schopenhauer, the latter is perhaps the most convincing. He explains that according to the tenets of the *point d'honneur*, honour does not consist in the opinion of others about our moral value, but simply in the outward acts which would imply such an opinion, irrespective of whether such an opinion existed or not. Others, therefore, may have a very bad opinion about our conduct and despise us. Our honour remains untouched so long as no one dares to express that opinion. On the contrary, even if we by our actions and qualities win the high esteem of our fellow-men, it is only necessary for some

person, even the most ignorant and foolish, to express his lack of esteem for us, and lo, our reputation for honour is gone if we do not repair it by a duel. The conduct of a man may be good and honourable, his conscience may be clean and his intelligence great, but all that cannot save him from losing his "honour" if another man, who perhaps has not infringed the *point d'honneur*, but is in other respects a scamp, a gambler, and altogether good for nothing, chooses to belittle him in the eyes of his fellow-men. If such a man insults him, the insult is taken as true and well founded until it is washed out in blood. In short, the offended is supposed to be what he was called by the offender if he has not challenged him to a combat by duel. The men of "honour" will despise him, ostentatiously avoid his society, and so forth. "Duelling," says Schopenhauer, "tends to place might for right. It is an easy matter for people with limited intelligences to appeal to a decision by arms each time they find themselves losers in arguments. If, for instance, clever Cajus debates with stupid Sempronius on a scientific question, and Cajus by better judgment and sounder logic proves to be the superior debater, causing Sempronius to appear in the public eye as the losing party, the latter needs only to become rude and offensive, and the legitimate and indubitable triumph of Cajus is annihilated if he does not answer the rudeness of Sempronius by greater rudeness. Sempronius, by these means, is in the eyes of the men of 'honour' the victor. Truth, knowledge, intelligence, wit, are of no avail. Rudeness beats them all. But if Cajus answers with greater rudeness, a duel becomes inevitable, and should Sempronius happen to be the better shot, he will have it all his own way, and will be admired for his 'victory' by the men of 'honour.'"

The best way of dealing with the duel is to recognise the necessity for resorting to arbitration in affairs touching honour if the parties do not like to appeal to the law. This principle has already been introduced in Russia and other countries by special regulations, and there is every reason to believe that it will be further developed, especially if

British influence is allowed to have a voice in the matter. The principle of arbitration could be introduced by law, and also by public opinion. It would have to be established as right and proper that arbitration should take the place of the duel. There is no necessity for a permanent court of arbitration, but in each single case the parties would have to elect arbitrators, one or an equal number of arbitrators for each party, and the latter would have to elect a super-arbitrator as their president. It would be the duty of the court to investigate the case, and to fix the blame on the party at fault; that party would have to withdraw the offence, express his regret, recognise his guilt, and offer formal apologies. This would be the best possible reparation for any wrong committed against honour.

Such Courts of Honour have been very rarely resorted to in England, because Englishmen, as already mentioned, find it more expedient to apply to the ordinary law courts. At the same time, it is very characteristic of Englishmen that the question of honour, from a Continental point of view, does not play a great part in English social life. Englishmen believe much more in duty than in honour, and duty certainly stands on a higher plane from a moral point of view.

In ancient Rome civic honour was an attribute of the citizen, guaranteed by the State. Every Roman citizen, every *vir bonus et honestus*, who led an upright and moral life had a right to the esteem of his compatriots. The civic honour *existimatio* was the recognition by society of the ethical value of an individual. This also in our own time forms the idea of honour, only it has ceased to be a juridical conception, and has become of a purely social value. Every one receives recognition of his own personal value in the esteem which he enjoys in his particular sphere of life, approximately in the same way as the value of a writer is deduced from the criticisms of his works. Thus, in the case of honour, it is not sufficient that a person is conscious of his own value, but in order to maintain his social position it is necessary that this self-consciousness of honour is shared by his fellow-men.

Not so with duty. Here the opinion of others does not matter. If a man acts from motives of duty, every consideration of the opinion of others must be lost sight of, in order that the idea of working for moral good, which he conceives to be his duty, can be accomplished. Moral duty is superior to the judgment of the multitude. Morality is derived from the yearning of the soul towards the good, and the obligation which is felt towards that which is recognised as good. The man who is conscious of his duty has the one aim in view that his action shall correspond with the moral principles which he recognises as obligatory. The result of doing one's duty is self-respect, while the enjoyment of "honour" assures respect on the part of others. Thus duty and honour complement one another, being different in their essence. The difference between them is not apparent so long as the carrying out of duty assures at the same time the esteem of others. But as soon as duty and honour come into collision, it becomes apparent which of them stands higher from an ethical point of view. The confession of the Italian priest-astronomer, *E pur si muove* ("And still she moves"), was heroic, inspired as he was by the holy duty of faithfulness to personal convictions, but none the less only brought to him dishonour, hatred, and excommunication. On the other hand, lack of duty often does not interfere with a man's honour or the place which he occupies in society. Honour, on the whole, is far more easily satisfied than duty, which has for its judge the inexorable tribunal of the conscience. In the light of duty, duelling appears particularly petty and insignificant.

It is good to defend one's honour (not by fighting duels, but by legal and social means), but it is even better to realise that duty stands higher than honour.

The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that duelling is, like a dangerous rudimentary organ in the human body, a pernicious anachronism in the body politic and social of modern life. It is objectionable from the point of view of the law; it is contrary to reason and common sense: it is a cataclysm which, far from repairing any injury, adds another

wrong to the wrong committed ; it stands in flagrant opposition to the Christian religion ; it is not only altogether unnecessary, but has proved itself to be an unmitigated evil, which should and could be suppressed by the rigour of the law, by stringent adverse public opinion, and by appreciation of the duties of democratic citizenship. Duelling in England has been abolished by an adequate improvement in legal remedies, and by a change in social opinion with regard to it. Both these factors would also be necessary in Russia in order to obtain the same result.

If one realises that the great majority of the population of Russia—namely, 80 per cent.—who belong to the peasant class, have never had the slightest inclination to fight duels, and that the peasant class all over the world does not fight duels : that the entire population of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the British Empire, the United States of America, and China have never indulged in this practice, it appears that those believing in duelling form a very small minority. In the twentieth century amongst the classes who hitherto believed in duelling a propaganda has been initiated in favour of abolishing this custom. In the August number of 1908 of the *Fortnightly Review* there appeared an interesting survey of the fight against duelling in Europe, by Alfonso de Bourbon et d'Autriche-Este. According to this article an Anti-Duelling League was formed in 1902 in Germany under the presidency of Prince Charles of Lowenstein, which in 1907 comprised 3000 members. At a general meeting of that League at Munich on October 13, 1907, it was moved that whoever commits adultery dishonours himself, and by this act becomes incapable of giving satisfaction by arms.

In France a committee was formed in Paris for the same purpose in 1909, under the presidency of General Baron de la Rocque and Admiral Kuverville. In 1903 the first Court of Honour was created in Paris, composed of distinguished military people, amongst whom there was also M. Paul de Cassagnac—since dead—who was previously a noted duellist.

In Austria a national Anti-Duelling League was formed, and in 1902 a general meeting was held at Vienna. An Anti-

Duelling Association for students at the University was organised at Vienna in 1905. In 1907 the Ladies' Austrian Anti-Duelling Association was formed.

In Italy an Anti-Duelling League was formed at Rome in 1902, and a Ladies' Committee was formed in 1906.

In Hungary an Anti-Duelling Movement was founded in 1902, and at the University at Budapest Courts of Honour for students were created. In 1906 a Ladies' Anti-Duelling Association was constituted at Budapest.

In Galicia, Prince George Tzartoryski in 1903 formed a League for the Protection of Honour, and a Ladies' Association was also founded. Nearly the whole of social Galicia has joined the League, and questions of honour are arranged by juries.

In Belgium an Anti-Duelling League was formed in 1903, and in 1905 rules were drawn up for Courts of Honour.

In Belgium the duel was almost unknown, but none the less an Anti-Duelling League was formed.

In Spain, in 1904, an Anti-Duelling League was started. In 1906 King Alfonso accepted the honorary presidency of that League.

The above-mentioned particulars about the anti-duelling campaign in Europe show that the movement is universal, and that public opinion in Europe is about to be strongly influenced against duelling. The war has brought the movement to a standstill, but as soon as it is over the anti-duelling campaign will continue, and probably be taken up also by Russia.

CHAPTER XV

PRO PATRIA

(A Defence against Hypercriticism)

A GREAT national cataclysm invariably provokes a tendency to blame those who are believed to be responsible for the calamity. If such criticism is exaggerated, unjust, and biased, it is right and proper to try to redress the wrong without, however, indulging in an attack or a panegyric. It is in this spirit I propose to submit some facts which may substantiate the defence against an excess of criticism concerning Russia.

If it be true that nothing succeeds like success, so is the antithesis, that nothing fails like failure—"Sorrow comes in battalions"! Now that the Colossus of the North, an idol of military and political power, once feared and courted, lies broken and desolate, the floodgates of criticism surge over the wreck! No wonder that Russia's enemies seize the opportunity to heap abuse upon the country and her people, but the "unkindest cut of all" comes from would-be friends.

At a time when the Government and people of Great Britain are trying to grapple with the intricate political and economic problem of aiding the restoration of Russia, and are endeavouring to promote friendliness and good feeling between the two nations, some books and periodicals—*nomina sunt odiosa*—have indulged in supercriticism regarding Russia which cannot possibly do good to the interests of both countries. It is even difficult to trace the practical aims which are pursued by such excesses of criticism, inasmuch as the publication of books detrimental to Russia must scandalise the Russian nation, and to a certain extent

compromise the British in the eyes of Russians, and altogether obstruct friendly intercourse between them, which, at the present juncture, is sadly in need of encouragement, and should not by any means be subjected to such misconceptions. The uncomplimentary nature of such hypercriticism may have arisen from the disillusion of those who trusted the word of Russia and relied upon her help. But Russia—the Russia of an established government—was a *bona fide* ally, and did not shirk any of her obligations. Her present dismal condition is that of a madman who cannot be made responsible for his acts. A revolution, like a great and unforeseen calamity in nature, bears the character of a *vis major*, which not only puts the very life of a nation out of gear, but also atrophies the working of the whole responsibility of State and Society. It involves the most serious set-backs, the greatest losses to the nation, as well as to foreigners whose interests are involved, but is of a purely temporary nature and does not imperil the future when public order and the working of the State administration are once more re-established.

The Revolution bursting at a time when Russia required all her strength for the conduct of the war, compromised her fighting power and injured the cause of her Allies. But why did the explosion occur just then? At the outbreak of the Revolution there was universal jubilation in Great Britain as the danger of a separate peace seemed thereby averted. It has already been mentioned * that the danger of concluding a separate peace did not exist at all, and that the false alarm had been invented and spread to incense the masses against the Government, that Nicholas II had up to the last been faithful to the Allies, and that certain ignoble charges launched against the Tsaritsa Alexandra Feodorovna were groundless. The Tsar had to wage war on two fronts—one against the enemy without; the other against the extreme Socialist offensive within. It is, therefore, clear that the untimely outbreak of the Revolution, which in its course broke the back of the Anglo-Russian alliance,

* See page 52.

can in nowise be considered as the work of the honest and loyal elements of Russia who concluded the agreement, but lies at the door of casual elements seeking destruction and negation.

Nothing can be said against a wholesome criticism which elucidates the nexus existing between cause and effect, and bears with clear insight and proper appreciation upon historic events and national psychology. In this respect the great tragedy enacted in Russia by the war and the Revolution merits a proper and logical explanation. But scientific analysis should be inspired and guided by a true sense of fairness and justice. Nobody expects nowadays to read flattering remarks about autocracy and the bureaucratic regime, but it seems unnecessary to deprecate the nature of the Russian people and the orthodox religion, and to heap abuse upon the head of the last of the Romanoffs, who, after all, was like Louis XVI, only one of the many factors which led up to the Revolution.

Is it not an exaggeration to characterise Russia as the "boneless man of Europe"? To speak of her "predatory nature assimilated by the people," of her "parasitism," which is alleged to have spread from the administration to the masses of the population? Is it true that the "bulk of the Russian population is intellectually benighted, morally obtuse, politically indifferent, and socially incohesive"? Can really "no hope be expected from the Russian Church" on account of its "having no international centre"? Is it "improbable that the various parts of the late Tsardom will be put together again"? Yet these are some of the venomous shafts levelled at Russia. It would be sad indeed if such a dark forecast and uncompromising verdict of the Russian people were well founded. As it is, such pessimism reflects only an ignorance of the Russian psychology, which, with all its incongruities, flaws, and intrinsic contradictions, is the true outcome of the conditions of Russian life during past centuries. Owing to a Government which refused to the bulk of the population any participation in practical statesmanship, and influenced by a form of religion which

not
pro. Rm

E. 077
against
R

retarded ethical progress by accentuating too much the meritorious nature of church ceremonies, the Russian has up to the present remained the well-intentioned but inexperienced child of nature. That state of immaturity explains his inconsistency, vagaries, and aberrations. He has simply not had the possibility of forming a well-defined, self-conscious, and determined character.

But he is endowed with idealism carried to the height of mysticism, and reaching out to the infinite, a generosity inclined to go to extremes, and an Oriental fatalism prone to laziness, and ignoring the complexity of gradual growth and development in human affairs. When considering the shortcomings of the Russian character from an historical point of view, one realises that it is unjust to cast upon it the slur of hopeless moral turpitude. Particularly so at a moment when the fetters which have been paralysing the Russian mind, marring it with deep and disfiguring traces, have been broken and cast off never to be worn again, thereby amply justifying a hopeful prospect for the future. There is every reason to believe that the Revolution will be the *point de départ* for the seasoning of the Russian character, and maturing its good-nature, sympathy, and charity.

Why revert to a pessimistic, unsympathetic, and altogether uncompromising interpretation of the Russian character when its defects and shortcomings are manifestly of a much simpler and rudimentary nature. The lack of constructive capacity and of tenacity of purpose is chiefly and mainly the result of the Oriental passivity which hitherto has hampered not only political progress, but also rational economic exploitation of the riches of the soil and of the mineral wealth in Russia. The all-Russian indolence, a product of lack of education, is likewise a key to the exploitation of the Russians by foreigners, be they Germans, English, Armenians, Hebrews, Belgians, etc. It is therefore of primary importance for the Russian people to be conscious of the social and ethical value of physical and intellectual exertions. As soon as education

helps them to realise that nature's destiny for man is work, that they improve by work and deteriorate if they do not apply their energies, they will correct and eliminate the defects of their nature which in the eyes of prejudiced critics seem irreparable and final.

Again, corruption is thought to appertain to an indelible depravation of the Russian character. However, the corrupt practices, which during the Revolution spread to much greater proportions than ever under the Tsarish rule, are nothing but the unavoidable concomitant of non-existent, or deficient, organisation. If Russia were organised to the same extent as England and if money matters were as satisfactorily regulated as in this country, there would be probably no room for corruption. Therefore the causal nexus does not lie in a special congenital defect of character, but is traceable to the sad and unsatisfactory conditions of life existing in Russia. If these conditions are improved by education, respect for the law, efficient public organisation, and a steady and enlightened form of Government, corruption will disappear automatically, and ill-informed critics vociferating about incorrigible defects in the Russian character will be put to shame. To use a physician's language, the body politic, social, moral, and economic of Russia is not suffering from chronic organic disease, but is afflicted with an acute malady brought about by adverse circumstances—a condition which demands energetic counter-measures and wise treatment, but does give no reason for despair although the patient may be at present as bad as he can possibly be.

Again, the Russian people have been accused of "fitful ferocity." Of course the acts of fiendish cruelty and ghastly murder committed during the Revolution are perfectly appalling, but if one realises, as one should, that prison doors were opened by the revolutionists, setting at liberty tens of thousands of criminals, that the inarticulate masses were systematically perverted and incited to deeds of atrocity, it appears that it was the Revolution which was solely responsible for the crimes which were perpetrated. Such deprava-

tion cannot be judged as typically expressive of the Russian character in its normal frame, and in times of peace and order. As a rule Russians are rather prone to fatalism and ready to bear iniquity. It was Leo Tolstoy, a Russian of the Russians, who proclaimed the principle of the non-resistance and forbearance, and opposed any action conducive to ferocity. But at present Russia is in the grip of Bolshevik terrorism, converting Russia into a slaughter-house for those whose only fault is that they belong to the educated classes. Was not the *règne de la Terreur* of the French Revolution a phenomenon analogous in its psychological significance. The French did not incur the reputation of ferocity from this terrorism because it was not peculiar to the French but merely arose in consequence of the degeneracy of the French Revolution, just as the Bolshevik terror is the direct result of the degeneracy of the Russian Revolution, which no longer recognises the law of God or man, pandering only to the bestial instincts of a bloodthirsty mob.

It is not the case that Russians are "intellectually benighted." They are quick to see their material advantage and to use their undoubted natural gifts. Otherwise they would not have been able to achieve the successes which built up their vast empire. To reproach them of social incoherence is even more unjust. The time-honoured *Artel* (Association of Working Men), the *Krugovaia Poruka* (Mutual Guarantee), and so many other collectivist organisations, tell a very different tale. Nowhere has co-operation taken to so phenomenal proportions as in Russia. Finally, the great work of the *Zemstvos* (County Councils) is a brilliant testimony to social coherence. All this proves that the Russian nation is distinctly endowed with the capacity and the inclination for social work, and it is this feature in the Russian character which permits the hope that a broad application of the principle of self-government will bring prosperity and welfare to the country.

But what about the alleged "predatory" character of Russia. Those living in glass-houses should never throw

stones. It is true that Russia has enlarged her territory by conquest, and it is equally true that all other States have done likewise provided there was any possibility to do so. The political configuration of the territory of a State has always and everywhere shaped itself in accordance with the free play of conflicting forces. Where the force of resistance was equal to the force of attack the State frontiers remained stationary, but they were extended when the force on the other side of the frontier was not strong enough to oppose the invasion. The British Empire is no exception to this. Or are we to believe that the different parts of the greatest Empire that ever existed chose to combine together by self-determination? No, the British Empire grew even as Russia did by the same principle of subduing weaker nations. If other countries did not succeed in attaining the proportions of Russia or the British Empire, it was simply because they had no possibility of doing so. Russia cannot be blamed for a mode of procedure common to all States.

global

The prophecy that "it is improbable that the various parts of the late Tsardom will be put together again" is unlikely of fulfilment, since it is to their advantage to bind together as a powerful political unit, and to assist each other economically. Western Siberia needs the ports of Southern Russia as an outlet for its industry and commerce, and the same may be said of Central European Russia in regard to Northern and North-Western Russia. The Caucasus and Central Asia without the support of Russia are open to Turkish aggression, and must, therefore, safeguard themselves against such an eventuality. Little Russia will have to rejoin Great Russia as a matter of course, belonging as they do to the same racial stock. Such centripetal movement will be the more assured as the different parts of the previous empire enjoy Home Rule and autonomy.

Is not the history of Russia in itself a guarantee against the splitting up of her territory? Has not Russia had a long and victorious past, thereby abundantly proving her vital energy? Did she not succeed in becoming one of

the most powerful States of the world? Is it not improbable that such a gigantic entity, representing an economic world-factor of primary magnitude, should be wrecked by an upheaval mainly brought about by those hailing from the cosmopolitan slums of New York and the East End of London? Russia's intrinsic worth cannot thus be whittled away by destructive criticism. The temporary overthrow created by the Revolution, which spells *finis Russiæ* to those suffering from bias, is primarily due to the overwhelming complexity of the nature of the Revolution. Simultaneously it sought to demolish autocracy, monarchy, bureaucracy, centralisation, religious and racial intolerance, bourgeoisie, and economic inequality. No nation could bear the shock of such an onslaught; it is, therefore, easy to understand that the Russian Revolution could only lead to chaos and destruction, and there is no necessity whatever to assume that a "gangrenous decomposition" has set in. The tragic outcome of the Revolution cannot, therefore, by any means serve as an example of the unsoundness and incapacity of the Russian nation.

That Russian orthodoxy has "no international centre" like the Roman Catholic Church is not a drawback, but, on the contrary, a guarantee of its value. The Christian Oriental Church avoided the pretensions of Roman Papacy which aimed at world-power. The claim of the Roman pontiff is derived from the story of the martyrdom of St. Peter at Rome, a legend which is not supported by historic research, and according to all probability has its root in pure fiction. The œcumenic Patriarch did not follow the example of the Pope, and allowed the churches in the different States of Eastern Europe to become autocephalous, viz. independent and national. This was an improvement on the idea of Roman centralisation, and embodied the enlightened idea that the worship of God—as one of the essential functions of the national soul—should be regulated by the nation itself and not by an international spiritual autocrat with power to pull the strings contrary to the actual interests of that nation. The national character of the Russian

Church will enable her to be the bedrock *ære perennius* on which the Russian State edifice of the "New Age" will be erected. A thousand times over the Russian people may be called anarchic, nihilistic, and destructive, but there still remains the one unassailable ground of their religious fervour which is a positive asset and a uniting element of constructive power.

A brilliant Russian writer, Alexander Nicolaevitch Brianchaninoff, holds the same view. He exclaims: "Can it be that not so long ago our Allies admired the dash of our officers and soldiers, that they recognised the universality of our mystic idealism, that they believed in our inexhaustible resources of power, in the future of our culture, and in our economic strength? Can all this be an illusion, a deception, a dream? Or is Russia now passing through a nightmare? For the mystic the world is facing the problem of social reconstruction, and the war has fallen upon Europe to liberate her from ancient fetters. Even before other nations, the Russian nation, the least stable and the most sensitive, singed herself in the flame of attempts at social reform, and suicidally burnt herself out in the flare of impossible reforms, because she did not follow the lead of integral men of peaceful progress, but was carried away by fraudulent instigators of internal conflagration. By the example of Russia's crucifixion the world will see how not to conduct a social revolution, striving to adapt Utopian ideas to practical social organisation. But at the same time the fate of Russia will teach the world to realise the truth of social reform which has become necessary, and must come about at the end of the war. Russia will resuscitate or perish according to whether she returns to the fiery confession of the Christian faith, the only guiding star of her people, or follows political parties who have lost the faith and are, therefore, barren of creative power, leaving the path of Christ to tread the road of proud self-conceit, led by earthly and not heavenly reason. The *Sobor* (Church Congress) concluded its message to the churches with the words: 'May the new Powers preserve their fidelity to

Holy Russia in which we believe. Verily, we cannot cherish our homeland without our holy faith.' Outside the Christian faith there is no salvation for the Russian people. As of old, Russia will be saved and restored by men of this belief."

The future of Russia is not uncertain. The revolutionary gang, who are at present playing at ruling the State, have a fair opportunity of putting their political and socialistic creed to a practical test. If they prove successful, Russia is bound to resuscitate; if not, and sufficient rope be given, the end will be the complete ruin of the country; then the necessity for authority will arise stronger than ever, and, under the guidance of the Church as the only remaining power, a new and permanent order of things will be created. Whenever a national centre, with a stable government worthy of the name, is established, be it at Petrograd, Moscow, Kieff, or in Siberia, the other parts of the former empire will crystallise around it, as, sooner or later, weaker units are bound to sink all antagonism and co-operate with the stronger Power, and for the special reasons enumerated above. The right of self-determination will soon prove to be a *nudum jus* in all cases where nations unable to maintain themselves against foreign aggression have to join a State capable of defending them. It is only a matter of time when Russia again comes into her own, not only as "a united race," but also as a powerful State organism.

The hypercriticism which has been meted out to unhappy Russia has not spared the fallen and murdered monarch. The mismanagement at the festivities on the Khodinka Pole in Moscow, which occasioned the death of over 3000 people at his coronation on May 18, 1896, has inspired a critic to the statement: "Nero fiddled while Rome burnt, and Nicholas danced while the Khodinka victims were dying." Now, what are the facts of the case. It can hardly be doubted that the terrible accident at the coronation festivities greatly impressed the mind of the sensitive and impressionable Tsar, but the joyful solemnity of the coronation arrangements, attended by millions, and watched in its progress from near and far by the whole nation, could not be clouded

over. Moreover, superstition saw in the tragic occurrence an omen foreboding evil. The Tsar was, therefore, strongly advised to attend the Court ball and not to break off the festivities planned for the hundred thousands who had flocked together from all ends of the Empire. Under these circumstances the monarch was not free to act as he would have liked to act if reasons of State had not compelled him to hide his grief at the disaster. His first duty was to hide an aching heart and not to cast a gloom over the coronation. It must be left to the judgment of all fair-minded people to decide whether a pure accident of crushing people to death, such as may happen in the overcrowding of any circumscribed area, could lend colour to a comparison of Nicholas II with a monster of cruelty like Nero.

But the adverse judgment on the late ex-Tsar is chiefly based on his autocratic tendencies. People are wont to forget that berries of more than one kind cannot be gathered from one and the same bush. Nicholas II had before him the example of his enlightened grandfather, Alexander II, murdered after having introduced great liberal reforms, and that of his frankly reactionary father, Alexander III, who died a natural death after a reign of stagnation and repression. The natural tendency which Nicholas II derived from these lessons of history was a leaning towards his father's methods of rule, and he left no doubt about it that he was resolved to follow in the latter's footsteps. The answer he gave on January 30, 1895, to the representatives of the Zemstvo of Tver, who ventured to hope that representatives of the people would be allowed to participate in public affairs, was merely a reiterating of his intention of "maintaining the principle of autocracy as firmly as his never-to-be-forgotten parent had done." He cannot be blamed for holding views which he inherited from his father as autocrat. He was crowned and anointed, and his life was declared "sacrosanct," according to the teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church. This must have further confirmed him in the belief that his actions were guided by divine inspiration.

However, in the course of his reign he decided for most generous and broad-minded reforms, such as the granting of a constitution, the convocation of a conference at The Hague in 1905, for the establishment of permanent peace, and the total abolition of drink in 1915. In each case his Russian lack of the sense of proportion, and his generosity, carried him away too far. *Il avait les défauts de ses qualités.* The suffrage law proved to be too advanced and generated Dumas, which were openly revolutionary and could not do useful work. Here the evil genius of Witte had a part in giving the country a kind of constitution unsuited to her practical needs of the moment. The suppression of vodka was carried out before there was time to teach the inarticulate masses how to use their leisure freed from the spell of drink. Finally the idea of establishing a permanent arbitration court was premature, as international political problems were involved which could only be solved by war. The good intention was there, but the power to carry it out was lacking. A Hamlet on the Russian throne—Nicolas II was constantly wavering in the execution of his aims and thereby accelerating his own downfall.

Deeply religious and superstitious by nature as many Russians are, he came across an evil-minded man endowed with personal magnetism and the psychic power of telepathy. To be influenced by that man was fatal for a ruler, but it was weakness more than wickedness that brought the Tsar under the spell of that dark power. Nicholas II was a tragic figure ; he was a martyr to his own good intentions.

An excellent husband and father, his patriotism, chivalry, and noble-mindedness shone out in many of his actions. He came to the rescue of poor bullied and threatened little Serbia ; he sacrificed his personal interests to the benefit of Russia when revolution overcame him, and he died a noble death, his last thoughts were all for his country. Had Nicholas wanted to save his throne he could at the outbreak of the Revolution have marched on Petrograd at the head of his army. He could have concluded peace with Germany in order to be able to use all his powers to fight the enemy

within. But his country stood higher for him than his own safety and advantages of a personal nature. He chose, therefore, rather to abdicate, surrendering himself into the hands of his enemies. All loyal Russians will hold his memory sacred—aye, the time will come when pilgrimages will be made to the spot where his blood was shed.

“Не тронъ помазаннаго Моего!”

(“TOUCH NOT MY ANOINTED!”)

The defence against hypercriticism might be carried to far greater lengths and strengthened by many more exemplifications. But the intention was not to exhaust the subject, the aim being merely to pierce the gloom of hopeless criticism for arriving at a saner and more faithful appreciation of Russia and her future.

to
highlight
issues, not
solve

INDEX

- ABOLITION of sale of vodka, 27
 Act of June 16, 1907, 19
 Ἀδιαφορά, 162
 Agrarian reform, 29
 Agriculture in Russia, 107
 Aksakoff, 31
 Alexander I., 58
 Alexander II., 14, 58
 Alexander III., 23
 Alexandra Feodorovna, Tsaritsa,
 202
 Alfonso, King, 200
 Alsatians, 98
 Amateurish business men, 155
 Amour-propre, 187
 Anarchy, xv
 Anglo-Russian Agreement, 1907, xi
Animus delinquendi, 191
 Anointed, 213
 Archangel, xi
 Assembly of the representatives of
 the nobility, 24
 Assistance from abroad, 81
 Augustine, 46
 Austria-Hungary, 33
Avos, 152

 BACON in Russia, 107
 Baltic particularism, 91
 Baltic problem, 84
 Baltic Provinces, 31
 Baluchistan, 141
 Barbarism, 3
 Barons, 12
Baskak, 2
 Beaconsfield, xiii
 Biron, 89

 Birth-rate, 170
 Bishop Albrecht, 88
 Black Hand, 187
 Blundell, Captain, 189
 Boers, 39
 Bolshevik Government, xii
 Bolshevik peace treaty with Ger-
 many, xiv
 Bombay, 136
Bona fide ally, 202
 "Bon duelliste, mauvais soldat,"
 185
 Bourbon et d'Autriche-Este, Alton-
 so de, 199
 Boyars, 6
 Brest-Litovsk, 85
 Briantchaninoff, 209
 British Empire, 39
 British Empire as example for
 Russia, 76
 Broad nature of the Russians, 151
 Bukara, 36
Bundesstaat, 87
 Bunge, 92
 Burghers, 8, 13
 Bureaucracy, 20, xiii
Burgui, 53
 Burke, 156
 Byzantine principles, 1

 CADET party, 50
 Cæsarø Papacy, 9
 Campbell, Major, 189
 Capitalism, 68
 Cassagnac, 199
 Caucasians, 8, 31, 73
 Centralisation, 37

- Chancellor, Richard, xi
 Charles XII of Sweden, 5, 89
 Charlemagne, 56, 88
 Chinese Boxer Rebellion, 81
Chinovnik, 2
 Christian ideals, 3
 Christian love, 3
Civis Romanus, 42
 Clergy, 8
 Climate of Russia, 102
 Coal in Russia, 115
 Collectivism, 65
 Commercial expansion in Russia,
 134
 Committees, 50
 Conscientious objector, 151
Conquistadores, 88
 Constitution, 18
 Constantinople, xiii, 9
 Consular Service, 133
 Cook, 8
 Co-operation with Russia, xvi
 Co-operative Societies, 26
 Copper, 119
 Corruption, 204
 Cosmopolitanism, 35
 Counts, 12
 Council of Empire, 24
 Courage, 185
 Courts of Honour, 197
 Credit, 131
 Crimea, 74
 Cures, 88
 Cyril, 9

 DAGO, 84
 Dahl, 7
 Decentralisation, 41, 72
 Declaration of Rights, 17
Défauts de ses qualités, 212
 Degeneracy of Revolution, 49
 Delirium tremens, 159
 Divorce, 179
 Doctrinarianism, 58
 Dorpat, 91
 Dostoevsky, 5, 7, 12
 Drake, 8
 Duelling, 181
 Duma, 2

 EASTERN Prussia, xiv
 Economic *reductio ad absurdum*,
 62
 Educated classes, 51
 English Revolution, 17
E pur si muove, 198
 Errors of the past, xv
 Esthonians, 8, 73
 Esths, 94
 Eugenic marriages, 175
 Europeanisation, 2
 Exports from Russia, 123
 Expropriation, 61

 FEAR of Russia, xii
 Federative Republic, 74
 Ferocity, 205
 Feudal relics, 2
 Finlanders, 31, 73
 Finnish-Mongolian tribes, 7, 88
 Finno-Mongolic races, 57
 Fisheries in Russia, 111
 Foreigner, difference between friend
 and foe, xii
 Four categories of Russian citizens,
 39
 France, 83
 Frederick the Great, 43
 Freygang, 7
 Fur in Russia, 103

 GENTLEMAN, conception of a, 155
 Gentleman, meaning of, 186
 German measles, xv
 German tutelage, 1
 Germany's influence, 81
 Germanophil tendencies, 23
 Gogol, 7, 12
 Gogol's *Revisor*, 2
 Gold in Russia, 117
 Good manners, 185
 Gorky, 2
 Gortchakoff, 22
 Great Russians, 6
 Great Russians 43.5 per cent. of
 Russian population, 40
 Greek Orthodox faith, 6
 Grevile de Girardin, 195

- Grot, 7
 Grusia, 36
- HARTMANN, 195
 Hellas, 55
 Herzen, 17
 Higher education of women, 170
 Hilferding, 7
 Holy Synod, 9
 Home Rule granted by Peace of Nystadt, 91
 Honour, 187
 Hypercriticism, 201
- IMPORTANCE of Anglo-Russian relations, xii
 Imports into Russia, 124
 Indian exports to Russia, 140
Indian Pioneer Mail, 138
 Information as to customers deserving credit, 132
 Intellectual coalescence, 145
 International objections, 53
 Iron and steel, 118
 Ivan the Terrible, xi
- JAMES I of England, 86
 Japanese nation, 5
 Japanese war, 18
 Jewish question, 24
 Jews, 26
 Judaism, 34
- Kahals*, 25
Kak nyeboudj, 152
 Kalmuks, 8, 56
 Kamtchadale, 8
 Kapustin, 41
 Kashmir, 141
 Katkoff, 31, 44
 Kerensky, 64
 Kettler, 89
 Khomjakoff, 31
 Kieff, 1, 74
 "Kingdom of God," 44
 Kirghiz, 8
 Korff, 92
Kormlenie, 21
 "Koulak" (money-lender), 162
Koye kak, 152
- Krugovaia porouka*, 14
 Kuverville, Admiral, 199
- LA BRUYÈRE, 195
 Ladak, 141
Laissez-faire, 153
 Lenin, 35
 Lermontoff, 7, 12
 "Lettres Persanes," 195
 Letts, 8, 73, 94
 Levelling of chances, 67
 Levelling of human society, 154
Lichoimstvo, 21
 Lithuanians, 73
 Little Russians, 6, 31
 Livonia, 88
 Livonian Order, 55, 89
 Lyall, Sir Alfred, 137
- MAFFIA, 187
 Makaroff, 12
 Mendeléeff, 42
 Menenius Agrippa, 69
Mésalliance, 11
 Mesopotamia, xiv
Messenger of Temperance, 158
 Methodius, 9
 Mineral oil in Russia, 116
 Minerals in Russia, 113
 Mingrelia, 36
 Mining products, 120
Mir, 13
Mittel-Europa, 129
 Moses, 163
 Most-favoured-nation clause, 127
 Moulin, 181
 Müller, 7
 Muscovian State, 36
 Muscovite Tsars, 8
 Muscovites, 55
- NARVA, Battle of, 6
 National Constituent Assembly, 51
 Nationalisation, 61
 Nature of Russians, 56
 Nero, 210
 Nesselrode, 92
 Nicholas I, 58
 Nicholas II, 23
 Nobility, 8

- Nobility of Russia, 10, 11, 12
 Novgorod, 1, 36, 55
 Nyebos, 152
 Nystadt, Peace of, 90

 OBI River, 103
 Odessa, 136
 Oesel, 84
 Old Believers, 10, 45
 Ostaken, 7
 Osterman, 92
 Ostrovski, 5
 Outlaws of society, 193

 PALE of settlement, 24
 Papal State, 44
 Paper in Russia, 112
Partie honteuse, 175
 Particularism, 91
 Patriarch Nikon, 10
 Patriarch of Moscow, 58
 Patriotism, xv
 Pax Romana, 55
 Peasants, 13, 26
 People decides henceforth, 49
 Peshawar, 141
 Pessimism of English public opinion, xiv
 Peter the Great, 2, 5, 30, 90
 Philaret, Patriarch of Moscow, 10
Point d'honneur, 192
Point de départ, 204
 Poles, 55
 Political pendulum, 58
 Political economy, 60
 Poltava, Battle of, 6
 Population of Russia, 101
 Posterity, 166
 Powers of Darkness, 24
 Predatory nature, 203
 Prjevalski, 150
 Productivity of the soil, 15
 Proletarians, 67, 173
 Proletarianism, 52
 Prostitution, 176
 Protestantism, 46
 Protopopoff, 20
 Pskoff, 1, 36, 55
 Pushkin, 5, 7, 12

 RACIAL freedom, 37
 Raleigh, 8
 Rasputin, 24
 "Real Russians," 40
Reductio ad absurdum, 182
 Regeneration, 73
Regierungsbeamte, 2
 Religion, 8
 Religion atrophied, xiii
 Religious tolerance, 43
 Repudiation of State debt, 79
 Repudiation of treaty and financial obligations, xii
 Reutern, 92
 Rocque, Baron de la, 199
 Romanoff, 73
 "Rouskaya baba Pobedeet," 171
 Rousseau, 195
 Rurik, 57, 73
 Russian Church, 203
 Russian intellectuality, 148
 Russian language, 6
 Russian literature, 145
 Russian market, 130
 Russian nation, 6
Russian Statistical Annual, 103
 Russification, 97
 Russo-Indian trade relations, 135
 Russo-Japanese War, xi
 Russian Provisional Government, 36

 SAMARCAND, 36
 Samoyeds, 8
Sans gêne, 153
 Schopenhauer, 196
 Self-determination, 54, 82
 Serfdom, 95
 Sievers, 92
Skhody, 4
 Slavophil traditions, 19
 Slavophilism, 7, 28
Smutnoye Vremya, 58
 Socialism, 34
 Splendid isolation, xii
 Sports, 147
 Steinberg, 85
 Stock Exchange, 70
 Stolypin, 15
Subsequens matrimonium, 174
 Suetonius, 173

- Sugar in Russia, 109
- Suppression of vodka, 158
- Switzerland, 39
- "TABLE of Rangach," 2
- Tartar yoke, 3
- Tartars, 31, 73
- Tchehoff, 5
- Tchinovnik*, 21
- Teutonic descent, 8
- Theocratic-monarchic idea of Tsar-
dom, xiii
- Timber in Russia, 103
- Times of India*, 138
- Titles, 11
- Tobacco in Russia, 108
- Tolstoy, 2, 5, 12, 164
- Tolstoy, Alexis and Leo, 7
- Tomsk, 4
- Triple Alliance, 34
- Trotsky, 35
- Tsar Alexis Michaelovitch, 10
- Turgenieff, 7, 12
- Turkey, 33
- "Twilight Sleep," 178
- UNITED States of North America, 56
- VERESTCHAGIN, 2
- Vetché*, 28, 57
- Vir bonus et honestus*, 197
- Volostnia Oupravlenia, 3
- Voltaire, 43
- Vsiatka*, 21
- WAR of 1917, xii
- Ways of communication in Russia,
100
- Wilful vengeance, 189
- Willoughby, xi
- Wines in Russia, 110
- Woman's part in creation, 166
- Women in Russia, 4
- Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants'
Delegates, 50
- YAKUTS, 8
- Yenisei, 103
- Yermak, 8, 150
- Yugo-Slavs, 33
- ZEMSTVO, 3
- Zemstvos, 20, 24
- Zhukovsky, 12

JUST PUBLISHED

Demy 8vo. Cloth. 12s. 6d. net. Inland postage, 6d.

RUSSIA: Its Trade and Commerce

Edited by ARTHUR RAFFALOVICH, President of the
Russian Chamber of Commerce in Paris.

CONTENTS.—Brief Geographical Sketch—National Education—Agriculture—Cotton and Cotton-growing—Factories and Workshops—Mining and Metallurgy—Machine Industry—Forestry—Fisheries—Internal Transport—Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones—Internal Trade of Russia—Foreign Trade in Russia—Public Finances—Money and Credit—The Drink Question in Russia—Formation of Joint Stock Companies—Appendices.

Demy 8vo 1s. 6d. net. Inland Postage, 2d.

Some Notes on the State Sale, Monopoly, and subsequent Prohibition of Vodka in Russia

By J. Y. SIMPSON, D.Sc., F.R.S.E., Professor of Natural
Science in New College, Edinburgh.

Second Edition. With 3 new chapters on **Bolshevism, Another Year of Inflation, and The Proposed Levy on Capital**

Demy 8vo. Cloth. 12s. 6d. net. Inland Postage, 6d.


WAR FINANCE

By J. SHIELD NICHOLSON, M.A., Sc.D.

Professor of Political Economy in the University of Edinburgh

Daily Telegraph.—"These essays are very well worth study, and the main contention that the root evil of our financial policy has been the extravagant payments made by the State for all the services required by the war cannot be gainsaid."

P. S. KING AND SON, LTD., WESTMINSTER



DK
266
H48

Heyking, Al'fons
Al'fonsoovich, baron
Problems confronting
Russia

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
